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Abstract 
A current and popular view of the relationship between areas of the mind-brain sciences is one 
where inter-communication and cross-disciplinary collaboration is required to advance 
epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain.  My goal in this dissertation is to analyze what 
it means for information from different areas of science to fit together to produce strong 
epistemic claims by addressing how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are 
corroborated in scientific practice.  Philosophers of science have advanced various concepts of 
the notion of fitting together information from different areas of science and its relation to 
scientific progress (e.g., Bickle, 1998, 2003, 2006; Darden and Maull, 1977; Mitchell, 2002, 
2003; Mitchell and Dietrich, 2006; Nagel 1949, 1970, 1979; Piccinini and Craver, 2011; and 
Roskies, 2010).  However, each of these concepts are vague and subject to multiple clarificatory 
questions. To get a handle on the notion of fitting together and its ability to produce 
epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain, I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary 
corroboration’ as a placeholder for the various accounts of fitting together to facilitate my 
investigation of how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated by interdisciplinary evidence 
in practice.  To address this question, I argue that looking at review papers (specifically, Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences review papers) is a good place to begin analyzing interdisciplinary 
corroboration.  Accordingly, I conduct a two-part analysis of a Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
review paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’ structured around what 
Eichenbaum does and does not do to support the claims he advances about spatio-temporal 
memory organization.  My analysis revealed that critical information was missing to adequately 
assess the extent to which the claims about memory organization were corroborated in 
Eichenbaum’s paper.  I use the lessons from my analysis to develop and advance a methodology 
for philosophers of science interested in knowledge production for evaluating review papers for 
corroboration in the mind-brain sciences. 
 
Key Words:  Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Science, Mind-Brain Sciences, 
Interdisciplinary Corroboration, Review Papers, Systematic Review Papers, Meta-Analysis, 
Spatio-Temporal Organization of Memory, Scientific Progress, Scientific Explanation. 
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Summary for Lay Audience 
The mind-brain sciences comprises multiple areas of science (e.g., psychology, biology, 
computational modelling and artificial intelligence, neuroscience, etc.).  It has been argued by 
philosophers of the mind-brain sciences that claims about the mind-brain stand on firm epistemic 
footing (i.e., that they are well supported) when they are the product of evidence from those 
respective areas of the mind-brain sciences fitting together.  However, the philosophical accounts 
advocating the notion of fitting together lack a clear explanation as to what constitutes fitting 
together; what does it mean for pieces of evidence from different areas of science to fit together 
in such a way that produces epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain?  How and to what 
extent are claims about the mind-brain corroborated in scientific practice?  This is the main 
question I address in my dissertation.  I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ as a 
placeholder for the various philosophical accounts of fitting together to facilitate my 
investigation of what it means for claims to be corroborated by interdisciplinary evidence in the 
mind-brain sciences.  My definition of interdisciplinary corroboration reads that claims about the 
mind-brain are corroborated when interdisciplinary pieces of evidence point towards a general 
claim and when those pieces of evidence are mutually supportive.  I argue that review papers 
(specifically, Trends in Cognitive Sciences review papers) are a good place to start investigating 
interdisciplinary corroboration insofar as these papers often contain arguments demonstrating 
how interdisciplinary evidence combines to corroborate a given claim.  To get clear on how 
exactly this occurs, I conducted a two-part analysis of a review paper by Eichenbaum (2013) 
entitled ‘Memory on Time’ on the topic of memory organization (i.e., how memories are 
organized in space and time).  My analysis revealed that key information was missing in the 
review paper that is necessary to properly assess how and to what extent claims about memory 
organization are corroborated.  I use the lessons from my analysis to develop and advance a 
methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye for corroboration in the mind-brain 
sciences.  
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Preface 
Multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences (e.g., psychology, cognitive science, biology, 
neuroscience, etc.) aim to advance knowledge about how the brain realizes psychological 
functions (e.g., decision making, memory, language, etc.).  Kaplan (2017) has noted both 
scientists and philosophers of science alike concede that understanding the relationship between 
the different areas comprising the mind-brain sciences is critical for scientific progress.  The 
current and dominant view of the relationship between the different areas of the mind-brain 
science is one where inter-communication and cross-disciplinary collaboration is required to 
advance epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain1.   
In this dissertation, I am interested in the integrative and collaborative relationship between 
different areas of the mind-brain science and how this relationship results in epistemically strong 
claims about the mind-brain.  My goal in this dissertation is to analyze what it means for 
information from different areas of science to fit together in such a way that results in 
epistemically strong claims by addressing the question of how and to what extent claims about 
the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice.   
This question was prompted by numerous accounts of scientific progress emphasizing the notion 
of interdisciplinary pieces of evidence fitting together in such a way that the resulting claim 
about the mind-brain stands on firm epistemic footing.  That is, I noticed many accounts of 
progress in the philosophy of the mind-brain sciences argue that strong epistemic claims are the 
result of interdisciplinary evidence fitting together in such a way that the resulting claim is 
corroborated.   
 
1
 A note on how I use the term ‘mind-brain’ is necessary.  I am concerned primarily with how claims from different 
areas of the mind-brain sciences fit together in such a way that a claim about the mind-brain is corroborated.  Due 
to this, and the fact that much of my analysis deals with scientific studies, I use the word ‘mind’ in the way that 
scientists in the mind-brain sciences use the term, i.e., to refer to cognitive processes/functions and states 
occurring within an organism that are ‘causally responsible for but not identical to’ that organism’s behavior 
(Sullivan 2014,48).   It is this set of states and processes that scientists in the mind-brain sciences investigate.  
While the goal of the sciences is often stated in terms of ‘understanding the mind’, scientists typically break this 
down into ‘understanding an aspect of the mind’.  By aspect of the mind I mean either a cognitive state (e.g., 
feeling happy, feeling hungry, etc.) or a cognitive process (e.g., procedural memory, decision-making, etc.).  Thus, 
when I discuss how the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain) works, I understand these questions as 
referring to how the brain realizes psychological functions. 
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To better understand this phenomenon, I begin in chapter one by laying down the relevant 
motivation and background for my dissertation by surveying the history of different accounts of 
scientific progress emphasizing the fitting together of results from different areas of science as an 
integral part of scientific progress and strong explanations.  I review some reductionist (Nagel 
1949, 1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist (Darden and Maull, 1977; 
Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Roskies 2010) 
accounts of the relationship between areas of science emphasizing the phenomena of fitting 
together.  While the surveyed accounts advance different concepts and descriptions of fitting 
together and what it entails for scientific progress, ultimately, both reductionist and non-
reductionist accounts alike recognize the importance of collaboration amongst different areas of 
science such that evidence from each area be fit together (in some respect) to yield strong 
epistemic claims about the mind-brain.   
A note on the scope and purpose of this chapter.  There are many more accounts of scientific 
progress and fitting together than I survey in chapter one; I flag these accounts in footnote seven 
of chapter one.   Including every and all accounts emphasizing the notion of different areas of 
science fitting together for scientific progress would go beyond the scope of my first chapter.  
Accordingly, I selected some key reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress to 
demonstrate that despite different concepts of fitting together, a common assumption underlying 
these accounts is that epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain require evidence from 
different areas of science to fit together in some way.   
Despite this consensus, the accounts of fitting together that I survey are vague and elicit 
numerous questions as to how exactly this fitting together occurs.  For example, it is unclear 
what criteria must be met in order to confidently assert that pieces of evidence fit together in 
such a way that its resulting claim stands on strong epistemic footing.   
To get a handle on the nature of fitting together in the mind-brain sciences, I introduce the term 
‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) in chapter two as a placeholder for what I think 
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards but have yet to analyze in depth.  I 
introduce this term as a working definition whereby IC occurs when the results of different areas 
of the mind-brain sciences (using different protocols, methods, etc.) corroborate some claim 
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about the mind-brain insofar as they all generally point towards a similar claim and insofar as 
those pieces of evidence are mutually supportive.  
Given that IC is a working definition, it too requires elaboration.  To shed light on the nature of 
IC, I suggest looking for instances of it in scientific practice.  Specifically, I recommend looking 
at review papers, which are units of analysis surveying literature from a variety of areas of 
science on a given topic.  While some review papers consist solely of a literature summary, other 
review papers include explanations and arguments.  These arguments, which may be implicit or 
explicit, can involve showing how a given claim is corroborated by the literature surveyed in the 
review paper; because authors of review papers frequently cite interdisciplinary findings in their 
summary, and because they sometimes demonstrate how those findings corroborate a claim 
about the mind-brain, review papers are strong candidates to begin investigating the nature of 
interdisciplinary corroboration.  Put differently, they are a good place to start investigating how 
and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice.   
I argue that while there are numerous types of review papers on offer in the mind-brain sciences, 
looking at a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper is an ideal starting point to begin my 
investigation insofar as it contains components indicative of IC (i.e., the author of a review paper 
in Trends in Cognitive Sciences surveys interdisciplinary findings and sometimes includes 
arguments about how those findings fit together to corroborate a claim about the mind-brain). 
A note on the scope of this chapter.  In chapter two, I consider two options for beginning my 
investigation of how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific practice – i.e., a 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper and a Frontier in Neuroscience systematic review 
paper.  I argue are both well-suited for the task of investigating IC.  However, due to the scope of 
my dissertation, I decided to focus on a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review to begin the process 
of investigating how, and to what extent, claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in 
scientific practice.  I acknowledge, in chapter four, different avenues of research one could 
undertake in exploring the epistemic role of units of analysis that function to corroborate claims 
about the mind-brain and their implications for scientific progress.  This includes extending my 
project by comparing a Trends in Cognitive Sciences paper with a Frontiers in Neuroscience 
systematic review paper to discern whether the additional components of the latter (i.e., adhering 
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to systematic review guidelines and/or including a meta-analysis) increase the integrity of the 
corroboration of the claims they advance about the mind-brain. 
To better understand how claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in a Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences review paper, I conducted a two-part analysis of a review paper entitled ‘Memory on 
Time’ (2013) (hereafter referred to as the case study) by Eichenbaum in chapters three and four.   
Critically, I began my analysis in chapter three with a general understanding of how a Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences review paper works; this came from the descriptive work I provided for the 
different kinds of review papers found in mind-brain science journals in chapter two.  
Furthermore, my analysis is guided by some cursory criteria such as the following questions: 
“what is the main aim of the review paper”, “what claims does Eichenbaum defend”, “how does 
Eichenbaum show support for his claims”, “what kind of arguments does Eichenbaum provide”, 
and “does the case study represent a strong example of interdisciplinary corroboration”?   
Guided by these questions, I structured chapter three around the work Eichenbaum does in the 
case study to defend the claims he advances.  This work primarily consists of Eichenbaum 
stating findings from various interdisciplinary studies which he states support a given claim 
about memory organization.  His arguments for the corroboration of these claims are implied by 
the language and terms he used to introduce findings for a given claim and to advance specific 
claims about memory organization.  For example, when introducing evidence for claim x, 
Eichenbaum states that there is ‘substantial evidence’ supporting x, thus conveying to the reader 
that there are good reasons to take x as corroborated (since it is supported by substantial 
interdisciplinary evidence) (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).2  My analysis of these terms indicated that 
the kind of corroboration in the case study was one where the claims were not to be understood 
as true, but instead as highly probable, approximately true, etc.  Further, I argue because the cited 
findings are interdisciplinary and because they are published in high-calibre mind-brain journals 
with high impact factors and citation rates, the cited findings constitute reliable pieces of 
information (thus increasing the integrity of the corroboration of the claims in the case study).  I 
 
2
 Where x represents one of the claims contained within ‘Memory on Time’ (Eichenbaum 2013). 
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note that, prima facie, the case study appears to represent a strong example of interdisciplinary 
corroboration.   
As I conducted my analysis in chapter three, which indicated Eichenbaum’s argument for the 
claims he advances in the case study depended on critical terms such as ‘substantial evidence’, I 
began to notice that certain pieces of information were missing from Eichenbaum’s argument 
that could potentially undermine the case study representing a clear case of IC (ibid). 
Specifically, I began to wonder about the following questions: “what counts as substantial 
evidence”, “what is meant by consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored 
into the findings supporting the claims found in the case study”.  These questions led me to 
conduct part two of my analysis in chapter four, where I address these questions and their 
implications for interdisciplinary corroboration. 
Thus, my analysis in chapter three structured around the work Eichenbaum did to support the 
claims he advances prompted questions concerning just how clearly the case study represented a 
clear instance of IC.  To better analyze how and to what extent corroboration occurs in the case 
study, I structured my analysis in chapter four around what features were missing in the case 
study (i.e., what Eichenbaum does not do to support the claims he advances).3  For example, I 
noted that definitions for terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistency’ were lacking; this is 
critical because Eichenbaum’s implicit arguments hinges on these terms (ibid).  I argued that if 
these key terms are not defined, it is difficult to discern whether and to what extent the claims in 
the case study are corroborated.  I elaborated on the questions “what counts as substantial 
evidence”, “what is meant by consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored 
into the findings supporting the claims in the case study” in this chapter, and, in elaborating on 
these, it struck me that another important factor missing in the case study was an evaluation of 
the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites.  I then demonstrate how all of these missing 
pieces of information complicate the case study representing a clear case of interdisciplinary 
corroboration. 
 
3
 These missing features were determined by the questions and concerns that arose in conducting my analysis in 
chapter three. 
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From my analysis, I extracted three key lessons.  The first lesson is that the fundamental 
assumptions shared by both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress that I 
surveyed in chapter one – i.e., that epistemically strong claims are the result of evidence from 
different areas of science fitting together – is complex, and not nearly as straightforward as the 
literature makes it out to be.  The second lesson is that my analysis prompts a revised definition 
of interdisciplinary corroboration.  Interdisciplinary corroboration should now be understood as a 
phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar as they are 
interdisciplinary, mutually supportive, and rule out coincidence, errors, and alternative 
hypotheses, and all point towards a similar claim.  Finally, the third lesson emerging from my 
analysis is that certain critical pieces of information are missing to adequately assess the extent 
to which the claims Eichenbaum advances in the case study are corroborated.   
After conducting my analysis and extracting its key lessons, I recognized that the questions and 
concerns I raise in chapter four would be helpful in evaluating future/different review papers for 
corroboration.  From this, I advanced a methodology comprising an itemized list of questions to 
direct towards the evaluation of review papers for corroboration. 
A note on the nature of my methodology is warranted.  The methodology I advance in chapter 
four is meant as a working framework.  In chapter two, I highlighted multiple types of units of 
analysis that could be considered for investigating interdisciplinary corroboration.  However, due 
to the scope of my dissertation, I began my investigation of interdisciplinary corroboration via a 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper.  Accordingly, the methodology I advance pertains 
primarily to this kind of unit of analysis.  As more research is conducted on the different units of 
analysis in the mind-brain sciences and interdisciplinary corroboration, I expect my methodology 
to be revised, and my definition of IC to become sharper. 
I conclude, in chapter five, by summing up the dissertation, acknowledging its limitations, and 
noting the contributions of my dissertation for the mind-brain sciences and, more generally, for 
the philosophy of science and empirically engaged philosophy of mind. 
A final note on what I am not trying to accomplish in this dissertation is necessary.  I am not 
trying to establish whether any of the main claims Eichenbaum defends are true; nor is it my goal 
to assess the scientific rigor of Eichenbaum’s paper.  The purpose of the dissertation is also not 
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to ascertain which of the surveyed accounts in the first chapter most accurately captures the 
nature of interdisciplinary corroboration in the mind-brain sciences.  Instead, my main goal is to 
analyze one aspect of the nature of the integrationist relationship of the different areas 
comprising the mind-brain sciences by asking what it means for different pieces of evidence to 
fit together in a way that yields strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain.  I introduced a 
case study of a Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper to see what lessons can be learned 
regarding the nature of interdisciplinary corroboration.  My analysis revealed that critical 
information is missing to adequately assess the extent to which corroboration has occurred, and, 
accordingly, I advanced an itemized list as a methodology for philosophers of science interested 
in knowledge production to consult when analyzing review papers for corroboration. 
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Chapter 1 
1 Introduction 
Multiple fields of science comprising the mind-brain sciences (e.g., psychology, cognitive 
science, neuroscience, biology, etc.) aim to understand and advance knowledge about the mind-
brain.4  Kaplan (2017) notes there is consensus between both scientists and philosophers alike 
that “… understanding the complex relationship between neuroscience and psychological science 
…” is critical for achieving progress in the mind-brain sciences (1).5   
During the pinnacle of computational cognitive psychology (i.e., the mid-20th century), the 
relationship between these fields was viewed as one of autonomy (ibid).  In other words, the 
respective phenomena of investigation, methods, and theories of each area of science were held 
to be completely independent from each other.  There was thus no need for interdisciplinary 
collaboration or cross-field projects (ibid).   
This understanding of the relationship between the different fields of mind-brain sciences has 
recently undergone substantial change.  Nowadays, the autonomy view of the mind-brain 
sciences is considerably less popular.  Instead, the autonomy view has been replaced by a 
characterization which sees the relationship as one of ‘complete disciplinary integration and 
interdependence’ (ibid).   
In discussing various positions on the debate over which ontology of the mind-brain is the 
correct one, Anderson (2015) notes that all positions in this debate reject the traditional view of 
the autonomy of psychology and neuroscience (70).  Thus, there is currently a general rejection 
of the autonomy view of the relations between different areas of the mind-brain sciences.  
Churchland and Sejnowski (2000) state whereas it was previously held that discoveries and 
explanations at the neuronal and the cognitive level were considered completely separate and of 
 
4
 As I note in my preface, my use of the term ‘mind-brain’ throughout this dissertation refers to understanding 
how the brain realizes psychological functions. 
5
 Kaplan (2017) typically refers to the relationship in question as consisting of the relationship between 
neuroscience and psychology.  Unless otherwise specified, when I refer to this relationship, I understand it in the 
broader sense of comprising the multiple areas housed under the mind-brain sciences.  These include but are not 
limited to: computer science and artificial intelligence, cognitive psychology, biology, neurobiology, 
neurophysiology, linguistics, etc. 
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little ‘academic significance’ to the other, there is now consensus amongst scientists that the time 
is ripe for the convergence of the mind-brain sciences (14).  Kaplan (2017) attributes this shift to 
the birth of cognitive neuroscience, where from the beginning, contributors of the cognitive 
neuroscience movement (such as Michael S. Gazzaniga and George A. Miller who coined the 
term ‘cognitive neuroscience’ in 1979) acknowledged the ‘integrative and interdisciplinary’ 
character of the emerging field which shared the goal of trying to understand the mind-brain 
(Kaplan 2017, 2).6   
Similarly, Boone and Piccinini (2016) argue against the traditional cognitive science view of 
explanations as distinct and autonomous; instead, they maintain that explanations in cognitive 
neuroscience must integrate the “… computational and representational functions and structures 
across multiple levels of organization in order to explain cognition” (1509).  The research 
strategy appealed to in cognitive neuroscience, according to Churchland and Sejnowski, is 
neither top-down nor bottom-up, but is instead best understood as an interaction between the 
various fields in the mind-brain sciences whereby research from one field provides 
“…constraints, corrections, and inspiration for research at other levels” (Churchland and 
Sejnowski 2000, 14).7  
 
6
 In a letter correspondence to Michael S. Gazzaniga from George A. Miller, Miller defines cognitive neuroscience 
as the following: “Cognitive neuroscientists attempt to discover the molecular logic of organic knowledge systems, 
i.e., the principles that, in addition to the principles of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, govern the 
behavior of inanimate matter in living knowledge systems” (Gazzaniga 2000, 11). 
7
 Churchland and Sejnowski note that there are at minimum three different definitions of the term ‘levels’ 
(Churchland and Sejnowski 2000, 14).  They highlight: levels of analysis, levels of organization, and levels of 
processing.  Briefly, levels of analysis refers to the conceptual distinctions in terms of the different types of 
questions one can ask about a given phenomenon.  Marr and Poggio (1977) distinguish three respective levels of 
analysis: the computational level (which decomposes a task into its main parts), the algorithmic level (which 
stipulates a form procedure to perform the task) and the level of physical implementation (Churchland and 
Sejnowski 2000, 14).  The level of organization refers to how those three levels of analysis ‘map onto the nervous 
system’.  The structure of the nervous system involves “… molecules, synapses, neurons, networks, layers, maps, 
and systems.  The range of structural organization implies, therefore, that there are many levels of implementation 
and that each has its companion task description” (ibid, 15).  The implications of the structural organization of the 
nervous systems are that because there are as many types of task descriptions as there are levels of structure, the 
algorithmic level as well as the level of implementation are ‘over simplified’ (ibid).  Critically, the levels of structural 
organization, while conceptually separable, cannot be physically separated.  For example, they note that attention 
can rely on mechanisms at various levels; some may be found at the level of a local neural network, while others 
may be housed within (a) broader neural system(s) found in multiple locations of the brain (ibid).  Finally, the level 
of processing is described as there being different degrees of information processing depending on the distance 
between the responding cells and the sensory input.  As an example of fruitful integration of levels between 
different fields of the mind-brain sciences, Churchland and Sejnowski advance a case study of color vision whereby 
different theories were proven correct, but at different levels of structural organization (ibid 17-18).   
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Thus, the current and popular view of the relationship between the different fields of the mind-
brain sciences is integrationist, interdisciplinary, and non-autonomous.  This characterization 
allots a fundamental role to the notion of ‘fitting together’ for explanation and progress in the 
mind-brain sciences.  That is, to understand an aspect of the mind-brain, pieces of evidence from 
different areas of the mind-brain science must fit together in some way to produce epistemically 
strong claims about the mind-brain; this is part and parcel of the view of the relationship between 
the mind-brain sciences being integrative, collaborative, and non-autonomous.   
My goal in this dissertation is to assess and analyze this integrative nature of the mind-brain 
sciences; to tackle the question of what it means for different areas of the mind-brain sciences to 
be fit together in such a way that yields epistemically strong claims, thereby advancing 
knowledge of the mind-brain.8   
My aim in this chapter primarily motivational; here, I review the history of different accounts of 
scientific progress emphasizing the phenomena of fitting together and highlight a key problem 
shared by the surveyed accounts.  I begin in section 1.1 and 1.1.2 by reviewing some reductionist 
(Nagel 1949, 1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist (Darden and Maull, 
1977; Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Piccinini and Craver 2011; Roskies 
2010) accounts of the relationship between areas of the mind-brain sciences emphasizing the 
fitting together of evidence from different areas of science as critical for scientific progress and 
strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain.9  In section 1.2, I evaluate the surveyed accounts 
 
 
Thus, when Churchland and Sejnowski (2000) claim that different fields comprising the mind-brain sciences (which 
often work at different levels) interact with each other by providing “… constraints, corrections, and inspiration for 
research at other levels” they mean that this type of interdisciplinary interaction will lead to ‘a chain of models 
linking adjacent levels’, ultimately providing us with a more comprehensive picture of how some feature of the 
mind-brain works (ibid, 14, 21).   
8
 My goal for my dissertation and the question of how pieces of interdisciplinary evidence fit together to yield 
strong claims about the mind-brain was motivated by Sullivan’s (2009) work on experimental protocols and her 
(2016) work on construct stabilization.  Specifically, Sullivan’s (2009, 2016) skepticism towards accounts of 
scientific progress claiming that results from different areas of the mind-brain sciences fit neatly together to yield 
claims about the mind-brain that stand on firm epistemic footing, led me to think more critically about how the 
concept of fitting together actually occurs in scientific practice. 
9
 Reviewing each and every reductionist and non-reductionist account of progress and interdisciplinary fitting 
together would be far beyond the scope of my dissertation.  For more reductive accounts c.f., Churchland’s notion 
of ‘co-evolution’ (1986), Hooker’s ‘general theory of reduction’ (1981), Schaffner’s ‘general reduction paradigm’ 
(1967), and his revised ‘general reduction-replacement model’ (1992); for non-reductive accounts c.f., the notion 
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and highlight the common assumption underlying all accounts – namely, that progress is made 
when results from different areas of science are fit together yielding complete and strong 
epistemic claims.  I then identify a key problem with this assumption; specifically, the notions of 
fitting together advanced by the surveyed accounts are vague and under-analyzed.  I sum up this 
chapter in section 1.3, by noting why it is important to analyze this assumption and to get a 
handle on the notion of fitting together. 
1.1 Historical Reviews of Scientific Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences (Some 
Reductionist Approaches) 
Reductionism is a popular account of explanation that offers a model for the relationship 
between different areas of science.  Historically, reductionism was brought to the forefront of 
philosophy of science with the alleged reduction of Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity, chemistry to atomic physics, gas laws to statistical mechanics, etc. (Curd and 
Cover 1998, 903).  Nagel spearheaded reductionism by proposing a model of inter-theoretic 
reduction (Nagel 1949, 1961, 1979).  Nagel believed that reductionism enabled a special kind of 
understanding; one which constituted/led to an ‘important scientific achievement’ (Nagel 1949, 
123).10  Briefly, Nagel took reductionism as an explanatory relation holding between two 
theories whereby one theory is derivable from the other, with the help of bridge laws (when 
applicable).  Such a relation holds only if two formal conditions plus an essential condition are 
met; if one or more conditions are not satisfied, the alleged reduction would fail (Nagel 1949, 
1979).  I will first consider each condition in detail, and then discuss Nagel’s inter-theoretic 
model of reduction and its relation to the concepts of fitting together and scientific progress.   
As stated above, Nagel construed reductionism as an explanatory relation holding between the 
theories of two sciences whereby one theory is derivable from the other.  Nagel took the set of 
theories and/or experimental laws comprising the reduced theory as the ‘secondary science’, and 
the theory which enables the reduction as the ‘primary science’ (Nagel 1949, 107; Nagel 1979, 
338).  On Nagel’s view, a reduction occurs when the claims of a secondary sciences’ 
 
of ‘cross-disciplinary patterns’ by Bechtel (1986), ‘decomposition’ by Bechtel and Richardson (1993), ‘integration’ 
by Boone and Piccinini (2016), ‘coordinated contributions’ by Hastings et al. (2014), and the notion of ‘robustness’ 
by Wimsatt (1980, 2007). 
10
 Nagel contrasts ‘important scientific achievement’ with ‘trivial scientific accomplishments’, which are often ad 
hoc in nature (Nagel 1949, 123).  I elaborate on the two types of achievements shortly. 
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theories/experimental laws are demonstrated to be the logical consequence of the fundamental 
claims of the primary science.  This is the first formal condition of reduction – the derivability 
condition.  That is, the claims from the secondary science are logically derivable from those of 
the primary science.   
Nagel identifies two main types of reductions (i.e., homogenous and heterogenous), each of 
which have different implications for the derivability condition (Nagel 1979, 339).  The former 
kind of reduction occurs when “… the laws of the secondary science employ no descriptive 
terms that are not also used with approximately the same meanings in the primary science.  
Reductions of this type can therefore be regarded as establishing deductive relations between two 
sets of statements that employ a homogenous vocabulary” (ibid).  These reductions are relatively 
unproblematic since the two sciences share (more or less) the same descriptive terms.  
Accordingly, the derivability condition can be easily satisfied (Nagel 1949, 103).   
As an example of a homogenous reduction, Nagel cites the reduction of Galilean science to 
Newtonian mechanics.  Nagel notes while it is undoubtedly true that one can differentiate 
between the subject matters of Galilean science and Newtonian mechanics, there is an important 
sense in which these subject matters are ‘homogenous and continuous’ (ibid).  That is, both 
sciences are inquiring into the motions of bodies and the causal underpinnings of these motions, 
and there are no descriptive terms that appear in Galilean science that do not also appear with 
approximately the same meaning in Newtonian mechanics (ibid).  Thus, because there are no 
terms which are discontinuous (i.e., the terms in the former possess more or less the same 
meaning as those found in the latter), the derivation of the secondary science to the primary 
science is uncomplicated and uncontroversial (ibid 103-104; Nagel 1979, 338). 
Heterogenous reductions, however, are more complicated and are a source of great ‘intellectual 
discomfort’ (Nagel 1979, 338).  This discomfort is in part due to the fact that the subject matters 
between the primary and secondary science are ‘qualitatively discontinuous’ and that “… the 
secondary science employs in its formulations of laws and theories a number of distinctive 
descriptive predicates that are not included in the basic theoretical terms or in the associated 
rules of correspondence of a primary science” (ibid, 342).   
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As an example of a heterogenous case, Nagel cites the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical 
mechanics.  Specifically, the terms ‘temperature’ ‘heat’ and ‘entropy’ as well as other general 
assumptions found in the former are not present in nor entailed by principles in mechanics. 
(Nagel 1949, 121, and Nagel 1979, 342-343).  The discontinuity of subject matter and 
descriptive terms makes satisfying the derivability condition impossible.  This is because, 
according to Klee (1999), the principles of logic stipulate that “… no term can appear in the 
conclusion of a formal demonstration unless the term also appears in the premises” (112).  The 
only way the derivability condition can be satisfied for heterogenous reductions is by satisfying 
Nagel’s second formal condition: the connectability condition (Nagel 1949, 119).   
The connectability condition requires that one establish a ‘proper kind of relation’ between those 
expressions contained in the laws of the secondary science and the fundamental principles of the 
primary science (ibid, 120).  This relation – also known as a bi-conditional bridge law – can be 
understood in one of two ways: either as a logical relation whereby a term in the secondary 
science is related to some expression in the primary science via synonymity or entailment, or, by 
adopting a material or physical hypothesis whereby “… the occurrence of the properties 
designated by some expression in the premises of the primary science is a sufficient, or necessary 
and sufficient, condition for the occurrence of the properties designated by the expression of the 
secondary discipline” (ibid).  Thus, if there is some term/expression x in the experimental laws of 
the secondary science not found in the theoretical assumptions of the primary science, a suitable 
relation/bridge law must be established between x and the theoretical assumptions of the primary 
science.  In the case of a material or physical hypothesis, however, because the meaning of the 
term/expression contained in the secondary science cannot be demonstrated as ‘analytically 
related’ to the expression in the primary science, the material or physical hypothesis is at best, 
‘contingently true’ (ibid, 121).   
Nagel examines the two possible relations via the derivation of the Boyle-Charles law from the 
kinetic theory of gases.  Nagel notes that the term ‘temperature’ – which, for the sake of 
simplicity, Nagel considers as the sole term occurring in the laws of the secondary science that 
does not occur in the expressions of the primary science – as used in thermodynamics is neither 
synonymous with, nor entailed by the expression ‘mean kinetic energy’ (ibid).   Accordingly, a 
successful deduction would require that an additional assumption be introduced, and in this case 
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that assumption would come in the form of an empirical hypothesis stating “… a determinate 
factual connection between two properties of physical systems that are in principle independently 
identifiable …” (ibid).   
Nagel considers the reduction of a secondary science to a primary science to be constitutive of an 
‘important scientific achievement’ crucial for scientific progress (ibid, 123).  However, the 
satisfaction of the two formal conditions does not guarantee an important scientific achievement.  
Nagel notes: “For if the premises of an alleged primary science could be selected quite 
arbitrarily, subject only to formal requirements that have been mentioned thus far, the logical 
deduction of the laws of a secondary science from such premises selected ad hoc would in most 
cases represent only a trivial scientific accomplishment” (ibid, second emphasis mine).  Since a 
trivial scientific accomplishment would be largely inconsequential to scientific progress, Nagel 
introduced an essential condition, which requires the assumptions of the primary science be 
empirically supported by evidence that has ‘some measure of adequacy’ (ibid).11  Nagel 
elaborates on the essential condition by returning to the example of the reduction of 
thermodynamics to mechanics: 
It is well known that the general assumption according to which physical bodies in different 
states of aggregation are systems of molecules is confirmed by a large number of well-
established facts of chemistry and of molar physics, facts which are not primarily about 
thermal properties of bodies.  Accordingly, the adoption of this hypothesis for the special task 
of accounting for the thermal behavior of gases is in line with the normal strategy of the 
natural sciences to extend the use of ideas fruitful in one set of inquiries into related domains.  
Similarly, the fundamental principles of mechanics, which serve as partial premises in the 
reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics, are supported by evidence drawn from many 
fields of study distinct from the study of gases (ibid, 124, emphases mine). 
I will now unpack this quote in the context of Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction model to draw 
out some implications of his model for the notion of fitting and scientific progress.  To see how 
fitting together contributes to scientific progress, it is helpful to consider Nagel’s distinction 
between good and bad science.   
 
11
 Nagel says no more here on what is meant by adequacy, stating that it is an issue beyond the scope of his work.   
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Bad science is the product of unsuccessful and ad hoc reductions; bad science results in trivial 
scientific accomplishments (ibid, 123).  Good science, on the other hand, is the product of 
successful reductions and results in important scientific achievements (ibid).  A successful 
reduction requires the two formal conditions plus an essential condition are satisfied.  The 
essential condition requires assumptions in the primary science to be supported by empirical 
evidence that possesses a certain degree of adequacy (ibid).  Nagel provides no explanation of 
what he means by ‘adequacy’, but at the very least, Nagel seems committed to the idea that 
assumptions are empirically adequate to the extent that they are well-confirmed, and assumptions 
are well-confirmed to the extent that there is evidence from multiple fields of science supporting 
them.  In Nagel’s example of the reduction of thermodynamics to mechanics (quoted above), he 
states the assumptions of mechanics (i.e., the primary science) are supported by numerous 
different fields of study; this is where the notion of fitting together enters into Nagel’s model of 
inter-theoretic reduction and scientific progress.  That is, if the assumptions of the primary 
science are not empirically supported by different areas of science, the essential condition is not 
satisfied.  If this condition is not satisfied, the reduction is unsuccessful.  By this, Nagel seems to 
imply that for the assumptions of the primary science to be empirically adequate, they must be 
supported by evidence from different areas of science.  Thus, different areas of science must fit 
together in such a way that they support/confirm the assumptions of the primary science.  To the 
extent that this occurs, the essential condition is satisfied.  If the essential condition and formal 
conditions are satisfied, a successful reduction occurs. This is important because Nagel takes 
successful reductions as paradigmatic of important scientific achievements.  This is the relation 
of the notion of fitting together and scientific progress for Nagel’s inter-theoretic model of 
reduction. 
Another more recent account of reduction has been proposed in the mind-brain sciences by 
Bickle (2003, 2006).  Building on his 1998 book, Psychoneural Reduction, Bickle advances a 
‘reductive-in-practice’ model in his (2003) Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly 
Reductive Account, and again in his (2006) ‘Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating 
the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience’.  In these works, 
Bickle argues that a ruthless reduction is ‘alive and thriving’ in the field of cellular and 
molecular neuroscience and that in this field, low-level neuroscience can directly explain 
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behavior via a methodology Bickle dubs ‘intervening molecularly and tracking behaviorally’ 
(hereafter the IMTB method) (Bickle 2003, 2-3; Bickle 2006, 411, 425).   
One of the motivating factors behind Bickle’s works is to dispel the anti-reductionist worry that 
low-level neuroscience is incapable of directly explaining behavior (Bickle 2006, 411).  Drawing 
on Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell’s (2000) Principles of Neural Science, Bickle argues that most 
working neuroscientists agree with the main tenets of the textbook; namely, that it is, in fact, 
possible to link psychological concepts to ‘molecular-biological mechanisms and pathways’ 
(Bickle 2006, 412).  For Bickle, these links are constitutive of a ruthless reduction whereby 
behavior is directly explained by low-level neuroscience.   
A great deal of anti-reductionist push-back stems from a deep-seated doubt about the potential 
for neuroscience to bypass multiple levels in one shot.   That is, reduction in the mind-brain 
sciences was traditionally understood as being composed of multiple levels such as the 
behavioral level, the information processing level, the neuroanatomical level, etc.12  The thought 
was that in order to claim a mind-to-molecules reduction, intermediary bridges needed to be 
established between each and every level.13  However, Bickle argues, this step-by-step 
reductionist picture is misguided and can be completely discarded once one shifts their focus to 
work in cellular and molecular neuroscience.  In this field, Bickle states: “… molecular 
neuroscientists have developed experimental practices that bridge the behavioral to the molecular 
pathway levels directly; and these practices are common to all recent empirical successes …” 
(ibid, 414).  Further, when one devotes attention to the field of cellular and molecular 
neuroscience, it is demonstrably clear that a step-by-step level-based reduction is unnecessary 
since there is a type of ruthless reduction that can and has bypassed multiple levels by explaining 
behavior directly at the cellular/molecular level (ibid). 
While Bickle never explicitly states that this kind of ruthless reduction constitutes scientific 
progress, resulting in epistemically strong explanations about the mind-brain, it is implied by his 
account of reduction.  For instance, Bickle quotes the Principles of Neural Science (1991), 
 
12
 See Bickle’s (2006) figure 1 for a visual representation of this reduction via levels model on page 413.   
13
 This seems akin to the picture Churchland and Sejnowski paint when they describe interdisciplinary interaction 
as ‘a chain of models linking adjacent levels’, providing a more comprehensive explanation of the mind 
(Churchland and Sejnowski 2000, 14).   
10 
 
wherein Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell assert that the ultimate explanandum of the mind-brain 
sciences is to discover and understand how the mind works (i.e., how it thinks, perceives, 
remembers, processes, etc.) (Bickle 2003, 3).  As stated above, Bickle notes that neuroscientists 
already have experimental practices in place that bridge molecular pathways directly to behavior, 
and that further, all successful empirical cases share these experimental practices (Bickle 2006, 
414).  It is those ‘bridges’ or ‘links’ that do the work required by Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell 
(1991, 2000) to answer the ‘ultimate explanandum’ (i.e., the mind) (Bickle 2003, 3; Bickle 2006, 
414). 
What experimental methods are employed by working neuroscientists enabling them to explain 
behavior to molecules directly?  One of these methods is what Bickle dubs the ‘intervene 
molecularly and track behaviorally’ method (hereafter the IMTB method).  This method is of 
great significance, since, for Bickle, this method is tantamount to, “… what “reductionism” 
amounts to within the current discipline” (Bickle 2006, 425).  The IMTB method provides a new 
way to conceptualize reductionism contrasting with inter-theoretic options which dominated a 
fair part of modern philosophy of science (ibid).  The IMTB method is comprised of two parts: 
first, one causally intervenes “… at the level of cellular activity or molecular pathways within 
specific neurons …”, and second, one tracks “… the effects of these interventions under 
controlled experimental conditions using behavioral protocols well accepted within experimental 
psychology” (ibid).  Bickle explains the implications of this method:  
… this methodology constitutes an implicit condition on explanation in this field.  One only 
claims a successful explanation, a successful search for a cellular or molecular mechanism, 
or a successful reduction, of a psychological kind when one successfully intervenes at the 
lower level and then measures a statistically significant behavioral difference (ibid).   
Bickle uses Kogan, Frankland, and Silva’s (2000) work on social recognition memory in 
mammals to illustrate the IMTB method in practice.   Kogan et al. (2000) intervened in the 
cAMP-PKA-CREB pathway in mice by inserting a Neo gene which does not allow the activator 
α and δ isoforms of the CREB molecule to develop (Bickle 2006, 420).  Kogan et al. (2000) then 
applied a “… hippocampus-dependent fear-conditioning memory task (memory for a novel 
environmental context-foot shock association) …” to the CREBαδ− knock-outs which 
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demonstrated impairment in long-term memory despite in-tact short-term memory (Bickle 2006, 
421-422).14  Kogan et al. (2000) applied a behavioral paradigm developed by Thor and Holloway 
(1982) to their work with CREBαδ− knock-out mice in addition to employing different 
experimental control groups (Bickle 2006, 422).  Their results demonstrated: 
… CREBαδ—mutants displayed normal short-term social recognition memory for a juvenile 
conspecific presented earlier.  Thirty minutes after the initial exposure to it, they spent the 
same amount of time (statistically) in stereotypic investigative interaction with the juvenile as 
did the wild-type control adults. …  However, CREBαδ—mutants were seriously impaired in 
long-term recognition memory.  In fact, the mutants spent the same amount of time 
(statistically) investigating the same juvenile 24 h after initial exposure as they did during the 
initial exposure.  This result indicates complete long-term amnesia despite intact short term-
recognition (ibid). 
Bickle takes this result as confirmation of the claim that there is “… a molecular mechanism of 
the consolidation switch for a cognitively robust kind of memory” (ibid).  Thus, because 
interventions at the molecular level (i.e., the cAMP-PKA-CREB pathway) allowed for the 
tracking of targeted behavior (i.e., social recognition memory) via the ‘widely accepted’ Thor 
and Holloway (1980) protocol for studying the nature of social recognition memory, Bickle 
concludes by stating this example constitutes the gold standard for how hypotheses and claims 
about the mind-brain can be confirmed reductively in a way that bypasses multi-level steps (by 
moving directly from the cellular/molecular level to behavior)15 (ibid, 425-427). 
However, if it is the case that Bickle’s account of reduction does away with different levels 
involved in traditional accounts of reduction (e.g., work done at the information processing level, 
the neuroanatomical level, etc.), each of which is studied by different fields of science, and we 
can explain behavior directly by appeal to the cellular/molecular level, where does the concept of 
fitting together come into play?  Prima facie, it appears to have little to no role at all.  That is, if 
the ‘explanatory relevance’ of higher-level theorizing is abandoned in favor of the IMTB method 
 
14
 See Bickle (2006) pages 420-425 for an in-depth explanation of Kogan et al.’s (2000) experiments and results. 
15
 See Sullivan (2009) for a critique of Bickle’s reduction-in-practice model. 
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and the levels held between behavior and molecules on the traditional view disappear, then there 
seems to be no place for higher-level theorizing from different areas of the mind-brain sciences.   
Importantly, in arguing for a ruthless reduction that bypasses multi-level steps, Bickle does not 
advocate a wholescale elimination of high-level theorizing, but instead offers it a new job, so to 
speak.  He maintains that the methods employed by higher-level theorizing in contemporary 
neuroscience such as fMRI, cognitive and computational modelling, neuropsychological 
assessment, etc., are crucial for successful reductions (and ultimately achieving progress with 
respect to understanding the mind-brain) (ibid, 427).  Further, Bickle insists this kind of 
theorizing and their respective methods are essential for explaining the link from molecules to 
behavior, as the theorizing conducted at higher levels helps address critical questions such as the 
following: “What are good experimental protocols for tracking behavioral outcomes for the 
psychological phenomenon we seek the cellular and molecular mechanisms of … and “Where 
shall we begin inserting our cellular and molecular interventions?  (The possibility space in both 
brains and intra-neuron molecular pathways is enormous!)”  (ibid). 
Bickle classifies these kinds of questions as heuristic, and accordingly, considers the role for 
higher-level theorizing as one of heuristics (ibid).  Bickle argues it would be quite difficult to 
address these questions at the cellular/molecular level; that is, he takes these higher-level 
questions as fundamental and ineliminable in the search for cellular and molecular mechanisms 
(ibid).  This interplay of higher-level theorizing about behavioral and/or cognitive phenomena, 
along with the work conducted at the lower-level neuroscience level via the IMTB method, 
demonstrates the importance of interdisciplinary fitting together for scientific progress and 
strong explanations about the mind-brain.  The phenomenon of fitting together, however, does 
not sit at the level of the actual reduction itself (as it does with many inter-theoretic models of 
reduction) but instead precedes it.  That is: 
… from a diachronic perspective on mind-brain science, investigation into a cognitive or 
behavioral phenomenon initially looks like the approach illustrated in Fig. 1 with 
investigations and explanations at multiple levels and the search for step-by-step linkages of 
features down the level’s hierarchy.  But when this methodology reaches candidate cellular or 
molecular processes in specific neurons linked in the ways revealed by neuroanatomy, 
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investigation shifts to the approach in Fig. 8.  And when these investigations succeed, a 
reduction of mind to molecular pathways is taken as established (ibid, 428).16   
The role of higher-level theorizing comes into play in the early stages of investigation by 
isolating the “… relevant neuroanatomy and the candidate cellular and molecular mechanisms 
…” so that the work at the cellular/molecular level can proceed via the IMTB method (ibid).  
While Bickle never explicitly argues this, his account seems to imply that if higher-level 
theorizing were eliminated, then work at the cellular/molecular level would not get off the 
ground, and thus the prospect of reducing mind to molecular pathways would be compromised.   
In fact, Bickle (2003) argues that transdisciplinary projects (i.e., projects that incorporate 
questions, data, theories, etc., from different areas of the mind-brain sciences) are key for making 
headway in the search for cellular/molecular mechanisms.  He cites his own project (Bickle et. al 
2000) which combines methods, theories, data, etc., from single-cell physiology, functional 
neuroimaging and biological modelling to help answer what cellular/molecular mechanism is 
responsible for saccade sequences in the frontal cortex and how they are processed (Bickle 2003, 
115-130).  According to this transdisciplinary picture, aspects of both high and low-level 
neuroscience need to fit together for progress (i.e., for the reduction of mind to molecules) to 
occur.17 
In sum, Bickle argues that low-level neuroscience can directly explain behavior by appealing to 
experimental practices such as the IMTB method commonly used by scientists in 
cellular/molecular neuroscience.  However, low-level neuroscience still needs higher-level 
theorizing in order to adequately pick out and isolate the desired cellular/molecular mechanism 
in question; this is where the relationship between progress and fitting together lies.   
Before moving onto non-reductionist accounts of progress, I will briefly recapitulate how the 
notion of fitting together plays into Nagel and Bickle’s accounts of reductionism.  For Nagel, the 
 
16
 Figure 1 displayed the traditional model of reduction as a step-by-step hierarchy of levels (see Bickle 2006, page 
413 for illustration) and figure 8 displayed Bickle’s reductive-in-practice or ruthless reduction model which 
bypasses multiple levels by linking the behavioral level directly to the cellular molecular level (see Bickle 2006, 
page 426 for illustration). 
17
 See Bickle (2003) for an example of a transdisciplinary project which combines questions, theories, and data 
from single-cell physiology, neurocomputational modelling, and functional neuroimaging (115-130).  
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role of fitting together comes into play with the essential condition which claims that the 
assumptions of the primary science must be well-supported by different areas of science.  
Despite Nagel failing to provide an account of what it means for evidence to be well-supported 
and how evidence from multiple fields confirms assumptions in the primary science, it is clear 
that the phenomenon of fitting together interdisciplinary evidence is required for successful 
reductions, which, on Nagel’s view, are the key to scientific progress.  That is, the results from 
these areas of science must fit together in such a way that lend empirical support to the 
assumptions of the primary science for the reduction to stand on firm epistemic footing.  For 
Bickle, the notion of fitting together occurs between the interaction between high-level 
theorizing which occurs prior to actual investigations and discoveries at the cellular/molecular 
level.  Similarly, Bickle does not provide an in-depth analysis of what fitting together would look 
like nor what it entails; nonetheless, the fitting together of the higher and lower-levels of the 
mind-brain sciences is critical for the reduction of mind-to-molecules (and thus for scientific 
progress and strong explanations of the mind-brain). 
1.1.1 Historical Reviews of Scientific Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences (Some Non-Reductionist 
Approaches) 
Reductionist models are not the only accounts of scientific progress emphasizing the importance 
of different areas of science fitting together; non-reductive alternatives similarly emphasize this 
notion as central to scientific progress and strong explanations.  Some non-reductive alternatives 
include the following concepts put forward to explain the nature of how different areas fit 
together in a way that is constitutive of progress and strong explanations: ‘interfield theories’ by 
Darden and Maull (1977), ‘integrative pluralism’ Mitchell (2002, 2003), ‘convergence’ by 
Roskies (2010), and ‘seamless integration’ by Piccinini and Craver (2011). 
During Nagel’s time, the focus was on relations between different theories within different areas 
of science (Darden and Maull 1977, 43).  Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction model demonstrated 
the derivational reduction of a theory from a secondary science to a theory from the primary 
science (ibid).  Instead of trying to understand the relations between different areas of science by 
focusing on their theories, Darden and Maull shift their focus to understanding the kinds of 
relations that exist between fields in their (1977) paper ‘Interfield Theories’.  Briefly, examples 
of fields include cytology, genetics, biochemistry, etc. (ibid).  Fields may contain a theory or 
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multiple theories; genetics, for example, contains the classical theory of the gene (ibid).  
Theories such as the classical theory of the gene are what they dub ‘intrafield theories’ – i.e., 
theories that exist within a particular field.  Finally, interrelations between different fields can be 
generated via what they call ‘interfield theories’ (ibid).  Interfield theories bridge different fields 
of science, resulting in scientific progress.  To better understand how interfield theories 
constitute progress, I begin by reviewing what a field is, the kinds of relations that can exist 
between them, and the motivations for generating an interfield theory.  I elaborate on their 
account of interfield theories by drawing on their example of the chromosome theory of 
Mendelian heredity and state its implications for scientific progress and the notion of fitting 
together.18   
Darden and Maull define the term field as a field of science possessing the following 
characteristics: (a) a field must have a central problem, (b) it must possess a domain of items that 
are understood as facts relating to that problem, (c) it must possess general goals and explanatory 
factors guiding scientists on how to solve the central problem, (d) it must possess its respective 
techniques and methodologies, (e) they frequently employ their own special vocabulary, and 
sometimes (f) but not always, fields will have concepts, laws, and theories that are associated 
with the central problem (a) that help to realize its explanatory goals (c) (ibid, 44).   
For example, in the field of physical chemistry, the central problem (a) was to determine how 
different parts of molecules interact, its domain (b) consisted of molecules, their respective parts 
and interactions, and the development of new techniques (d) such as mass spectrometry have 
allowed scientists to determine (c) the structure and interaction of molecules.19  At any given 
 
18
 While Darden and Maull (1977), Mitchell (2002, 2003), and Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) write and focus on 
examples in the biological sciences specifically, I have included them in my survey since the biological sciences are 
housed under the larger umbrella of cognitive neuroscience and/or (more generally) the mind-brain sciences.  
Recall that George A. Miller defined ‘cognitive neuroscience’ as the following: “Cognitive neuroscientists attempt 
to discover the molecular logic of organic knowledge systems, i.e., the principles that, in addition to the principles 
of physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, govern the behavior of inanimate matter in living knowledge 
systems” (Gazzaniga 2000, 11, emphasis mine). 
In a different characterization, Bechtel and Richardson (1993) use the term biology generally to characterize the 
‘life sciences’ as comprising, “… physiology, cellular and molecular biology, biochemistry, genetics, evolutionary 
biology and neuroscience” (xvii).  Therefore, I have included accounts focusing biology since biology is considered 
by many to be a part of the mind-brain sciences. 
19
 For similar examples in the fields of cytology, genetics, and biochemistry, see pages 46-47 (Darden and Maull, 
1977). 
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time, a field may contain either no theory, a working theory, multiple competing theories, or one 
main successful theory (ibid, 48).20  Sometimes when theories are well confirmed they become 
part of the general domain, and one might consequently look for a  ‘more encompassing’ theory 
to explain said domain (ibid).  One final point worth noting is that fields cannot be reduced to 
another.  Darden and Maull state: “… reduction in the sense of derivation would be impossible 
between such elements of a field as techniques and explanatory goals” (ibid).  Presumably, this is 
because they consider fields to be distinct (insofar as they possess unique sets of vocabulary, a 
specific problem and set of tools to address the problem etc.) making it impossible for a classical 
reduction to occur.21  Taken together, this is how Darden and Maull understand and use the term 
field.22 23 
Fields bear relations to other fields via what Darden and Maull dub ‘interfield theories.24  An 
interfield theory describes and explains relations that exist between different fields.  Darden and 
Maull highlight four main types of relations that can hold between fields.  The first type is the 
part-whole relation whereby one field demonstrates a specific physical location for some 
entity/process assumed in a different field.  For example, the chromosome theory of Mendelian 
heredity posited that Mendelian genes were located either in or on the chromosomes; the 
physical location required specification.  Cytology had the tools necessary to specify the physical 
location of genes (ibid, 49).  With this knowledge from cytology (i.e., that genes are in the 
chromosomes), the relation between the two fields became complete, hence it being a part-whole 
relation (ibid).  The second type of relation is the physical nature relation; here, a field may 
present the physical nature of some entity/process held by another field.  For example, “… 
biochemistry provided the physical nature of the repressor, an entity postulated in the operon 
theory” (ibid).  The third relation is a structural relation and occurs when one field investigates 
 
20
 It is important to note here that although Darden and Maull (1977) use the term ‘competing theories’, they 
maintain that in general, fields do not compete and nor do theories from different areas of science. 
21
 This remark clearly demonstrates the authors’ wanting to distance and distinguish themselves from Nagel and 
inter-theoretic reduction type models.   
22
 Cf. also Toulmin’s (1972) term ‘discipline’, Lakatos’s (1970) ‘research programme’, and Kuhn’s (1962) ‘paradigm’ 
contrasting with their definition of a ‘field’.   
23
 See Darden and Maull’s (1977) pages 45-46 for a detailed comparison between their concept of a field and 
Toulmin’s (1972) ‘discipline’. 
24
 Interfield theories, Darden and Maull maintain, best describe the kinds of relations between fields in biology 
(contra reductive relations) (Darden and Maull 1977, 48). 
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the structural property of a given entity/process and another field investigates the functional 
properties of the same entity/process (ibid).   For example, physical chemistry provided the 
structure of molecules and biochemistry provided the function of the molecules – this example 
constitutes a structural relation (ibid).  Finally, a causal relation occurs when the entities/ 
processes assumed by one field are the causes of the effects found and studied by a different 
field.  As an example, Darden and Maull cite the theory of allosteric regulation which provides 
“… a causal explanation of the interaction between the physicochemical structure of certain 
enzymes and a characteristic biochemical pattern of activity” (ibid).  These relations are not 
mutually exclusive; a part-whole relation can also be a causal relation, a structural relation may 
also be a causal relation, etc. (ibid).   
Darden and Maull note three motivating factors for generating an interfield theory.  First, there is 
motivation to generate an interfield theory when there are relationships between two fields which 
are already known to exist.  They note: “… prior to the proposal of operon theory, the fields of 
genetics and biochemistry were known to be related; to cite one of many instances, the physical 
nature of the gene was specified biochemically as DNA.  Thus, further relations could be 
expected between the fields and might lead to the generation of an interfield theory” (ibid).  
Secondly, one might generate an interfield theory when two fields are investigating different 
aspects of the same phenomena (ibid).25  Thirdly, one might generate an interfield theory if there 
are questions in each field that cannot be answered by their respective resources (i.e., by their 
methods, tools, techniques, etc.).26 
To better understand the nature of interfield theories, Darden and Maull draw on examples from 
the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity (which bridged the fields of cytology and 
genetics); the operon theory (which bridged the fields of genetics and biochemistry); and the 
theory of allosteric regulation (which bridged the fields of biochemistry and physical chemistry) 
(ibid, 48).   
 
25
 This motivation will become clearer in the following paragraph wherein the example of the chromosome theory 
of Mendelian heredity is described. 
26
Similarly, I elaborate on this motivation in the following paragraph. 
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For the sake of brevity, I focus on their first example.  When cytology emerged as a field in the 
early 1800’s, one of its central problems was to answer where within the germ cell ‘hereditary 
material’ can be found (ibid, 51).  By the 1900’s, it was generally accepted that chromosomes 
answered that question.  Theories of heredity emerged in the early 1900’s in part due to the 
discovery of Mendel’s law (ibid).  Mendel noted the hereditary traits of garden peas and crossed 
them artificially and proposed a law of inheritance based on his findings (ibid).  This one law is 
not solely responsible for the emergence of genetics, however.  Instead, genetics emerged 
approximately between 1900 and 1905 with the “… independent discovery of Mendel’s law by 
Hugo de Vries and Carl Correns and with the promulgation of Mendel’s experimental approach 
by William Bateson” (ibid).   
By 1903, cytology and genetics were investigating the same phenomena (i.e., heredity), but were 
asking importantly different questions about it.27  For example, cytology was concerned with the 
location of hereditary material within the cell; genetics was concerned with explaining the 
patterns of inheritance within genes (ibid, 49).  However, there were questions within each field 
that could not be answered from within their respective fields’ resources (ibid, 51-52).28  For 
example, genetics studied patterns of inheritance and their methods of investigation included 
artificial breeding; cytology studied the location of hereditary material within cells via methods 
such as various types of microscopy (ibid, 49-50).  Thus, part of the motivation to generate an 
interfield theory in this instance was because genetics did not have the appropriate set of 
tools/methods to answer the question of where genes were physically located.  On the other 
hand, cytology had the tools and resources required to answer this question and provide the 
specific physical location of genes inquired by geneticists (ibid, 52).29 
 
27
 Recall that this is the second motivations listed by Darden and Maull as a reason to generate an interfield theory 
(Darden and Maull 1977, 49). 
28
 This is the third motivation listed by Darden and Maull as a reason to generate an interfield theory; thus, there 
were numerous motivating factors around during the early 20th c for interfield theories. 
29
 This nicely demonstrates one of the kinds of relations – i.e., the part-whole relation – that can exist between 
fields.  As Darden and Maull (1977) explain: “… the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity postulated that the 
Mendelian genes were in or on the chromosomes; cytology provided the physical location of the genes.  With 
more specific knowledge, the theory explained the relation in more detail: the genes are part of (in) the 
chromosomes” (49). 
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The chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity is an instance of an interfield theory created to 
bridge the fields of cytology and genetics in a way that advanced knowledge of heredity.  In 
bridging the two fields, the interfield theory unified knowledge in each field which allowed for 
deeper explanations such as the similarities between chromosomes and genes (ibid).   
According to Darden and Maull (1977), when one shifts the attention away from the traditional 
view of science whereby philosophers focus on the relations between theories – specifically, 
theories viewed as being the same in kind (i.e., as axiomatic systems) and the relations between 
them as derivationally reductive – to focus on the relations between fields, a multitude of virtues 
emerge (ibid, 60).   For one thing, a host of similarities shared between theories may have gone 
unnoticed with the Received View still in place.30  For example, they note that their analysis 
revealed important relations between fields (ibid, 61).  That is, there are “… important 
similarities between the generation and function of relationships which, on the older analysis, are 
in the different categories of “reductive” and “nonreductive” and would not have been seen as 
similar” (ibid).  Thus, interfield theories can bring into awareness new items for a domain that 
previously went unmentioned (and would have continued this way without the introduction of an 
interfield theory).  Secondly, interfield theories can solve some theoretical problems by 
introducing a new idea pertaining to the relations between two fields, such as the idea that 
chromosomes are the physical location of genes (ibid 52-53, 59).  Thirdly, they aid in answering 
questions that are unanswerable from within one specific field (as was demonstrated in the 
example of the chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity) (ibid, 59).  Fourthly, interfield 
theories can help predict new items for the domains of each respective fields.  Fifthly, interfield 
theories can generate a new, collaborative line of research fields.31  There are thus numerous 
virtues of interfield theories.  Importantly, interfield theories involve the fitting together of 
different fields of science in a non-reductive way that enables progress and strong explanations.   
 
30
 According to Suppe (1974), the Received View, which was almost universally accepted between the 1920’s to 
the 1950’s, held that the structure and nature of theories were the most fundamental topic in philosophy of 
science, since theories were considered to be a ‘vehicle of scientific knowledge’ and therefore must be involved in 
almost every part of science (3).  The Received View held that theories were “… axiomatic calculi which are given a 
partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules” (ibid).  Further, as Darden and Maull (1977) 
note, the relationship between theories was understood as derivationally reductive (60).   
31
 By focusing on the reduction of theories, one potentially misses out on opportunities for collaborative research 
projects which can lead to new discoveries and insights. 
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On Darden and Maull’s (1977) view, progress in modern biology occurs when interfield theories 
bridge together the biological and the physical sciences.32  On their view, it seems that at least 
some explanations in the life sciences cannot be complete without interfield theories.  Darden 
and Maull do not explicitly make this claim, however, it follows that if it is the case that there are 
questions and problems that are unanswerable from within one respective field F1, then F1’s 
explanations and knowledge can only go so far.  Eventually, due to conceptual, technical and 
methodological limitations, explanations and the understanding of some phenomena investigated 
by F1 will plateau.  However, interfield theories have the potential to overcome this plateau by 
bridging F1 with F2 (which is equipped with the proper resources to help answer some of the 
questions F1 is unable to).33   
Indeed, Darden and Maull strongly maintain that interfield theories are crucial for progress: “… 
the chromosome theory was the first of a series of interfield theories … that advanced our 
understanding of the relationship between the biological and physical sciences and resulted in 
progress in modern biology” (ibid, 62, emphasis mine).  The aspect of fitting together comes into 
play in the different ways that two fields can be bridged together via an interfield theory.  It 
could be the fitting together of a structure of one field to a function of another field, or an entity 
of one field with a physical location of another field, etc.  Regardless of those details, the fitting 
together of different aspects from different fields via an interfield theory is important for 
progress (e.g., new discoveries, new predictions, a new and deepened understanding/explanation 
of a given phenomenon, etc.).   
 
32
 This is what unification looks like on their view.  They call this the “… progressive unification (bridging) of the 
biological and physical sciences (Darden and Maull 1977, 61). 
33
 It seems that, up until this point, Bickle might agree.  In fact, this general narrative fits with his description of 
and argument for the importance of transdisciplinary projects and higher-level theorizing (i.e., there are some 
questions that are simply unanswerable at the cellular/molecular level; one needs to look to different areas of 
science using different techniques such as single-cell recording in physiology, biological modelling, and FMRI in 
neuroscience to help get a deeper and complete view of some phenomena).  According to Bickle’s notion of a 
transdisciplinary project both high and low-level neuroscience need to fit together for progress (see my footnote 
15 on where to find more details on Bickle et al.’s (2000) transdisciplinary project).  At least at this point Darden 
and Maull’s and Bickle’s views seem compatible.  Where they part ways is the details of fitting together where 
Bickle proposes a strongly reductive view and Darden and Maull a non-reductive view.  Regardless of those details, 
however, a commonality linking the two is that there must be interaction(s) between different fields of science and 
aspects of those different fields must be fit together in order to have deeper and more complete explanations of 
some phenomenon.    
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In sum, the aspect of fitting together thus comes into play in the different ways that two fields 
can be bridged together via an interfield theory.  Interfield theories enable the fitting together of 
different aspects of different fields.  For example, an interfield theory might involve the fitting 
together of the structure of one field to a function in another field.  This fitting together 
constitutes progress insofar as it results in new discoveries, predictions, and a more complete and 
epistemically strong explanation about a given phenomenon. 
Like Darden and Maull (1977), Mitchell (2002, 2003) positions herself in opposition to 
reductionist accounts of the relationship between different areas of science and scientific 
progress.  Mitchell rejects both classical inter-theoretic versions of reductionism (e.g., Nagel 
1949, 1970) as well as more current, ‘new wave’ versions of reductionism (e.g., Bickle 1997, 
2003; Churchland 1986), and presents an alternative, non-reductive account of the relationship 
between different areas of science and scientific progress (Michell 2003, 185-186).34   
Alternatives to reduction tend to be pluralistic and Mitchell’s account is no exception (ibid, 186).  
However, Mitchell maintains that most pluralist accounts are untenable.  Mitchell rejects the 
‘anything goes’ pluralism commonly associated with Feyerabend (1975, 1981), stating that 
condoning any and all ‘possibly inconsistent’ theories is just as unacceptable as reductionism 
(ibid).  Non-Feyerabendian versions of pluralism tend to appeal to isolationist theories, such as 
Sherman’s (1988) ‘levels of analysis’ account (hereafter LOA).   
Sherman’s LOA identified four levels of questions for the biological sciences: the level of 
evolutionary origin, of current reproductive function, of ontogeny, and of mechanisms (Mitchell 
2002, 57).35  According to LOA, scientists working on a phenomena – e.g., the division of labor 
in social insects – would investigate it from within their own respective level (which asks its own 
respective questions) (Mitchell 2003, 187).  For example, scientists working in the evolutionary 
origin level would ask questions concerning why a certain behavior/trait arose at a certain period 
in time; those working at the mechanistic level would investigate the “… environmental triggers 
 
34
 The biggest reason to reject reductionism stems from the fact that reductionism with its focus on laws and 
theories just does not seem to adequately capture the nature and relations of the life sciences (Mitchell 2003).  For 
general criticisms of classical reduction see Darden and Maull (1977), Fodor (1974, 1975), Feyerabend (1962, 
1966), Wimsatt (1972), Van Riel (2011), etc.  For criticisms of current ‘new wave’ reductionism, see Schouten and 
De Jong (1999).   
35
 See table 6.1 (page 201) for a visual representation of the LOA analysis (Mitchell 2003). 
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and hormonal or cognitive mechanisms that then issue in the behaviors”, etc. (ibid). According to 
LOA, levels are autonomous and do not (and need not) interact with other levels.  Accordingly, 
competition between explanations occurs solely within and not between levels; there can be a 
plurality of competing explanations only within a given level (Mitchell 2002, 57; 2003, 187).  If 
there is no competition between levels, and each level is strictly autonomous, there is no need for 
any kind of collaborative interaction between levels; each scientist would work from within their 
respective level on their respective questions.   
Mitchell draws on Darden and Maull (1977) to argue that this isolationist picture is 
fundamentally flawed (Mitchell 2003, 187).  That is, it conflicts with the history of science 
which is ripe with examples of fruitful collaborative and interdisciplinary projects between 
scientists working on questions at different levels (ibid).  While Sherman’s (1988) account may 
be representative of how some scientists work, it does not represent how all scientists work.  
Mitchell argues that the LOA account of how science works is thus mistaken and that its key 
mistake lies in its understanding of the epistemological structure of answers (Mitchell 2002, 57).  
That is: 
… scientific explanations often are causal explanations, identifying the set of conditions that 
give rise to the phenomenon of interest.  At the same time, complex phenomenon harbor 
multiple interacting causal processes and multiple levels of organization which all may be 
involved in the generation of the feature to be explained.  By disambiguating the question to 
be answered by an explanation … one is still left with a plurality of potential causes acting at 
a number of levels of organization which may well constitute compatible answers to that 
single question (ibid, emphasis mine).36  
Thus, due to the complex and dynamic nature of biological organisms, Mitchell argues pluralism 
is a better alternative to reductive options.  However, that pluralism cannot be a Feyerabendian 
‘anything goes’ pluralism, nor can it endorse isolationist views which conflict with the history of 
science.  Instead, Mitchell (2002, 2003) advances the concept of integrative pluralism to account 
 
36
 Bechtel and Richardson (1993) argue similarly against this kind of isolationist picture claiming that the causal 
dependence and interaction between different levels implies that narrow work in exclusively one level would be 
unable to provide an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of interest.   
23 
 
for the types of relations existing between levels which constitute strong explanations and 
scientific progress.37 
To better understand Mitchell’s concept of ‘integrative pluralism’, I begin by reviewing the 
earlier (2002, 2003) articulation of integrative pluralism, and then elaborate on Mitchell and 
Dietrich’s (2006) later version of integrative pluralism.  In articulating this concept, I introduce 
her distinction between competitive and compatible explanations, and elaborate on this via her 
example of the division of labor of social insect colonies.  Afterwards, I explain how the concept 
of integrative pluralism relates to the concept of fitting together and scientific progress. 
Mitchell’s integrative pluralism hinges on the distinction between competitive and compatible 
alternative explanations.  Mitchell notes that most philosophers of science have focused 
exclusively on the virtues of competitive alternatives (or hypotheses, explanations, etc.) such as 
Darwinian and Lamarckian theories of inheritance (Mitchell 2002, 56).  The argument in favor of 
competitive pluralism is that competition amongst different alternatives concerning the same 
phenomena of interest creates an optimal space for testing alternative explanations.  According to 
this view, science progresses when false alternatives are revealed (and accordingly ruled out and 
rejected) through this optimal testing space.38  Therefore, a plurality of competing explanations is 
desirable in that they increase the likelihood of ruling out false explanations, thus narrowing the 
scope of true explanations (ibid). 
Another argument in favor of competitive pluralism is advanced by Beaty (1987) and Kitcher 
(1991).  They argue that “… maintaining multiple, competing theories and explanations is 
 
37
 Importantly, other than offering Sherman’s (1988) description of levels in biology, Mitchell gives no description 
of what she means by levels.  Thus, I operate on the assumption that she accepts Sherman’s definition and uses it 
accordingly.  While Sherman’s ‘levels’ are described in the biological sciences, and Mitchell seems to accept this 
definition, it is unclear whether Mitchell would also accept the traditional picture of levels described by Bickle (see 
Bickle 2006, page 413 for illustration). 
38
 C.f. Bacon’s ([1620] 1902) notion of crucial experiments whereby Bacon took crucial experiments (hereafter CE) 
as experiments that could be the neutral arbiter between two competing (rival) theories.  This was done by finding 
a prediction which two (or more) theories disagreed on, then conducting an experiment to see which makes the 
correct prediction.  Theory A predicts x and theory B predicts not-x; a CE whose result was x would demonstrate 
theory A to be the correct theory.  As an example, consider the measurement of the bending of light by the sun.  
The general theory of relativity and classical mechanics differ by a factor of two.  Eddington’s experiment 
demonstrated Einstein’s predictions to be correct, and this can thus be considered as a CE (on Bacon’s account) 
which contributed to the early acceptance of relativity.   
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deemed the rational strategy to adopt for the scientific community as a whole in order to hedge 
its bets against empirical uncertainty” (Mitchell 2002, 56).  While these accounts all advocate (a 
type of) pluralism, Mitchell argues their conceptualization of pluralism misconstrues how 
science is and should be done.  Mitchell’s main disagreement with these accounts is that they all 
seem to imply the goal of uncovering one true, overarching theory (ibid).39  That is, these 
accounts of competitive pluralism all assume “… that pluralism is temporary and strategic, but 
ultimately eliminable.  While this analysis correctly describes some of the diversity of models 
and explanations found in contemporary science, it fails to capture all of it.  The remainder is 
constituted by compatible, not mutually exclusive, alternatives” (ibid, 56-57, emphases mine).   
Mitchell argues many instances in the biological sciences are constituted by compatible 
explanations.  For example, a social insect colony is compositionally, dynamically, and 
evolutionarily complex.40  It is compositionally complex in that it is made up of many, non-
random parts (ibid, 58).  Dynamically, it hosts a multitude of interacting causes, some of those 
comprising linear functions, and some comprising non-linear functions (ibid).  Evolutionarily, 
social insect colonies exhibit a diversity of “… historically contingent, adaptive responses to 
environmental challenges” (ibid).  Mitchell considers three different self-organization 
explanations of the division of labor in social insect colonies: a ‘genetic diversity for threshold 
response’ by Page and Mitchell (1991, 1998), a ‘foraging for work algorithm’ by Tofts and 
Franks (1992), and a ‘learning algorithm by Deneubourg, Pasteels, Fresneau, and Lachaud 
(1987) (Mitchell 2002, 60-61).   
Each of these explanations focuses on a single causal factor in the explanation of division of 
labor in a social insect colony.  Instead of viewing each explanation (all located at the 
ontogenetic level) as competing, Mitchell argues they are better understood as compatible 
explanations.  This is because each explanation represents an idealized abstraction from the 
actual, concrete phenomenon (i.e., the division of labor of social insects) (ibid, 63).  For 
 
39
 As we shall see, Mitchell’s account of integrative pluralism recognizes a plurality of ‘true theories’ not one all 
encompassing theory.  To foreshadow, instead of one true theory of the division of labor in social insects, there 
will be one true theory for honeybees, one true theory for leafcutter ants, etc. (Mitchell 2002,67). 
40
 She appeals to similar examples such as the origin of an infectious disease responsible for amphibian decline 
(Mitchell and Dietrich 2006), and Culver (1999) and Koonce and Locci’s (1999) example of Lake Erie as instances of 
compatible, not mutually exclusive explanations for complex and dynamical biological phenomena.   
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example, Page and Mitchell’s (1991, 1998) genetic model focuses solely on individual genetic 
diversity while ignoring any/all other factors (Mitchell 2002, 63).41   Thus, despite residing at the 
same level, the three explanations do not actually compete because they each describe only what 
would occur in ‘one non-overlapping world’ (ibid, 64).42   
What kinds of relations hold between compatible explanations at the same level?  Mitchell 
(2002, 2003) believes the answer lies in what she calls integrative pluralism.  Integrative 
pluralism rests on the distinction between theoretical modelling and the application of the model 
in the explanation of some concrete phenomenon (Mitchell 2002, 66).  At the theoretical level of 
the social insect example, pluralism is justified since it presents three different explanations 
referring to three different idealized worlds.  However, at the application level, integration is 
necessary, since no matter how complex and how many causes contribute to some biological 
phenomenon, this phenomenon has only one causal history (ibid).   
Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) elaborate on the notion of integrative pluralism by defining it as: 
“… a view of the diversity of scientific explanations that endorses close study and modeling of 
different causes and different levels of organization but calls for integration of multiple accounts 
in the explanation of a concrete phenomenon” (S76).  Therefore, if the three self-organization 
explanations are understood as partial explanations, then a correct theory of the division of labor 
of social insects would be one that properly integrated all three partial accounts at the 
application level.   
However, Mitchell notes, while integration of partial explanations is required for the explanation 
of a concrete phenomenon, it is unlikely that integration will occur at the theoretical level 
(Mitchell 2002, 67).  This is because the “… diversity of ‘solutions’ to adaptive problems and the 
historical contingencies influencing those variable paths that preclude global, theoretical 
unification” (ibid).  For example, ants and bees display similar patterns of division of labor.  
 
41
 The other two models similarly focus on one aspect of the division of labor in social insects while ignoring 
any/all other factors (Mitchell 2002, 64).   
42
 C.f. Cartwright (1994, 2000) and Wimsatt (2007) for further discussion of idealized models and the falsity of 
models in science.  While both views of the falsity of models/theories help make sense of compatible scientific 
models, Mitchell believes that her integrative pluralism offers a better solution for making sense of compatible 
model examples such as the one described above, and that more can be said on the nature of compatible models 
in the biological sciences and how they can be integrated (Mitchell 2002, 65).    
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Despite similarities, what may at first seem like a plausible explanation of the same phenomenon 
will be dependent on the “… particular features and pathways that occur in each case” (ibid).  
This, however, does not sanction a Feyerabendian ‘anything goes’ pluralism, because, as 
Mitchell notes, there will be only one ‘true’ integrated explanation for honeybees, and one ‘true’ 
integrated explanation for leaf-cutting ants, etc. (ibid).  Mitchell concludes by noting that while 
explanations at the same level can be compatible due to their representing different abstract 
idealizations, the true nature of explanation requires integration.  Importantly, given the multiple 
causal factors and historical contingencies of organisms in the biological sciences, integration at 
the application level will be piecemeal.  Accordingly, pluralism with respect to compatible 
explanations “… can and should coexist with integration in the generation of explanations of 
complex and varied biological phenomena” (ibid). 
How does integrative pluralism relate to the notion of fitting together and scientific progress?  
The answer to this involves the nature of organisms studied in the biological sciences.  That is, 
scientists in the biological sciences must frequently make use of simplified and abstract models; 
these models usually focus on one feature while ignoring others.  Accordingly, these models only 
account for partial causes.  In such cases, Mitchell maintains that a more accurate explanation of 
a phenomenon will require the integration of “… diverse theories of all the relevant features that 
uniquely characterize a given phenomenon” (Mitchell 2003, 190).  Thus, the integration of 
partial explanations constitutes the ‘hallmark of better science’ (ibid).  To drive the point home, 
integration is the hallmark of better science.  Good science involves the integration of partial 
explanations.  To make progress into biological sciences – i.e., to advance accurate and complete 
explanations – involves integration, and the concept of integration is where the notion of fitting 
together comes into play.  That is, in the social insect example, it is the partial causal 
explanations of self-organization that must be fit together at the concrete application level to 
produce an epistemically strong explanation of the division of labor in the social insect colony. 
In sum, Mitchell (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) advocate an alternative to 
reduction and non-reductive pluralist accounts of scientific explanations and progress, which 
focuses on the relations between compatible explanations.  They call this integrative pluralism 
whereby different, yet compatible explanations can co-exist within a level, but must be 
integrated to provide a complete understanding of a concrete phenomenon. 
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A more recent alternative to reductionism is advanced by Roskies (2010) in her paper ‘Saving 
Subtraction: A reply to Van Orden and Paap’, where she argues that scientific progress occurs 
when different pieces of evidence in the mind-brain sciences converge on a conclusion via a 
method she dubs ‘functional triangulation.  I begin by laying out the motivation behind Roskies’ 
proposal.  I then introduce three distinct kinds of functional triangulation and show how Roskies’ 
account relates to the notion of scientific progress and fitting together. 
Roskies’ main motivation is to demonstrate, contra Van Orden and Paap (1997), that contrastive 
methods (e.g., classical subtractive methods) commonly used in cognitive neuroscience can and 
do enhance our understanding of the mind.43 44  Roskies believes their dismissive attitude 
towards neuroimaging is due to their failure to properly contextualize neuroimaging evidence 
within the broader scope of the mind-brain sciences (Roskies 2010, 640).  Far from conceding 
that individual neuroimaging experiments stand on their own by producing conclusive evidence, 
Roskies states they must instead be considered “… pieces in a larger puzzle of inference to the 
best explanation” (ibid).  Roskies argues that neuroimaging advances knowledge of the mind-
brain when they are involved in a method called functional triangulation.  Functional 
triangulation works when “… information from other task comparisons and other studies are 
brought to bear on the interpretation of experimental data” (ibid, 640-641).  Functional 
triangulation (hereafter FT) is a method by which claims about the mind-brain are substantiated 
via a mass task/study comparison when the results of which all converge on a given claim.45 
A close reading of Roskies’ (2010) paper reveals multiple kinds of FT.  Despite this, no clear 
taxonomy is advanced; in what follows, I attempt to do this work by distinguishing two main 
 
43
 Roskies explains the subtractive method in the following way: “In subtractive studies, task-related changes in 
blood flow are identified  by subtraction of the image intensity of a blood flow profile due to the performance of 
one task from that of another.  Thus, suppose task A involves processes X, Y, and Z and task B involves the 
processes X and Y.  The blood flow profile generated by performing task A will indicate increased activity in the 
brain regions which support processes X, Y, and Z, while the profile generated by performing task B will show 
increased activation in those areas involved in supporting processes X and Y.  … if the results of performing task B 
are subtracted from Task A, the resulting subtraction or ‘difference image’ will reflect the blood flow differences 
associated with differences in neural activity between the performance of task A and task B.  In this case, the 
regions subserving process Z will be isolated” (Roskies 2010, 638). 
44
 Roskies highlights four key criticisms that Van Orden and Paap (1997) wage against the use of neuroimaging to 
better understand the mind.  I will not be addressing the four criticisms at large (as they do not directly relate to 
the main goal of my dissertation), but will refer to them only when necessary. 
45
 C.f. Campbell and Fiske (1959) and Jick (1979) for earlier articulations of the concept of triangulation. 
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types of FT – micro and macro-FT.  Under micro-FT is what Roskies calls ‘within-subject’ FT 
(hereafter WLFT).46  WLFT employs different comparison tasks within the same lab experiment 
where they are (ideally) designed to “… enable comparisons between tasks within different 
combinations of psychological components of interest” (ibid, 641).  As an example of how this 
works in practice, Roskies cites a semantic processing experiment from her own lab (Roskies et 
al. (2001)) where experimenters used several different comparison tasks – a hard and easy 
categorization task, a synonym task, and a rhyme task – to hone in more specifically on the brain 
region(s) involved in semantic processing.  Each of these tasks were “… performed on pairs of 
words, matched for frequency and length, and both the hard and easy categorization tasks used 
the same words” (ibid).  The lab researchers began by comparing the difference in activity in 
brain regions between the easy and the hard categorization task with the hypothesis that the latter 
would require more semantic analysis than the former (ibid).  This comparison revealed “… a 
frontal region modulated by task …” (ibid).  In order to functionally triangulate from within 
Roskies’ lab/experiment and accrue greater confidence with respect to the nature of semantic 
processing and its associated brain region(s), additional task comparisons were performed via 
synonym and rhyme tasks.  Data from these tasks were acquired and analyzed to identify 
whether the initial brain region was active.  The experimenters found that the same frontal region 
identified earlier was active in the synonym task, but not for the rhyme task (ibid).  Roskies et al. 
(2001) concluded that these findings together helped lend support to the initial hypothesis that 
the frontal region was involved in semantic processing (Roskies 2010, 641).   
In this example, WLFT begins with a certain goal (e.g., to identify (a) brain region(s) involved in 
semantic processing) and a certain hypothesis (e.g., that the frontal region is implicated in 
 
46
 It is not entirely clear here what Roskies means by the ‘subject’ in her ‘within-subject’ (Roskies 2010, 641).  She 
could mean functional triangulation occurring within one individual test subject (i.e., within one human, one 
animal, one organism).  For example, sometimes two or more different experimental conditions will be explored 
within the same person, animal, etc.  However, Roskies could also mean functional triangulation as it occurs within 
one particular lab across subjects (since there are typically multiple ‘subjects’ in a given experiment).  In my 
dissertation, I take her to be mean the latter, and will thus refer to her ‘within-subject’ FT as ‘within-lab’ FT 
(hereafter WLFT).  It is important to note that adopting the latter interpretation does not rule out that the former 
interpretation is also required. 
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semantic processing).  That hypothesis gains more support with each additional task comparison 
that points to the conclusion that the frontal region is implicated in semantic processing (ibid).47 
While the conclusions reached via WLFT may be more accurate than conclusions from a lab 
employing only one or even no task comparison, WLFT is not sufficient for the stronger kind of 
claims Roskies wants to make (i.e., that functional triangulation and convergence imply that a 
claim about the mind-brain stands on firm epistemic footing).  As Roskies notes, the results from 
one lab experiment in isolation represents nothing more than “… evidence for one way of 
parceling out cognitive function over another …” and alone cannot claim the status of 
‘conclusive evidence’ (ibid).  What would be required for ‘conclusive evidence’?  What 
demarcates weak from strong evidence?  Roskies answers: 
Almost invariably, functional triangulation is also achieved with reference to other imaging 
experiments, usually those involving other tasks that would seem to involve a like component 
….  In such cases, the fact that imaging results are reported with reference to a canonical brain 
space helps the scientist to determine whether the same region as the one she has seen in her 
experiment is active in other experiments that are hypothesized to involve a similar 
psychological component.  Convergence across multiple experiments is key to epistemic 
warrant when it comes to attributing function to anatomical regions (ibid, emphasis mine).48 
The type of FT involved in this quotation is importantly different from WLFT (which focuses on 
comparisons within a single lab experiment); as such, I have chosen to classify it under macro-
FT in that it involves the comparison of multiple tasks from multiple different labs/experiments.49  
I identify two types of FT under this category: ALFT-1 and ALFT-2.  ALFT-1 involves cases 
where there are multiple task comparisons from multiple different labs/experiments from within 
the same area of science (e.g., the comparison of the results from 26 lab experiments in 
psychology).  ALFT-2 involves cases where there are comparisons from different 
 
47
 I classify this type of FT under micro-FT insofar as it involves/focuses on multiple task comparisons from within 
one individual lab/experiment.   
48
 One important note concerning this quotation.  Due to the aim of her paper, Roskies talks about the importance 
for attributing ‘function to anatomical regions’ (i.e., structure-function conclusions).  However, it is likely that her 
views on convergence here would extend to cover other (non-structure-function) conclusions borne out of the 
mind-brain sciences. 
49
 Due to this type of FT involving multiple labs/experiments, I will call it across-labs FT and abbreviate it as ALFT.   
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labs/experiments from multiple different areas of science (e.g., the comparison of results from 
different lab experiments focusing on semantic processing in psychology, molecular biology, 
physiology, neuroscience, etc.).50  Roskies states: “… results from psychology, neurology, or 
neurophysiology are frequently referred to in interpreting imaging data and are also used to 
further test hypothesized conclusions from studies already performed” (ibid, 642).51   
FT has different forms, but suffice it to say that for Roskies, FT plays a critical role making 
headway in understanding the mind-brain (ibid, 642).  Roskies’ picture of scientific progress is 
(at least, prima facie) compatible with the image of scientific progress endorsed by Darden and 
Maull (1977), and Mitchell (2002, 2003). That is, Roskies’ picture of scientific progress is one of 
bootstrapping, whereby complete and strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain come 
together piecemeal.  Roskies explains: “Knowledge derived from other techniques for 
investigating brain function is combined with insight from psychological theories and imaging 
studies in order to yield interpretations that cohere with our best theories” (Roskies 2010, 660).  
Both Darden and Maull (1977) and Mitchell (2002, 2003) – albeit in different ways – emphasize 
the fact that there are often questions that are unanswerable with the techniques, resources, and 
methods from within one field that another field has the resources to answer.52  For Roskies’, this 
is where ALFT-2 comes into play by building an understanding of the mind-brain drawing on the 
different techniques/methods from different areas of science all trying to understand some aspect 
of the mind-brain.   
Thus, the notion of fitting together in Roskies’ account comes into play with the results from 
either (a) different task comparisons from within a lab being fit together in a way that yields a 
convergent claim, (b) different task comparisons from multiple different labs/experiments are fit 
together in a way that yields a convergent claim, or finally (c) that different task comparisons 
from within different labs/experiments from different areas of science utilizing different methods 
 
50
 It could be argued that ALFT-2 is best suited for establishing well-confirmed conclusions in the mind-brain 
sciences since it is (or could be) a combination of WLFT and ALFT-1.  Roskies herself does not explicitly argue for 
this. 
51
 Here Roskies directs the reader to see Cohen et al. (2008) for an example of this case. 
52
 Even Bickle’s ruthlessly reductive view concedes this point, which is particularly illuminated with his example of 
the importance of transdisciplinary projects. 
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and techniques are fit together in a way that yields a convergent claim.53 54  It is in this way that 
progress and strong explanations in the mind-brain sciences are achieved. 
In sum, on Roskies (2010) account, when the results from different lab experiments from 
different areas of science (ALFT-2) converge on the same/similar result we gain new insights 
and knowledge about the mind-brain.  The fitting together of those results is key to progress 
because when convergence is achieved, there are good reasons to believe that the claim in 
question stands on firm epistemic footing. 
The last alternative to reduction I consider in this chapter is the concept of ‘seamless integration’ 
advanced by Piccinini and Craver (2011).55  Piccinini and Craver (2011) argue that mechanistic 
explanations are superior to all other types on offer in the mind-brain sciences in that they offer 
“… deeper, better confirmed and more useful descriptions …” (ibid, 307).  Mechanistic 
explanations produce reliable claims about the mind-brain by seamlessly integrating results from 
psychological and neuroscientific research.  To flesh out their account, I begin by describing 
functional analysis and mechanistic explanation.  Following this, I cite their example of the 
neurotransmitter and chemical neurotransmission to introduce their concept of seamless 
integration.  I close by indicating how seamless integration relates to the notions of fitting 
together and progress.   
Piccinini and Craver (2011) note there is consensus that the psychological capacities studied by 
psychology are explained functionally (ibid, 286).  They call this explanation ‘functional 
analysis’ which they describe as “… the analysis of a capacity in terms of the functional 
properties of a system and their organization” (ibid).  There are three main types of functional 
analysis, depending on the kind of functional properties being investigated: task analysis 
(Cummins 1975; Dennett 1978), functional analysis via internal states (Fodor 1965, 1968; Stich 
 
53
 Importantly, no strong examples of (b) or (c) are provided in Roskies’ (2010) work. 
54
 One might also note some compatibility between (b) and (c) and what is required for adequate empirical 
support for the assumptions of the primary science in Nagel’s inter-theoretic reduction via his essential condition.  
Recall that the essential condition requires that the assumptions of the primary field are well supported empirical 
evidence coming from different fields of study (which presumably use different methods and techniques) which fit 
together to provide strong empirical support. 
55
 Again, there are, of course, other alternatives, but to review every and each reductive and non-reductive 
account of explanation and progress would be beyond the scope of this dissertation.  See footnote 8 of this 
chapter for other non-reductive accounts not explored in detail here. 
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1983), and boxology (Fodor 1965, 1968) (Piccinini and Craver 2011, 286).  Task analysis 
involves the decomposition of some capacity into its ‘subcapacities and their organization’; 
function analysis via internal states involves analyzing a capacity in terms of its internal states 
and their interactions; and boxology involves the decomposition of some capacity into a ‘set of 
functionally individuated components’ (often represented in diagrams as black boxes), their 
processes and organization (ibid).  Importantly, it is typically believed that to explain some 
phenomenon properly and fully, functional analysis need only appeal to the functional properties 
of a given phenomenon.56 
A mechanistic explanation involves describing “… capacities (functions, behaviors, activities) of 
a system as a whole in terms of some of its components, their properties and capacities 
(including their functions, behaviors and activities), and the way they are organized together” 
(ibid, 291, emphasis mine).  Components in a mechanism have both functional and structural 
properties; an explanation appealing to function with structure, or structure without function 
would be incomplete, according to Piccinini and Craver (ibid).  The functional properties of a 
component may include “… their activities or manifestations of their causal powers, dispositions 
or capacities …” and the structural properties of a component may include things like shape, 
size, location, and the organization of their sub-components (ibid).57 
Mechanistic explanations require identifying the crucial components of a given mechanism 
(ibid).  These components are sometimes identified in terms of their structural properties; for 
example, one might use anatomical techniques to parse out the nervous system based on the 
 
56
 Piccinini and Craver (2011) do not subscribe to the view that some capacity can be explained solely via analysis 
of functional properties and processes.  This belief hinges on the argument that functional analyses of psychology 
and mechanistic explanations of neuroscience are not autonomous and distinct.  For a full explication of this 
particular argument, see pages 286-291.  For the sake of understanding the concept of integration as integral to 
producing good explanations, it will suffice to note that Piccinini and Craver hold that functional analysis and 
mechanistic explanation are not distinct and autonomous, and that their description of mechanistic explanation is 
“… rich enough to incorporate the kinds of functional properties postulated by functional analysis” (290). 
57
 Piccinini and Craver (2011) note that the term ‘structure’ as used in mechanistic explanations does not entail 
that structural components are static, or possess one sole function, or are neatly organized and localizable, or 
stable.  Instead, structural components can consist of dynamic and complex feedback relations with other 
components in the same or different mechanism.  Further, on the potential complexity of structural components, 
they note that “… a structural component might be so distributed and diffuse as to defy tidy structural description, 
though it no doubt has one if we had the time, knowledge, and patience to formulate it” (291).   
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various types of neurons found in each structure and how they are connected (ibid).58  Sometimes 
components are identified functionally; here, Piccinini and Craver appeal to how the use of fMRI 
has been used on cases of brain damaged patients to help identify areas of the brain that play a 
role in certain cognitive functions (ibid).59  These functional components play a critical role for 
mechanistic explanation insofar as they help investigators identify the parts of the brain where 
different kinds of cognitive functions might be found and help allocate functions to different 
parts of the mechanism (ibid).  Importantly, mechanistic explanation, on their account, involves a 
two-way, interdependent constraint:  
… the presence of certain functional properties within a mechanism constrains the possible 
structures and configurations that might exhibit those properties.  … the presence of certain 
structures and configurations within a mechanism constrains the possible functions that might 
be exhibited by those structures and configurations (ibid). 
Mechanistic explanations can be complete or incomplete.  Piccinini and Craver call incomplete 
models of mechanisms ‘mechanistic sketches’ (ibid, 292).  Mechanistic sketches contain gaps, 
questions marks, boxes and arrows, etc., and do not count as a complete mechanistic explanation 
insofar as critical details have been left out (ibid).  Incomplete mechanistic models still have 
heuristic value, however.  That is, mechanistic sketches can provide users with just enough 
information relevant to the goal/task at hand (e.g., for running an introductory tutorial, for 
presenting a defense in a courtroom, etc.) (ibid).  While mechanistic sketches can be useful, they 
are nonetheless elliptical/incomplete insofar as they fail to provide a full-blown (i.e., consisting 
of all the necessary details) mechanistic explanation.   
The goal of mechanistic explanation is “… to reveal the causal structure of a system.  
Explanatory models are evaluated as good or bad to the extent that they capture, even dimly at 
times, aspects of that causal structure” (ibid, emphasis mine). Piccinini and Craver argue that 
defenders of functional analysis are committed to the very same norms guiding mechanistic 
 
58
Piccinini and Craver (2011) cite Brodmann’s decomposition of the cortex into various structural regions as an 
example of identifying components structurally (291). 
59
 fMRI (or functional magnetic resonance imaging) picks up on changes in blood oxygenation levels (the BOLD 
signal) which occur as the result of changes in blood flow and other related factors (Roskies 2010, 637).  Typically, 
changes in the BOLD signal are taken to correlate with neural activity. 
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explanations precisely because the former is an elliptical mechanistic explanation (ibid).  Thus, 
the two types of explanation, on their account, are inextricably linked. 
As an example of a mechanistic explanation, they choose the neurotransmitter and the 
mechanism of chemical neurotransmission (ibid, 304).  They list six criteria that can be used to 
determine whether a molecule is a neurotransmitter (ibid).60  They use this table to demonstrate 
how attributing function to the neurotransmitter involves showing how it fits into the mechanism 
of chemical neurotransmission.  That is, each criterion is meant to demonstrate that the 
neurotransmitter is “… organized – spatially, temporally, actively and quantitatively – into the 
mechanisms of chemical transmission” (ibid, 305).  For example: 
Spatially, the transmitter has to be located in the presynaptic neuron and contained within 
vesicles.  Temporally, if the synapse has to convey signals passed by electrical signals that are 
hundreds of milliseconds apart, there needs to be some means for removing the transmitter 
from the cleft after each episode of release.  The transmitter has to be actively integrated 
within the mechanisms of synthesis of the presynaptic cell … and with the receptor 
mechanisms of the post-synaptic cell … And quantitatively the molecule’s release must be 
correlated with activation of the pre-synaptic cell, and it must be released in sufficient 
quantity to affect the post-synaptic cell (ibid, 305-306, emphases mine). 
Importantly, many of these criteria (e.g., localization) appeal directly to the structural properties 
of the synapse; thus, understanding the neurotransmitter mechanistically involves integrating its 
functional properties within the structural components of the mechanism of chemical 
transmission.  Piccinini and Craver argue that none of the properties alluded to in the example of 
the neurotransmitter are ‘independent of the causal details’ of the mechanism of which it is a part 
(ibid).  Thus, they reason that this example is a prime illustration of how “… functional language 
at lower-levels of neuroscience involves implicit commitments to structural facts about the 
mechanism in question.  The same, we claim, extends all the way up to the highest levels of the 
neuroscience hierarchy” (ibid, 306).   
 
60
 See their table 1. For a visual representation and listing of the criteria for identifying a neurotransmitter 
(Piccinini and Craver 2011, 304). 
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It is at this point that they introduce their concept of seamless integration.61   Piccinini and 
Craver claim that once the structural properties of some functional analysis are provided, the 
functional analysis becomes a full-blown mechanistic explanation.  It is this process of fitting the 
structural details together with the functional details of some capacity that entails a complete 
mechanistic explanation: “… functional analyses can be seamlessly integrated with mechanistic 
explanations, and psychology can be seamlessly integrated with neuroscience” and this gives us 
a unified picture of cognition (308, emphases mine).   Integration entails that “… explanatory 
unification will be achieved through the integration of findings from different areas of 
neuroscience and psychology into a description of a multilevel mechanism” (ibid, 285).62 
While they do not explicitly state it, it follows from their arguments and the 
neurotransmitter/chemical neurotransmission example that it is the fitting together of different 
areas of the mind-brain sciences (in this example, psychology and neuroscience) that entails 
progress.  That is, if it is the case that mechanistic explanation and functional analysis are 
‘inextricably linked’, and if it is the case that when both explanations from each respective area 
of science are fit together they are seamlessly integrated in such a way that entails a complete 
explanation, then it would appear that progress requires integration of this sort.63  In fact, Craver 
and Piccinini do claim that mechanistic explanations are the best type of explanation on offer in 
the mind-brain sciences, and that mechanistic explanations produce “… deeper, better confirmed 
and more useful descriptions …” (ibid, 307). 
In sum, on their account, it is the functional properties of psychology that are being fit together 
with the structural components of a mechanism that yields epistemically strong claims about the 
mind-brain.   
 
61
 Importantly, their concept of ‘seamless integration’ is brought up only peripherally at the end of their paper, 
with little description and elaboration on their concept. 
62
 Thus, Craver and Piccinini (2011) too, like all other surveyed alternative non-reductive accounts position 
themselves against reduction both in its classic, inter-theoretic form, and its more current articulations, such as 
Nagel (1949, 1961, 1979) and Bickle’s (2003, 2006) accounts of explanation and scientific progress. 
63
 While they make no mention of Roskies ‘convergence’ (2010), Mitchell’s (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and 
Dietrich’s (2006) ‘integrative pluralism’, nor Darden and Maull’s (1977) ‘interfield theories’, their (general account) 
of fitting together seems compatible with both non-reductive accounts of explanation and scientific progress.   
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1.2 Evaluating the Different Accounts of Fitting Together 
There is consensus between both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts alike that claims 
about the mind-brain stand on firm epistemic footing when they are the product of information 
from different areas of science fitting together.64  Whether this fitting together involves one 
theory being reduced to another, more primary theory (Nagel 1949, 1970), behavior being 
reduced to low-level neuroscience (Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006), one theory bridging two respective 
fields of science (Darden and Maull, 1977), or different areas of science being integrated 
(Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich, 2006; Piccinini and Craver, 2011) or converging 
(Roskies 2010), the common thread joining all the surveyed accounts is that epistemically strong 
claims about the mind-brain are the product of interactive, collaborative, and integrative work 
between different areas of science whereby information from each area is fit together to produce 
a claim about the mind-brain.  Despite the consensus on this assumption about the role of fitting 
together and scientific progress, what each account lacks is a clear explanation of what it means 
for information from different areas of science to fit together in such a way that demonstrates, to 
use Roskies’ (2010) term, ‘conclusive evidence’ for a given claim (641).  I will now elaborate on 
this problem and close by stating its implications for the nature of scientific progress (i.e., why is 
it important to get a handle on the nature of fitting together).65  
On Roskies’ (2010) account, scientific progress consists of a process whereby different areas of 
science triangulate (i.e., converge) on a claim; one might ask how convergence is meant to be 
understood?  Similarly, if we consider Nagel’s (1949) essential condition, which requires that the 
claims of the primary science be empirically supported by evidence from different areas of 
science, one might ask what it means for different areas of science to provide adequate empirical 
support for a given claim?  Must they, to use Roskies terminology, converge on the same claim?  
 
64
 Furthermore, it is worth noting all surveyed accounts implicitly embrace some form of scientific realism.  While 
none of the authors explicitly state their stance on the matter, it follows that from the general belief that the 
fitting together of different areas of science leads to better, deeper, more complete, stronger, and epistemically 
warranted explanations that constitute scientific progress, that the authors probably all, to some degree or other, 
embrace some form of scientific realism. 
65
 Although each account was surveyed historically (i.e., chronologically) in the first section, I will now consider 
these accounts in terms of which bear important similarities to the other (e.g., Roskies 2010 and Nagel 1949, 1970; 
Bickle 2003, 2006 and Darden and Maull 1977; and, Mitchell 2002, 2003, Mitchell and Dietrich 2006, and Piccinini 
and Craver 2011). 
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Neither Nagel nor Roskies elaborate on what it means for information from different areas of 
science to converge/support a claim.  Accordingly, I flesh out a couple of possibilities for the 
notion of convergence/supporting to show how they are problematic, and state why their 
concepts of fitting together require philosophical analysis. 
Let us assume that Nagel’s essential condition requires something akin to Roskies’ notion of 
convergence.66  How is convergence meant to be understood? 67  I identify two possible ways to 
define convergence.  The first involves a strong identity claim and the latter involves the notion 
of consistency.  The strong version requires that evidence from different tasks (for WLFT), or 
evidence from different labs from (sometimes) different areas of science (ALFT-1/ ALFT-2) 
converge on the exact same claim.  A weaker version of convergence can be described via the 
notion of consistency, whereby the evidence from different tasks and/or different labs (from 
different areas of science) all generally point towards a claim with room for minor 
discrepancies.68  However, both characterizations are problematic.   
With respect to the strong version, it is impossible for evidence from different lab experiments in 
different areas of science to converge on the exact same claim.  This is because ALFT-2 involves 
experiments from different lab experiments in different areas of science.69  Accordingly, if one 
lab is working on memory on the rat brain using lesioning techniques and another lab is working 
on memory in the human brain via fMRI, they would not converge on the exact same claim in 
virtue of their investigating memory on different species via different experimental 
protocols/techniques.   
Instead, one might argue that pieces of evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences 
need only be consistent with each other – i.e., that they do not contradict each other and there is a 
general pointing towards a similar but not identical claim— and thus characterize convergence 
 
66
 Since Nagel (1949) provides no elaboration on this point, it is at least a possibility that this could be what was 
meant. 
67
 Again, Roskies (2010) herself provides little to no guidance here. 
68
 It is already clear here, however, how terms like ‘general pointing towards’ and ‘minor discrepancies’ are vague 
and require elaboration. 
69
 Nagel (1949) too required that the empirical support for the assumptions of the primary science come from 
evidence from different areas of science. 
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via the notion of consistency.  However, the weak characterization of convergence runs the risk 
of reducing mind-brain claims to trivial conclusions.  By requiring consistency alone all we seem 
to need is a general compatibility between the results from different areas of science.  This kind 
of compatibility seems all too easy to achieve, and accordingly, it trivializes claims resulting 
from ALFT-2.70  Consistency alone is insufficient for ensuring reliable and accurate claims; that 
evidence be consistent is one thing, but it is also necessary for evidence to be mutually 
reinforcing in a way that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations can be ruled out.  
Thus, the concept of convergence is thus vague and prompts many clarificatory questions. 
There is a lot of compatibility between Darden and Maull (1977) and Bickle’s (2003, 2006) 
accounts.  On Darden and Maull’s view, progress occurs when interfield theories bridge two 
fields of science.  One of their arguments for the importance of and generation of interfield 
theories is that there are often questions which are unanswerable from within one field (F1) that 
can be answered via the techniques, methods, and resources of another field (F2).  Bickle (2003, 
2006) concedes this point.  In fact, this is the very basis for his encouragement of 
transdisciplinary projects and the importance of higher-level theorizing to help address questions 
and problems that cannot be addressed via the resources of low-level neuroscience.  Thus, on 
both accounts, information from two (or more) fields need to be fit together to solve a 
problem/question that one field in isolation cannot answer.  This fitting together of information 
from different areas of science, on both accounts, leads to strong explanations about the mind-
brain71   
While they concede these points, both offer different accounts of fitting together.  Darden and 
Maull (1977) argue the key to complete and epistemically strong claims involves the generation 
of interfield theories.  However, they fail to provide criteria for determining what defines a 
successful interfield theory; what demarcates a successful from an unsuccessful relation? What 
would an unsuccessful relation look like?  Since there are multiple types of relations that can 
 
70
 And in any case, who decides what entails a general compatibility?  How is one to determine where general 
compatibility begins and ends.  Is there a general standard/set of criteria for determining this or is it a ‘to each 
(researcher) their own’ scenario? 
71
 Of course, there are critical differences between the two; most notably relating to the characterization of the 
relations as non-reductive (Darden and Maull) and reductive (Bickle).  The point of emphasis here is to stress 
where their accounts are compatible with respect to the notions of fitting together, explanations, and progress. 
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hold between fields (Darden and Maull identify three distinct types in their (1977) paper 
‘Interfield Theories’)), is there/should there be a hierarchical taxonomy of criteria addressing 
each type of relation?   
Bickle (2003, 2006) argues that for a successful reduction of behavior-to-molecules, higher-level 
theorizing must first isolate a candidate cellular or molecular process.  However, on this account, 
one might ask what kinds of norms guide this kind of relationship between high-level theorizing 
and low-level neuroscience?  What criteria must high-level theorizing appeal to in order to 
adequately pick out a candidate cellular or molecular process; what criteria must a behavior-
molecules reduction appeal to in order to ensure epistemically strong claims/explanations about 
the mind-brain?  How many studies in low-level neuroscience are required for one to confidently 
state a ruthless reduction has occurred?  How, when, and at what point can we know that a 
reduction of Bickle’s sort has been achieved?  Like the concept of convergence, the concept of 
interfield theories and ruthless reduction are also vague and subject to many clarificatory 
questions. 
Finally, Mitchell (2002, 2003), Mitchell and Dietrich (2006), and Piccinini and Craver (2011) 
each propose the concept of ‘integration’ to account for the relations between the mind-brain 
sciences that constitute strong epistemic claims and scientific progress.  Here too, however, 
similar questions and problems emerge.  Specifically, their characterizations of ‘integrative 
pluralism’ and ‘seamless integration’ are vague.  On Mitchell (2002, 2003) and Mitchell and 
Dietrich’s (2006) account of integrative pluralism, one might ask what it would mean for 
different but compatible hypotheses to be integrated together?  Mitchell (2002, 2003) appeals to 
three explanations of self-organization for the division of labor in social insects and argues that 
these different but compatible hypotheses must be integrated at the level of concrete application.  
However, Mitchell (2002, 2003) never actually explains if and how this occurred.  What criteria 
must be satisfied for a proper integration?  Must all compatible hypotheses be integrated, or only 
some?  If the latter, how are the hypotheses to be integrated identified and chosen from the 
hypotheses that will be omitted from the integrated explanation; what norms guide this kind of 
integration of compatible hypotheses? 
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Piccinini and Craver (2011) argue that when neuroscience provides the structural details of some 
psychological capacity/process, the two fields are seamlessly integrated resulting in complete 
and epistemically strong explanations about the mind-brain. They appeal to the example of 
chemical neurotransmission as an instance of information from two fields being seamlessly 
integrated, but it remains unclear, from this example, just how exactly information from 
psychology and neuroscience was integrated.  Seamless integration must require more than 
simply fitting (a) function(s) of some mechanism into its structure(s).  How can one discern 
when a full-blown mechanism has been met?  Piccinini and Craver (2011) provide no criteria for 
discerning when and how a seamless integration occurs.  Admittedly, this is because Piccinini 
and Craver say nothing on what it means to be seamlessly integrated (only that it has occurred); 
no definition or elaboration is provided.  Thus, the various accounts of integration are also vague 
and elicit numerous questions and concerns.   
None of the surveyed accounts provide a strong definition or an in-depth analysis of what it 
would mean for information from different areas of science to be fit together, nor do they 
provide a clear set of criteria for determining when, how, and to what extent different areas of 
science have been successfully ‘reduced’, ‘integrated’, ‘converged’, etc. 
1.3 Concluding Remarks on the Historical Survey of the Accounts of Scientific Progress 
and Fitting Together 
In sum, all surveyed accounts involve the assumption that information from different areas of 
science must be fit together to yield complete and epistemically strong explanations.  However, 
as I demonstrated in section 1.2, each notion of fitting together is vague and requires 
philosophical attention.  If it is the case that the fitting together of information from different 
areas of the mind-brain sciences is required for claims about the mind-brain to stand on firm 
epistemic footing, it is crucial to get clear on the concept of fitting together by asking what fitting 
together entails, how it unfolds in scientific practice, and whether it is an achievable goal.  Given 
that the notion of fitting together is emphasized across both reductive and non-reductionist 
accounts of scientific progress as a fundamental requirement for epistemically strong claims, and 
given that current accounts of fitting together are unclear, it is critical to isolate and analyze this 
concept.   
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To address this problem, I introduce the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ in chapter two as a 
placeholder for the term ‘fitting together’ to capture what I think philosophers of science have 
been gesturing towards, but which has yet to be clearly articulated and analyzed.  From this 
point, I identity a unit of analysis (i.e., the review paper) that exemplifies the fitting together of 
evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences in practice.  I conduct a two-part 
analysis of a case study of a review paper in chapters three and four, respectively, to get a handle 
on how review papers work to corroborate claims about the mind-brain by drawing on evidence 
from different areas of the mind-brain sciences. 
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Chapter 2 
2 Introduction 
In chapter 1, I noted the current and popular view of the relationship between the different areas 
of the mind-brain sciences is integrationist, interdisciplinary and non-autonomous.  A key 
assumption behind this view is the thought that evidence from different areas of the mind-brain 
sciences must be fit together in a certain way to yield complete and epistemically strong claims 
about the mind-brain.  I surveyed some reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of scientific 
progress emphasizing the notion of fitting together, and closed by highlighting key problems 
held by each account.  The overall problem I identified is that each concept of fitting together is 
vague and under-analyzed; since this concept is emphasized across the board by both 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of scientific progress for strong epistemic claims 
about the mind-brain, it is crucial to isolate and analyze this concept.  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce various units of analysis that exemplify the fitting together 
of findings from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, and to argue that of those units of 
analysis, the Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper is a good candidate to start investigating 
the nature of fitting together and its relation to strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain.  I 
begin, in section 2.1, by introducing the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ as a general 
placeholder for the notion of fitting together emphasized in the different accounts of scientific 
progress I surveyed in chapter one.  Critically, ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ is introduced as a 
working definition, and accordingly, requires elaboration and analysis.  I argue a good starting 
point for investigating the nature of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ is to analyze review papers 
as these units of analysis survey literature on a given topic and often demonstrate how different 
findings fit together to support a claim about the mind-brain.  To get a better understanding of 
the epistemic role of review papers in relation to ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ and the mind-
brain sciences, I begin by sketching the motivation, history, and development of review papers in 
section 2.2.  In section 2.3, I advance a taxonomy for the kinds of review papers found in mind-
brain science journals.  In section 2.4, I note the epistemic advantages review papers boast; this 
sets the stage for section 2.5, wherein I argue that the Trends in Cognitive Sciences review paper 
is a good starting part for analyzing ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’.   
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To better understand the notion of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ via a Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences review paper, I conduct a two-part analysis in chapters three and four, with the aim of 
extracting key lessons for the notion of ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ and its relation to 
progress in the mind-brain sciences. 
2.1 Interdisciplinary Corroboration: A Working Definition 
In chapter 1, I identified a common assumption linking both reductive and non-reductive 
accounts of explanation and progress – i.e., that different areas of science must be fit together to 
generate strong epistemic claims about the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain, such as 
memory).  The problem I identified with this assumption is that the notion of fitting together has 
been largely under-analyzed; as such, it may turn out that this fundamental assumption is flawed 
(or that it requires further philosophical attention).  To address this problem, I introduce the term 
‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) as a general placeholder for what I believe 
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards but have yet to articulate and analyze in 
detail.  It is from this point that I will begin to analyze what IC means and what its implications 
are for scientific progress and strong explanations about the mind-brain.    
My working definition of IC is that scientific findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain 
insofar as they are interdisciplinary, mutually supportive, and all point towards a general claim. 
The accounts of scientific progress I surveyed in chapter one all maintained that strong epistemic 
claims about the mind-brain required evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences to 
fit together.  Implicit in their accounts is an argument stipulating claims about the mind-brain are 
corroborated by the fitting together of results from different areas of the mind-brain sciences. 
For this reason, I introduce IC as a general placeholder for the various concepts of fitting 
together presented in chapter one to facilitate my analysis of how interdisciplinary results fit 
together to corroborate claims about the mind-brain. 
There are two key components comprising IC: an interdisciplinary component, and a 
corroboration component.  The interdisciplinarity component relates to the different areas 
comprising the mind-brain sciences (e.g., computer science and AI, biology, neuroscience, 
psychology, genetics, etc.) and their respective findings on a given topic.  The corroboration 
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component relates to how evidence confirms or lends support to a given claim about the mind-
brain.   
How do interdisciplinarity and corroboration connect?  Bechtel and Richardson (1993) discuss 
corroboration in the context of the necessity of independent measures: 
If we have available a number of independent but uncertain pieces of evidence, all of which 
point to the same conclusion, then that conclusion may in fact be extremely probable, even if 
each piece of evidence is uncertain.  By contrast, even a highly reliable procedure will have 
some likelihood of failure.  It is a simple exercise in probability to see that employing 
multiple independent modes of evidence is superior to relying on a chain of inferences from 
one piece of evidence.  Afterall, the likelihood of getting an error in the latter case is the sum 
of the likelihood of errors at each step.  Think of adding a long series of numbers.  At each 
step there is a small chance of error, but the overall likelihood of error can be quite high.  By 
contrast, with independent but unreliable pieces of evidence, each piece of evidence may have 
a relatively high likelihood of error, but the overall likelihood will tend to be low (xxvii, 
emphasis mine).72 
Importantly, they note that for this to be true, it is critical for different pieces of evidence to be 
the product of independent measures.  This is where the interdisciplinarity component comes into 
play.  As noted in chapter one of this dissertation and above, the mind-brain sciences comprise 
multiple areas of science including but not limited to: psychology, cognitive science, cognitive 
neuroscience, biology, cellular and molecular neurobiology, computer science and artificial 
intelligence, genetics, etc.  Reflected in this diversity of areas investigating the mind-brain are 
numerous different methods, tools, techniques, etc.  These methods include but are no means 
limited to the following: questionnaires and surveys, imaging techniques such as fMRI or 
positron emission tomography (PET)), electrophysiological recordings, gene knockouts or 
genome editing, computational modelling, etc.  Accordingly, it is likely that if there are multiple 
sources of evidence from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, which make use of many 
 
72
 This is similar to the argument Roskies (2010) makes with her insistence on the necessity of functional 
triangulation for convergent (i.e., strong) explanations and scientific progress.   
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different methods, experimental protocols, and tools/techniques of analysis, then one can argue 
the pieces of evidence are the product of independent measures.  
Bechtel and Richardson (1993) argue if multiple sources point to the same conclusion, and 
especially if those multiple sources employ independent measures, it is very likely that a 
conclusion has been corroborated (in the sense that it is well-confirmed/supported/highly 
likely).73 74  This is what I have in mind for IC: evidence from multiple areas of the mind-brain 
sciences (using different tasks, experimental protocols, methods, etc.) corroborating claim x 
insofar as that evidence all points towards x and that evidence is mutually supportive.  
My working definition of IC leads to the question: how does IC function in the mind-brain 
sciences, and to what extent does it result in epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain?  
In answering this, it is helpful to look for instances of IC in practice; where are such instances 
found? 75   
Instances of IC are typically not found in the day-to-day science conducted in individual labs; in 
these cases, the goal is to answer very specific research questions from within a specific area of 
science.  IC involves interdisciplinarity, and, as such, given that most day-to-day lab work is 
 
73
 Wimsatt (2007) makes a similar argument for his concept of robustness.  Building on Campbell’s (1966) concept 
of triangulation in the social sciences, Wimsatt argues that things are robust to the extent that, “… they are 
accessible (detectable, measurable, derivable, definable, producible, or the like) in a variety of independent ways” 
(Wimsatt 2007, 196).  Like Bechtel and Richardson (1993), the emphasis on independent measures is critical.  
Wimsatt notes that we can be more confident in entities, processes, relations, mechanisms, etc. that are the result 
of multiple independent measures because  “… the chance that we could be simultaneously wrong in each of these 
ways declines with the number of independent checks we have” (Wimsatt 2007, 196).   
74
 Hacking (1983) also makes a similar argument in the context of entity realism.   Hacking argues that entity 
realism (specifically unobservable entities) is warranted if an entity is detected by multiple different and 
independent means of detection; the more independent means of detection; the more warranted said entity 
becomes.  Hacking refers to the example of detecting the dense bodies of red blood platelets.  In this case, “Two 
physical processes – electron transmission and fluorescent re-emission – are used to detect the bodies.  These 
processes have virtually nothing in common between them.  They are essentially unrelated chunks of physics.  It 
would be a preposterous coincidence if, time and again, two completely different physical processes produced 
identical visual configurations which were, however, artifacts of the physical processes rather than real structures 
in the cell” (Hacking 1983, 201).   
75
 In emphasizing the importance to practice I am aligning myself with the new mechanists, whom, towards the 
end of the 20th century, emphasized the importance of looking at the history of science and scientific practice to 
inform our theories.  See Bechtel and Richardson (1993) for a brief historical summary of the shift from logical 
positivism’s focus on scientific justification and the logical structure of explanations, to the focus on history with 
Kuhn’s (1970) Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and then to the new mechanist focus on practice, history, and 
discovery in the late 1980’s (xxi). 
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conducted within one specific area of science, it is not an ideal starting point for examining IC in 
practice.   
The scientific research papers emerging out of those labs seem like a better option insofar as 
these papers often try to situate their findings within the broader context of the literature, and in 
doing so, may cite other studies to lend support to the claim(s) they advance.  The problem with 
these papers is that the primary goal is to present original research, and, accordingly, the scope of 
the corroborative work is narrow.  Ideally, one would want the scope of corroboration to be 
much wider and for the main goal of the paper to demonstrate how interdisciplinary findings on a 
given topic fit together to support a given claim about the mind-brain.  
Instead, a unit of analysis with great promise for analyzing IC is various types of review papers.  
Interestingly, Roskies (2010) claims we can find instances of convergence in meta-
analyses/review papers.  Arguing against Van Orden and Paap’s (1997) view that neuroimaging 
fails to find convergent results, Roskies states: 
Convergence across multiple experiments is the key to epistemic warrant when it comes to 
attributing function to anatomical regions. Results from any single study are viewed by 
scientists as providing evidence for one way of parceling out cognitive function over another, 
but not as conclusive evidence. Van Orden and Paap seem to disregard the importance of 
functional triangulation in part because they claim that experiments meant to triangulate 
function fail to find convergent regions of activity. The majority of the literature belies this 
interpretation as recent meta-analyses have shown strong convergence in imaging results 
across tasks, across laboratories, and both across and within subjects (Roskies 2010, 641, 
emphasis mine). 
Roskies cites review papers by Krain et al. (2006), Miller et al. (2002), Steele and Lawrie (2004), 
and Van Overwalle (2009), as examples of literature demonstrating convergence (Roskies 2010, 
624).  However, Roskies does not provide an in-depth analysis of these units of analysis, nor 
their implications for convergence and scientific progress. 
Briefly, as an introductory description, authors of review papers summarize literature on a given 
topic.  Some review papers consist primarily of a literature summary and contain no arguments.  
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Critically for my dissertation, however, many review papers provide more than a summary; they 
also contain arguments – sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit.  These arguments support 
claims about the mind-brain based on the author’s summarized findings.  These arguments often 
involve the author demonstrating how findings from different areas of science combine to 
corroborate a claim about the mind-brain.  Sometimes these arguments are the product of meta-
analysis, sometimes they are the result of a qualitative analysis.  Thus, authors of review papers 
appear to do the work required by IC; that is, they demonstrate how findings from different areas 
of the mind-brain sciences (interdisciplinarity) fit together in a way that lends support 
to/confirms (corroboration) claims about the mind-brain.  Therefore, review papers provide a 
strong starting point for beginning to investigate the nature of IC by analyzing how it unfolds in 
practice.76 
Other philosophers of science have stated that progress in science is made when the findings 
from different areas of science fit together to support/confirm a claim about the mind-brain.77  IC 
is a working definition I introduce to get a handle on the phenomena of fitting together.  Review 
papers are a good starting point for this project insofar as they involve both the interdisciplinarity 
and corroboration aspects, and, accordingly, appear to produce epistemically strong claims about 
the mind-brain.  In chapters three and four, I conduct an in-depth analysis of a case study review 
paper.  Importantly, because I begin with a working definition of IC in this chapter, it is likely 
that a more complex and nuanced picture of IC will emerge post-analysis.  Before conducting my 
analysis of a review paper, however, I begin by explicating what a review paper is, what 
elements it is composed of, what standards it must adhere to, and arguments for the epistemic 
superiority of claims emerging out of review papers. 
2.2 Motivation, History, and Development of Review Papers 
If one is interested in IC, and the ideal outcome of IC is knowledge production – specifically the 
production of epistemically strong claims about the mind-brain – in the mind-brain sciences, and 
if review papers are strong candidates for how IC works in practice, then one would imagine 
there are certain standards review papers must adhere to.  Part of my goal in this chapter is to 
 
76
 That is not to say that review papers represent the only way in which areas of science are demonstrated to 
corroborate a claim about the mind, only that it is a strong candidate to begin analyzing IC in practice. 
77
 See my chapter one for a review of this literature. 
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explicate what a review paper is, when and how it developed in the sciences, and to elucidate 
what criteria are used to produce epistemically strong claims.    
A few precursory notes before I begin.  There are no specific organizations or lists of criteria for 
writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences.78  For this reason, when I discuss the history, 
development, and criteria for writing review papers, I do so in the context of the social sciences 
and the health sciences.  Accordingly, I reference different organizations (e.g., the Cochrane 
Collaboration) and standardized checklists for writing review papers (e.g., the Preferred 
Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (hereafter PRISMA)) within those 
areas of science.   Critically, the standards for Cochrane Collaboration and PRISMA review 
papers are not representative of review papers found in mind-brain science journals.  This is 
because review papers in the mind-brain sciences involve the synthesis of information from the 
different areas of science housed under the umbrella of the mind-brain sciences (e.g., 
psychology, biology, computer science and AI, genetics, neuroscience, etc.).  These areas of 
science make use of different methods, experimental protocols, and tools and techniques of 
analysis, and, accordingly, the standards advanced by organizations such as the Cochrane 
Collaboration in the health sciences, for example, will not be applicable to review papers in the 
mind-brain sciences.79  As such, I introduce and discuss the history, development, and criteria 
for writing review papers in the context of the health and social sciences while referring to 
organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration for comparative reasons. 
 
78
 I will return to this point later in this section. 
79
 That is, review papers in the health sciences frequently analyze and synthesize information using similar 
methods, tools, and techniques of analysis.  For example, a Cochrane review by Mehrholz, Thomas, and Elsner 
(2017) looked at treadmill training and body weight support interventions for humans post-stroke.  Critically, this 
review looked at two main types of interventions – i.e., treadmill training and body weight support – and focused 
on human adults post-stroke.  Of the 3105 human participants, the majority were approximately 60 years old and 
had previously had a stroke; thus, there was little variation in the type of species being considered in the review 
paper.  Further, the methods used were all similar; all involved a combination of treadmill training with body 
weight support, treadmill training without body weight support, and treadmill training with some other 
physiotherapy support.  Review papers in the mind-brain sciences, however, involve looking at information from 
different areas of the mind-brain sciences; consequently, the information being synthesized comes from research 
conducted on a wide variety of human and non-human animals, using very different and distinct methods, 
experimental protocols, techniques and tools of analysis.  Consequently, the standards for review papers in the 
health sciences/social sciences are not applicable to the types of reviews found in mind-brain sciences journals.   
 
49 
 
Generally speaking, a review paper provides a condensed summary of the current state of 
research in a specific field (e.g., in literature, anthropology, cognitive neuroscience, etc.) in 
relation to a specific topic within that field (e.g., exile in Prussian literature, kinship in 
anthropology, episodic memory in cognitive neuroscience, etc.), and this summary will include 
multiple citations from relevant secondary sources.  Review papers typically include some or all 
of the following features (depending on the kind of review paper they are classified as80): a 
summary, an explanation, a synthesis, and a direction(s) for future research.  The first 
component involves summarizing recent work relative to some question within a field of 
research, and, as such, it provides an avenue for the reader (both the expert, but particularly the 
non-expert) to develop a general understanding of the topic and where things stand.  In writing 
this summary, authors of review papers cite relevant published papers.  Authors of the review 
papers might also explain how the various findings from their cited studies shape and impact the 
question or topic they are writing on, and they might also provide a synthesis of those findings 
such that a given claim is advanced as substantiated by the cited literature.  Finally, authors 
might suggest, based on their summary and/or their analyses (via explanation and/or synthesis), 
directions for future research.  This is a rough and ready sketch of what a review paper is.  I will 
now contextualize review papers within the history and development of research synthesis, and 
then contextualize them further within the mind-brain sciences. 
Gurevitch et al. (2018) trace the beginning of research synthesis with the birth of meta-analysis, 
which they date around the early 20th C.  They define research synthesis as: “… synthesizing 
results across studies to reach an overall understanding of a problem and to identify sources of 
variation outcomes” (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175).  This began when Pearson attempted to 
combine knowledge from different studies to determine whether vaccination was an effective 
preventative measure against typhoid in soldiers in 1905 (ibid, 176).  In 1925, Fisher developed a 
method for combining probabilities over multiple studies (ibid).  The development of meta-
analysis continued into the mid-20th century with the attempt to formalize Fisher’s method via 
fixed and random-effects models by Yates and Cochran (1938) and Cochran (1954) (Gurevitch 
et al. 2018, 176).  However, it was not until 1977 that meta-analysis became acknowledged as a 
significant and invaluable tool for scientific research.  That is “… it was not until the insight of 
 
80
 I will elaborate on this classification below in section 2.3. 
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psychologists G. Glass and M. Smith in 1977 – that outcome measures from different 
experiments could be standardized and put on the same scale – that meta-analysis began to affect 
scientific research to a large extent” (ibid).  
Approximately nine decades following Pearson’s attempt to combine results across multiple 
studies, Chalmers and Altman introduced the term ‘systematic review’ in their 1994 foreword to 
their 1995 book, Systematic Reviews.  In this book, they argue for the necessity of review papers 
in light of the “… ever-increasing tidal waves of new research evidence” (Chalmers and Altman 
1994, foreword).81  Specifically, they argue that what they call ‘the systematic review’ is best 
suited to help researchers navigate the ‘tidal wave’ of new evidence pouring in from multiple 
sources in the health sciences (ibid).  They define the systematic review as a review which has 
“… been prepared using some kind of systematic approach to minimizing biases and random 
errors, and that the components of the approach will be documented in a materials and methods 
section” (ibid, emphases mine).82  Systematic Reviews (1995) acts as an introductory handbook 
for understanding and writing systematic reviews by advising potential authors on how to pick 
relevant studies for a systematic review, how to identify problems within meta-analyses, 
provides checklists for scientifically sound systematic review papers, and guidelines on how to 
report, update, and correct systematic reviews. 
Chalmers and Altman’s seminal work Systematic Reviews (1995) changed the course of research 
synthesis (both with respect to how it was defined and conducted).  Prior to 1995, research 
synthesis took the form of what Gurevitch et al. (2018) call the ‘narrative review’.  Gurevitch et 
al. (2018) provide no definition of a narrative review, claiming only that the main aim of a 
narrative review is to ‘summarize results across studies” (175).  The main problem they identify 
with narrative review papers for research synthesis is that it has become increasingly difficult to 
summarize hundreds of studies on a given problem in an un-biased way (ibid).  This, they 
speculate, may account for why narrative reviews haven fallen out of favor and why they have 
been replaced by systematic reviews, which are allegedly more equipped to deal with large 
 
81
 Importantly, this book is written in the context of the health sciences.   
82
 They distinguish the systematic review from meta-analyses in terms of qualitative and quantitative analyses 
(Chalmers and Altman 1994, foreword).  Systematic reviews do not necessarily need to incorporate a meta-analysis 
(i.e., a quantitative synthesis of data); instead, they may present a qualitative synthesis (this is especially popular in 
the social sciences). 
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volumes of research and problems of bias and random errors (ibid).  Gurevitch et al. (2018) note 
that despite having fallen out of favor, narrative reviews are still useful for providing a summary 
of the development and progress of a given intervention, problem, or field of research; the 
problem is that they cannot adequately ‘summarize results across studies’ (ibid).  Importantly, 
Gurevitch et al. do not explain what they mean by ‘summarize results across studies’ (ibid).  On 
my reading, when they claim that narrative review papers cannot accurately summarize results 
across studies I take it they mean narrative review papers cannot synthesize results across studies.  
Accordingly, one of the key differentiating factors between narrative and systematic review 
papers is that the primary component of the former is summary, and the latter is synthesis.  If this 
is the case, then narrative reviews simply list out/or summarize findings from different studies, 
but offer no explanations, arguments, or comments on their findings and how they shape the 
topic at hand, nor do they provide a synthesis of those findings.  Instead, that kind of work is 
performed by authors of systematic reviews. 
After 1995, systematic reviews were the main form of research synthesis in the medical/health 
and social sciences.  Gurevitch et al. define systematic reviews as papers which: 
… aim to provide a robust overview of the efficacy of an intervention, or of a problem or field 
of research.  They can be combined with quantitative meta-analyses to assess the magnitude 
of the outcome across relevant primary studies and to analyze the causes of variation among 
study outcomes (effect sizes)” (ibid, emphases mine).   
Systematic reviews boast numerous advantages and are revered in the literature on research 
synthesis as being a critical tool for scientific research and scientific progress (ibid).   
One particular feature – i.e., the reduction of bias – is held by many in the research synthesis 
literature (e.g., Chalmers and Altman 1995, Gurevitch et al. 2018, Mulrow 1995, Shamseer et al. 
2015, etc.) as being one of the standout features that differentiates systematic reviews from 
traditional, narrative reviews, contributing to epistemically strong claims.  None of these authors 
advance a full-fledged argument for the reduction of bias via the systematic review.  However, 
on my reading, their claim hinges on what I identify as two key assumptions made in the 
literature on research synthesis.  The first involves systematic reviews relying on an explicit set 
of methods and standardized guidelines for writing review papers, and the second involves the 
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relationship between systematic reviews and open science; I will now review each assumption in 
turn. 
The first assumption I identify is because systematic reviews rely on ‘explicit methods’ and 
‘formal methodological guidelines’ via organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration, the 
Campbell Collaboration, and PRISMA, the claims emerging out of systematic reviews stand on 
firmer epistemic footing than claims emerging out of papers which do not adhere to any 
standardized guidelines (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175; Mulrow 1995, 1).83  That is, these 
organizations produce checklists and guidelines for: 
… literature search, study screening (including critical appraisal of eligible studies according 
to pre-defined criteria), data extraction, coding and often statistical analysis (that is, meta-
analysis), along with detailed, transparent documentation of each step.  Software, protocols 
and reporting guidelines for systematic reviews and meta-analyses are well established in 
many fields; for example, PRISMA … (ibid, emphasis mine). 
The key assumption I identity for the reason systematic reviews deliver unbiased claims hinges 
on this notion of ‘pre-defined criteria’ (ibid).  That is, because, (ideally), all authors are being 
held to the same standards with respect to how to write, publish, and update systematic reviews, 
authors are less likely to let their own biases infiltrate their analyses.  An author writing a 
systematic review without consulting well-documented and formalized guidelines would 
presumably be choosing their own methods for writing a review paper.  Accordingly, the author 
in question would be choosing their own selection criteria, method(s) of data documentation and 
interpretation, etc., increasing the likelihood of the author’s personal biases infiltrating each step 
of the review writing process.  This would arguably make the claims emerging from said review 
less reliable. 84 85 86 87  
 
83
 I will elaborate on these organizations and their guidelines shortly. 
84
 C.f. also Oxman and Guyatt (1988) for the elimination/reduction of bias in systematic reviews. 
85
 Again, this is my interpretation of what I think Gurevitch et al. (2018) are trying to get at in their claim that 
systematic reviews eliminate bias as they never explicitly back up and elaborate on this claim. 
86
 These claims are, of course, not without their criticisms.  See Eysenck (1995); Egger et al. (1997); Ioannidis 
(2016); Gurevitch et al. (2018), etc. for some challenges and limitations pertaining to systematic reviews, meta-
analysis, and their ability to reduce bias in the health sciences.   
87
 See Sullivan (2016) for a critique of meta-analysis in the mind-brain sciences. 
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How did organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration emerge and develop in the history of 
research synthesis?  The late 20th and early 21st century saw substantial procedural and 
methodological growth, with much of that growth being attributed to multi-disciplinary 
collaboration organizations geared towards the advancement of research synthesis for the 
sciences.  Of notable mention for multi-disciplinary collaborations are the Cochrane 
Collaboration founded in 1993, the Campbell Collaboration created in 1999, the Society for 
Research Synthesis Methodology founded in 2005, and PRISMA (Gurevitch et al. 2018, 175).  
These organizations effectively “… oversee systematic reviews in the medical and social 
sciences, respectively, bringing practioners and methodologists together and setting standards for 
research synthesis publications and evidence-based guidelines for practice and policy” (ibid, 176, 
emphasis mine).  To re-iterate a point made above, it seems for Gurevitch et al. (2018) and 
Mulrow (1995), systematic reviews reduce bias in scientific claims precisely because they follow 
the strict and well-documented methods/guidelines advanced by these organizations.   
As an example of guidelines for writing sound systematic review papers, meta-analyses, or 
systematic reviews with a meta-analysis, consider PRISMA’s 27-item checklist.88  PRISMA 
provides potential authors with a minimum set of items required for writing systematic reviews 
(with and without meta-analysis) (http://www.prisma-statement.org/).  PRISMA “… focuses on 
the reporting of reviews evaluating randomized trials but can also be used as a basis for reporting 
systematic reviews of other types of research, particularly evaluations of interventions” (ibid).  
The PRISMA checklist includes instructions for sections of review papers including the title, 
abstract, introduction, methods, results, discussion, and funding (ibid).  Each of these sections 
contains sub-topics which are elaborated on; this elaboration provides authors with instructions 
on what they need to do to ensure a scientifically sound review paper.  For example, under the 
section ‘methods’ in the sub-topic ‘study selection’, PRISMA states all authors must “… state 
the process for selecting studies (i.e., screening, eligibility, included in systematic review, and , if 
applicable, in meta-analysis” (http://prisma-
statement.org/documents/PRISMA%202009%20checklist.pdf, 1).  Under sub-section ‘risk of 
 
88
 Since PRISMA’s checklist pertains to systematic reviews, meta-analysis, or systematic review with a meta-
analysis, I will shorten this to ‘review paper’ in the remainder of this section.  Unless specified otherwise, I use the 
term in this section of the chapter to encompass any of those types of reviews. 
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bias in individual studies’, PRISMA states authors must “Describe methods used for assessing 
risk of bias in individual studies (including specification of whether this was done at the study or 
outcome level), and how this information is to be used in any data synthesis” (ibid).  Under the 
sub-section ‘synthesis of results’, PRISMA requires that all authors “Describe the methods of 
handling data and combining results of studies, if done, including measures of consistency … for 
each meta-analysis (ibid). 89  Similar, but more elaborate guidelines are provided in the Cochrane 
handbook for the health/medical sciences and the Campbell Collaboration for the social 
sciences.90 
PRISMA’s checklist and the standards provided by organizations such as the Campbell 
collaboration deliver strict methods and guidelines which, on my interpretation, Mulrow (1995) 
and Gurevitch et al. (2018) hold responsible for the reduction of bias in systematic review 
papers.91  That is, following these guidelines allows for the un-biased assessment of a question, 
problem, or debate, resulting in reliable claims because authors are all held to the same 
standards for researching, reporting, writing, and updating review papers.  Importantly, I 
interpret both Gurevitch et al. (2018) and Mulrow’s (1995) claims as comparative.  That is, they 
are not claiming that following these guidelines entails the end-product of a systematic review 
will be wholly unbiased, but that in comparison to traditional reviews (i.e., narrative reviews), 
they are significantly less biased. 
The second assumption I identify with respect to the arguments in the literature on research 
synthesis for the reduction of bias in systematic reviews involves the relationship between open-
science and systematic reviews.  Open science is the belief that the dissemination of scientific 
research ought to be transparent and openly accessible to the public (including both experts and 
non-experts).  Gurevitch et al. (2018) discuss the nature and virtues of open-science practices: 
 
89
 See http://prisma-statement.org/prismastatement/Checklist.aspx for the full PDF version of the checklist. 
90
 Please see file:///C:/Users/Jackie/Downloads/Campbell_Policies_and_Guidelines_v4.pdf for guidelines by the 
Campbell Collaboration “Campbell Systematic Reviews: Policies and Guidelines” and http://handbook-5-
1.cochrane.org/ for the Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of Interventions. 
91
 Their claim thus importantly hinges on most/all journals/authors appealing to and abiding by these guidelines 
and standards.  That is, if all are held to the same set of standards, then the author’s personal biases are less likely 
to infiltrate the systematic review, thus resulting in less biased conclusions. 
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Open-science practices have emphasized full and unbiased access to scientific data, which is 
of longstanding importance and central to future progress in meta-analysis.  Pre-registration 
(called ‘registration’ in some fields) of planned studies can reduce selective reporting of 
outcomes; publication of ‘registration reports’ in which the methods and proposed analyses 
for a study are peer-reviewed and published before the research is conducted and can reduce 
publication bias (ibid, 180). 
Gurevitch et al. (2018) say little more on how open science contributes to the reduction of bias.  
Accordingly, I draw on work by Nosek et al. (2015) to draw out the assumption I believe is 
behind Gurevitch et al.’s claims (ibid).   
Nosek et al. (2015) elaborate on the nature of open-science practices by advancing eight 
standards they deem critical for openness and transparency in the scientific community.92  For 
example, Nosek et al. (2015) note that design standards allow for an “… increase in transparency 
about the research process and reduce vague or incomplete reporting of the methodology” 
(1423).  Complete transparency and proper documentation of one’s design protocols allows 
others to better evaluate the claims emerging out of review papers.  If one’s design and methods 
protocols were vague, incomplete, and/or absent, this may lead to an inaccurate assessment of 
review paper’s main claim.  Accordingly, the epistemic status of that paper’s main claim would 
stand on uncertain epistemic footing. That is, to properly assess whether the claims emerging out 
of a review paper stand on firm epistemic footing, one needs to know that the methods used to 
investigate the topic in question are sound/reliable.  It is difficult to make that assessment if the 
protocols are not explicitly outlined in the review paper; therefore, increasing transparency and 
documentation standards for review papers may help alleviate this problem. 
Another standard crucial for openness and transparency involves the preregistration of studies 
and the preregistration of plans for the analysis.  Gurevitch et al. (2018) also stress the 
importance of this standard in relation to open-science practices.  Here, they note preregistration 
of studies and analysis plans are peer-reviewed and published prior to the writing of the actual 
review.  This reduces bias insofar as the author must adhere to those published plans, even if the 
 
92
 I only address a few of their standards here for the sake of brevity.  For a full list, see their diagram of standards 
and levels on page 1424 (Nosek et al. 2015).   
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resulting claim disconfirms their initial hypothesis (180).  Nosek et al. (2015) add that the 
preregistration of studies makes the process of finding research (published or unpublished) much 
easier by making sure the study is recorded in a public registry, and that the preregistration of 
analysis plans “… certify the distinction between confirmatory and exploratory research …” 
(1423).   
In addition to providing eight general standards, Nosek et al. propose levels from 0-3 where 
levels 0-3 represent increasingly strict standards where level 0 is offered for comparative reasons 
and level 0 does not meet any standard, and level 3 outlines the highest standards for open 
science (ibid, 1423-1424).  Ideally, all review papers would fall under level 3 – i.e., they would 
adhere to strict standards to increase transparency and reduce bias in the review paper.93  The 
assumption that systematic reviews reduce bias in virtue of their relationship to open-science 
practices is that because guidelines such as the PRISMA checklist are accessible to the public, 
and because the emphasis on transparency requires authors to document all steps of the review 
process in a public forum (e.g., to publish the plans for the analysis prior to conducting the 
review), the claims emerging out of systematic review papers are less likely to be biased 
compared to narrative review papers.  
The relationship between open-science practices and systematic reviews that Gurevitch et al. 
(2018) point towards is one where instead of the traditional reviewer writing within the narrow 
confines of their own work space, with little to no interaction with other specialists, choosing 
their selection criteria and interpretation of the data as they see fit, systematic reviews (with or 
without meta-analysis) are written in a space that breaks the confines of the traditional 
workspace in virtue of the author consulting organizations that publish lists of standardized 
protocols and guidelines that their work must adhere to.  Ideally, all authors of systematic review 
papers would adhere to the guidelines set by either the Cochrane Collaboration, Campbell 
Collaboration, and/or PRISMA to ensure that the claims emerging out of them stand on firm 
epistemic footing.  It is thus the openness of science and the adherence to strict and well-
 
93
 See their diagram (page 1424) for a more elaborated explanation of levels and standards.   
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documented guidelines that reduces the likelihood of bias in review papers, thereby increasing 
the integrity of the epistemic status of the claims advanced by the authors of those papers. 94 
2.3 Taxonomy of Review Papers in the Mind-Brain Sciences 
The history and development of research synthesis as provided by Chalmers and Altman (1995) 
and Gurevitch et al. (2018), Higgins and Green (2011), Moher et all (2009, 2015), Stewart et al. 
(2015), focus almost exclusively on the medical and health sciences.  Handbooks and critical 
research on the nature of research synthesis, such as those by Cooper, Hedges and Valentine 
(2009) and Rosenthal (1991) focus on the social sciences.  Further, some of the largest and most 
popular cross-disciplinary organizations, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, contextualize 
research synthesis and related methods/guidelines in the health/medical sciences.  In their 
opening ‘about us’ statement, the Cochrane Collaboration states: “Cochrane is for anyone 
interested in using high-quality information to make health decisions. Whether you are a doctor 
or nurse, patient or caretaker, researcher or funder, Cochrane evidence provides a powerful tool 
to enhance your healthcare knowledge and decision making” (https://www.cochrane.org/about-
us, emphases mine).   
Shamseer et al. (2015) similarly highlight the importance of research synthesis for the 
health/medical sciences: “Systematic reviews hold a unique place in healthcare. They help form 
the basis for developing practice guidelines and they provide information on gaps in knowledge, 
thus informing future research efforts. This information is relevant to stakeholders across the 
health system” (https://www-bmj-com.proxy1.lib.uwo.ca/content/349/bmj.g7647, emphasis 
mine).  They continue to note that systematic reviews are particularly trustworthy due to the ‘a 
priori planning and documenting’ of their methods and protocols (ibid).  While this might help 
reduce bias and increase the reliability of claims emerging out of systematic reviews, it is 
important to note that most organizations for research synthesis are grounded in the 
medical/health sciences and/or the social sciences: 
Various international organizations such as the Cochrane and Campbell Collaborations and 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) regularly require and publish 
 
94
 It is an open question whether and to what extent this occurs in research synthesis in the mind-brain sciences, 
especially since, a point I have emphasized and will re-emphasize later, there are no organization or checklists 
dedicated specifically to writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences. 
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protocols. However, outside of such organizations, few protocols are published in traditional 
journals and most reports of completed reviews (89%) do not mention working from a 
protocol… Outside of select systematic review organizations, little to no general guidance 
exists for preparing review protocols (ibid, emphasis mine). 
This is problematic because many disciplines outside the health/social sciences make use of 
research synthesis (in many forms) in the dissemination of knowledge.  Of particular importance 
for my dissertation is the fact that while the mind-brain sciences make great use of research 
synthesis via review papers, there is no organization to date dedicated solely to outlining 
criteria/standards for writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences, nor has there been much 
analysis done on the nature of research synthesis within the context of the mind-brain sciences.95 
96   
Now that the background and motivation for research synthesis is in place, I will survey the 
different types of review papers found in journals for the mind-brain sciences.  Despite having no 
handbook or organization dedicated to laying out protocol for review papers in the mind-brain 
sciences, journals in the mind-brain sciences are replete with research synthesis in the form of 
review papers (both with and without meta-analysis).  Given that the standards for review papers 
will be different than those in the health sciences, it is important to look at review papers in the 
mind-brain sciences to see how, if at all, claims are being corroborated by the synthesis of 
interdisciplinary evidence.   
 
95
 Again, part of the reason for introducing the standards and guidelines advanced by organizations such as the 
Cochrane Collaboration was to set the historical background for the development of research synthesis and for 
comparative reasons, given that the standards set by organizations for writing review papers in the health and 
social sciences will not be applicable to the types of review papers found in mind-brain science journals.   
96
 Of the many journals in the mind-brain sciences, few provide any guidance with respect to review paper writing 
standards, with the exception of Frontiers in Neuroscience, which states authors should adhere to the guidelines 
published in either the Cochrane Collaboration, the Campbell Collaboration, or the PRISMA checklist 
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#article-types).  However, seeing as the mind-brain sciences 
are distinct from the social and health sciences, in that they bring together information from multiple areas of 
science, using different methods, experimental protocols, techniques and tools of analysis, one might argue for 
and advance a unique set of standards for writing review papers in the mind-brain sciences.  I consider this 
prospect in chapter four of this dissertation. 
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There are numerous journals that researchers in the mind-brain sciences can submit their work 
to, including but not limited to: Frontiers in Neuroscience, Trends in Cognitive Science 
(Elsevier), Neuron, the Journal of Neuroscience, Nature Neuroscience, etc.  I focus only on a 
subset of these top journals – specifically Frontiers in Neuroscience and Trends in Cognitive 
Science (Elsevier) – that contain review papers for two reasons.  First, I must constrain my focus 
for the sake of space, and second, of the above-mentioned journals, these two provide the most 
detail about the different types of review papers that can be published within their journal and 
what each type entails.97  Each journal classifies article types slightly differently, however, as I 
will demonstrate shortly, there are three main category types that review papers may fall under.   
Frontiers in Neuroscience is a popular mind-brain science journal.  In their ‘scope and mission’ 
section, they describe their journal as: 
… publishing rigorously peer-reviewed research across a wide spectrum of specialties and 
disciplines. …This multidisciplinary open-access journal is at the forefront of disseminating 
and communicating scientific knowledge and impactful discoveries to researchers, academics, 
clinicians and the public worldwide. … we seek to integrate and cross-link studies and 
citations in related subfields, providing an overview of the state-of-the-art in these fields and 
the ways in which they complement each other. After all, we may each of us look at the brain 
from particular standpoints - all the way from "genes to behavior" - yet the brain integrates all 
these levels seamlessly; this journal should reflect this in the best possible way. 
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#about, emphases mine). 
Statistically, Frontiers in Neuroscience is at the forefront of research in the mind-brain sciences.  
That is, the journal is the number one most cited journal in the neurosciences 
(https://reports.frontiersin.org/reports/frontiers-in-neuroscience-report.html).  Frontiers in 
Neuroscience boasts an impact factor (i.e., the average number of citations in a given year by 
papers that were published from the two preview years) of 3.566, a total of 13 520 508 article 
 
97
 The other journals either provide little (in comparison to Frontiers in Neuroscience and Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences) to no breakdown of article types nor any advice on what makes for a strong review article. 
60 
 
views and downloads, 691 mentions in newspapers such as Forbes and the Washington Post, and 
20,063 citations (ibid).98 
Frontiers in Neuroscience provides a list of tier 1 article types published in their journal, and I 
elaborate on each kind of review paper below 
(https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/neuroscience#article-types).  Non-review-based tier 1 
articles found in the Frontiers in Neuroscience journal include but are not limited to: original 
research papers, methods papers, protocol papers, technology report papers, perspective papers, 
case report papers, etc.99   
Tier 1 review-based articles found in Frontiers in Neuroscience include the following: 
1. The systematic review 
2. The review 
3. The mini review 
Authors of systematic review papers advance syntheses of published studies on a specific topic 
(e.g., episodic memory, retinotopic maps, semantic processing, spatial cognition, etc.) “… that 
uses systematic and clearly defined methods to identify, categorize, analyze and report 
aggregated evidence on a specific topic” (ibid, emphasis mine).  Authors must address an 
important question or problem in their field of research, and their answer must be grounded on 
the “… sound empirical basis of studies which were conducted well scientifically” (ibid).100  
Authors of systematic review papers do more than provide a summary of the current state of 
some field of research or topic; they also compare and explain the findings they cite in their 
summary and synthesize those findings into a claim about the mind-brain.  The findings involved 
in the systematic review may all belong to the same field (e.g., the author(s) may compare a 
number of studies in the field of psychology on the nature of mind-reading) and/or they may 
 
98
  Cited statistics are based on the most recent Journal Citation Reports (2017) . 
99
 I will comment on these and their relation to review papers shortly.   
100
 No elaboration is provided with respect to what a ‘sound empirical basis’ entails nor how one would 
evaluate/discern between studies which are empirically sound and those which are not.   
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involve studies from a variety of fields (e.g., the author(s) may compare a number of studies 
from psychology, cellular and molecular biology, cognitive neuroscience, etc., on the nature of 
mind reading).  Systematic reviews may or may not contain meta-analyses (i.e., the quantitative 
analysis of data from multiple independent studies on the same phenomenon conducted with the 
goal of discovering important trends).  The author may use the results of their meta-analysis (or 
their qualitative analysis) to advance a synthesized claim about the mind-brain. Authors may 
also, in closing, suggest directions for future research.  While systematic reviews include all four 
components listed in section 2.2 of this chapter – i.e., a summary, explanation, synthesis, and 
directions for future research – the primary component to these papers is the synthesis of various 
studies (which may include original research papers, books, case reports, perspective papers, 
other published review papers, etc.) via either a meta-analysis or qualitative analysis. 
The second article type is the review paper (hereafter the Frontiers review paper to distinguish it 
from another type of review paper outlined in Trends in Cognitive Science).  Frontiers review 
papers focus on topics that have undergone a significant change (or which have undergone 
substantial progress) and present a comprehensive overview of this topic (ibid).  Instead of the 
main emphasis being synthesis (as it was for the systematic review), the main emphasis of a 
Frontiers review is the summary of the current state of a topic about the mind-brain.  Authors of 
Frontiers review papers are to discuss critical aspects of their summary such as different sides of 
the debate, consensus and controversies, key concepts and problems (including gaps in the 
research), and they are also expected to close directions for future research (ibid).  Frontiers 
review papers, like systematic review papers, are not to include any of their own unpublished 
research; instead, they draw on other published research when presenting their summary. 
The third article type is the mini review paper.  The mini review is similar to the Frontiers 
review paper but differs primarily with respect to its scope/length.  That is, mini reviews tend to 
be more focused in scope, and home in on a particular facet of some topic (e.g., instead of the 
general topic of memory, a mini review might summarize findings on the more specific topic of 
spatial memory in rats) (ibid).  Authors of mini review papers are to present a clear and concise 
summary of a topic in the mind-brain sciences.  This brief but succinct summary allows readers 
to develop an understanding of the current state of the literature, its key concepts, controversies 
and problems, as well as future research possibilities (ibid).  Much like authors of the Frontiers 
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review paper, authors of the mini review paper cannot include any of their own unpublished 
research, citing other published research.  As mentioned above, the key difference between 
review and mini review papers is scope and length of the review, with the former typically 
having a maximum word count of 12 000 words (enabling the author(s) to write on a more 
general topic like memory) and the latter 3000 (enabling the author(s) to home in on a very 
specific aspect of memory) (ibid).   
Another popular academic journal for the mind-brain sciences is Trends in Cognitive Sciences 
(Elsevier).  Trends in Cognitive Sciences (hereafter Trends) is another highly influential peer-
reviewed journal focusing on review-based articles on topics in the cognitive 
sciences/neurosciences.  Trends boasts an impact score (i.e., the average number of citations in a 
given year by papers that were published from the two preview years) of 15.557 and a total of 
25391 citations according to the most recent 2017 Journal Citation Report 
(https://www.bioxbio.com/journal/TRENDS-COGN-SCI).   
According to their ‘Aims and Scopes’ section, Trends is a highly interdisciplinary journal, 
bringing the fields of psychology, computer science, neuroscience, anthropology, evolution, 
economics, and political science, etc. together to provide both expert and non-expert readers with 
up-to-date knowledge and insight about important topics and debates in the mind-brain sciences 
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/aims).  According to Trends: 
Trends journals seek to provide all scientists, from the tenured to the tenderfoot, with concise 
and curated updates on the latest research. It is our aim to highlight new scientific 
developments and their impact on the world outside the laboratory. Our high-caliber articles 
are cutting edge, provocative, yet accessible and are written by the most authoritative voices 
in science today. They are intended not only to bring readers up to speed on recent progress in 
the field, but also to serve as platforms for debate and to push the boundaries of conventional 
thinking. The Trends journals offer more than summaries, they contribute insight 
https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors).   
Each issue of Trends includes what they call review articles (hereafter Trends review papers, to 
distinguish them from Frontiers review papers) which function to bring readers up to date on 
recent debates and critical developments with respect to a mind-brain related topic.   
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Trends review papers are central to the monthly issues in Trends and are written by leading 
scholars – those whom they describe as having some of the ‘most authoritative voices in science’ 
in their respective fields (ibid).  Authors of Trends review papers present the reader with a 
balanced overview of the current state of some topic in the mind-brain sciences.  They do so by 
providing relevant background information and highlighting important developments and 
discoveries.  While Trends review papers focus on the summary component, these papers often 
include explanations and directions for future research.  That is, while authors of Trends review 
papers are not to include their own original research, Trends review papers do “… allow room 
for some speculation and debate …” (ibid).  Authors can explain and comment on the findings 
presented in their summary and/or take a stance with respect to a debate (with the caveat that 
authors are clear when they are providing their own opinions) (ibid).  It is within this space that 
authors can advance arguments regarding the findings contained in their summary.  For example, 
an author might argue that the summarized findings support a given claim about the mind-brain.  
This claim can be read as a synthesized claim insofar as it is the amalgamation of the 
summarized findings; it is the product of a qualitative analysis of the cited literature which, taken 
together, suggests a given claim.  Importantly, however, this synthesized claim is not the product 
of a quantitative meta-analysis or statistical modelling (like it is in the case of Frontiers 
systematic review), but is instead the result of a qualitative analysis.  Authors of Trends review 
papers are also strongly encouraged to conclude with directions for future research by clearly 
indicating to the reader “… the most productive avenues for future research and by highlighting 
current and future limitations” (ibid).  Critically, Trends review do not include original 
unpublished research, any new hypothesis, mathematic model(s) nor are they to include meta-
analyses (ibid).   
Before moving onto the advantages of review papers, something should be said about the nature 
of the relationship between review papers and the literature upon which they draw.101  The types 
of literature review papers draw on include but are not limited to: original research papers, case 
reports, perspective papers, books, textbooks, clinical trial papers, conceptual analysis papers, 
 
101
 When I use the term ‘review papers’ here I am referring to all four types surveyed thus far – i.e., the systematic 
review, the Frontiers review, the mini review and the Trends review. 
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opinion papers, etc.102  There is a two-way influence when it comes to review papers and non-
review papers.  In writing a review paper, authors survey literature on a given topic.  The 
findings from this survey may influence and shape the authors’ understanding of the topic; this 
might manifest itself in the way in which the summary is presented, the nature of the 
explanations of the summarized findings, and/or the synthesis.  Once a review paper is 
published, it has the potential to influence the course of future research.  That is, it might 
influence a new wave of original research.  If, to provide just one example, an author of a review 
paper closes with directions for future research indicating a gap within a theory, researchers may 
strive to fill in said gap, thus adding new research that may influence a future review paper (or 
might be used to update an existing review paper).  Thus, there is a two-way influence between 
review and non-review papers, and those who herald the importance of research synthesis for 
science acknowledge this influential relationship as crucial for progress and better explanations 
in the sciences.  For example, Gurevitch et al. (2018) state: “Evidence synthesis should become a 
regular companion to primary scientific research to maximize the effectiveness of scientific 
inquiry” (180).   
In sum, three distinct types of review papers emerge from the types I survey: the systematic 
review, the Trends review, and what I call the general review paper (hereafter shortened to GRP, 
which is essentially an amalgamation of the Frontiers review and the mini review).  The 
systematic review stands on its own insofar as its main component is synthesis (often the product 
of a meta-analysis).  The GRP’s are grouped together insofar as their primary component is 
summary.  Finally, the Trends review stands on its own as it arguably has two main components 
– a summary, and an explanation of the summarized findings (which can sometimes take the 
form of a synthesized claim, although the synthesized claim will not be the product of a 
quantitative meta-analysis as is often the case with the systematic review).  This classification is 
represented visually below in figure 1. 
 
102
 When referring to these types of papers in general, I will simply call them non-review papers. 
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Figure 1 - Represents my taxonomy of review paper types in the mind-brain sciences based on their main components. 
Now that I have laid out a taxonomy of review paper types in the mind-brain sciences, I turn to 
some of the advantages they possess, before closing this chapter with their implications for IC.   
2.4 Advantages of Review Papers for Progress in the Mind-Brain Sciences 
In general, review papers in the mind-brain sciences provide readers with current, up-to-date 
knowledge about the mind-brain (or an aspect of the mind-brain). 103  They help shed light on 
important concepts, distinctions, debates, and problems or gaps in the literature.  Ideally, this 
allows readers to understand what is at stake and potentially influences their thinking and future 
research about the mind-brain.   
These are the general features of review papers; what about the specific features of each 
individual type of review paper?  Do the different types of review papers surveyed above possess 
distinct features over above the others?  Assessing the unique features of each type of review 
paper will help set the stage for understanding why review papers are a good place to start 
investigating the nature of IC.  In this section, I survey the unique advantages of GRP’s, the 
 
103
 I use the term reader here to mean readers and/or researchers (as often readers are themselves researchers). 
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systematic review, and the Trends review, respectively.  Once this is complete, I draw out the 
implications review papers have for IC. 
One major feature of the GRP I consider advantageous for scientific research is their ability to 
enhance knowledge and update readers on the current state of a topic in the mind-brain sciences.  
This feature is in part due to the primary component of the GRP being the summary.  That is, a 
large portion of a GRP is dedicated to providing a general overview of a topic including things 
like historical background and development, critical debates and controversies, key concepts and 
theories, recent progress and problems, etc.  All of this helps provide readers with a general 
understanding of the current state of a topic in the mind-brain sciences.  This feature likely has 
different implications depending on the type of reader (e.g., non-expert layman, non-expert 
undergraduate, graduate student, expert, etc.).  For the non-expert laymen and undergraduate 
students, this overview functions somewhat like an introductory handbook (which will include 
background information, key concepts and problems, etc.) on the topic, allowing them to achieve 
a general understanding of a topic they previously knew little to nothing about.  From this point, 
the non-expert reader might be influenced to pick up on certain aspects of the summary; for 
example, an undergraduate student might find a certain problem interesting, and decide to pursue 
graduate studies dedicated towards investigating (potentially solving or deepening) said problem.   
Expert/advanced readers may find more benefit in mini review papers, which tend to be less 
generalized, and more focused on a specific feature or problem pertaining to the mind-brain.  
The mini review therefore might provide the expert reader with new insight, potentially 
influencing them to fine-tune their own research (e.g., perhaps by attempting to fill in a gap in 
the research), or to conduct a very specific study in relation to a problem noted in the mini 
review, thereby contributing more original research on the topic.   
Systematic reviews boast numerous advantages; however, I focus on the two most relevant to the 
goal of my dissertation (i.e., investigating the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences and 
assessing whether and to what extent review papers corroborate claims about the mind-brain).   
The two advantages I identify are the ability to integrate large amounts of information and the 
potential to corroborate claims about the mind-brain.  Starting with the former, as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the 21st century is inundated with an avalanche of information coming in 
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from multiple areas of science.  To provide a general example to set the stage, Mulrow (1995) 
notes in the medical sciences “… large quantities of information must be reduced into palatable 
pieces for digestion.  Over two million articles are published annually in the biomedical literature 
in over 20 000 journals – literally a small mountain of information. … In a stack, two million 
such articles would rise 500 m” (1).104  With such a large number of articles coming in annually, 
a method for sorting through this information in such a way that identifies and picks out the 
relevant and scientifically sound papers from the irrelevant and unsound articles is necessary.  
Mulrow believes this sorting method is accomplished by authors of systematic review papers 
who can critically analyze, evaluate, and sort through the mass amounts of information (ibid, 2).  
Mulrow does not argue how nor why these authors are able to do so, but I suspect once again the 
assumption behind her claim is the fact that these authors possess the proper sorting tools in 
virtue of their abiding by pre-established and standardized guidelines for writing review papers.  
That is, authors of review papers can consult the Cochrane handbook or the PRISMA checklist, 
for example, scroll to the criteria for study selection, and sort through papers, selecting only 
those which are scientifically sound and relevant according to pre-established guidelines.  
Having a pre-determined method for selecting studies and data, analyzing and interpreting data, 
etc., appears to make authors of systematic review papers mini experts of sorts on how to 
efficiently triage and integrate large amounts of information.105   
Understanding how systematic review papers can potentially corroborate claims involves 
analyzing the notion of synthesis (which is the primary component of the systematic review).  
When preparing to write a systematic review, an author will examine papers on a topic in the 
mind-brain sciences (e.g., memory) to determine whether there are any trends or patterns 
pertaining to a specific question or problem they are investigating.  Accordingly, if a meta-
analysis is conducted (i.e., either on findings from the same area of science or findings from 
different areas of science) and a general trend/pattern x is found, the author might argue that x is 
well-supported (i.e., it has a high degree of corroboration because a number of independent 
 
104
 These statistics are from the late 20th C, and surely have risen in the 21st C.  Importantly, these statistics are 
from the biomedical literature, wherein a large majority of the work on research synthesis has taken place for a 
while, however, the mind-brain sciences also deal with a large amount of published works on the mind-brain 
annually, and their numbers are also likely to be high. 
105
 Again, this is my interpretation of Mulrow’s (1995) claim that systematic reviewers are best equipped to sort 
through and integrate large amounts of information into a claim that stands on firm epistemic footing.   
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studies all suggest/or are consistent with/or point towards the same conclusion).106  This claim is 
thus the amalgamation/synthesis of all surveyed papers.  For example, if a meta-analysis is 
conducted and finds that all the cited papers in the systematic review (and their respective 
findings) implicate the hippocampus for memory, the author might argue the claim that the 
hippocampus is a critical brain region for memory is corroborated by the literature.  That is, this 
claim appears to be corroborated by findings from different areas of science all of which appear 
to point towards the same general conclusion about the hippocampus and memory. 
If systematic reviews can corroborate claims, these papers have the potential to influence 
education and future research.  For example, an allegedly corroborated claim may be taken as 
evidence against an alternative competing claim.  That is, if some alternative claim x is supported 
by ten studies from one particular area of the mind-brain sciences, meanwhile claim y has been 
supported by over eighty studies from multiple areas in the mind-brain sciences, then claim y 
(hereafter shortened to ‘y’) might be taken as evidence against claim x (hereafter shortened to 
‘x’), since it has a substantially higher degree of corroboration than x.  This may lead researchers 
to either abandon their work on x, or to try and save x by perhaps modifying it in some way or 
other.107  
Further, corroborated claims emerging from systematic review papers may be taken as providing 
a foundation of sorts.  If y has demonstrated a strong degree of corroboration (and this has lasted 
for a substantial amount of time), then one may take y as confirmed.  This confirmation may 
potentially make it such that y becomes a starting point for future research to expand on.  For 
example, if y represents ‘the hippocampus is a critical brain region for memory’ and y has 
received a high degree of corroboration, new research projects might emerge trying to establish 
the finer details of y (e.g., what other structures, regions, networks are involved, what other types 
of memory are realized in the hippocampus, how can one incorporate claim y within a dynamical 
brain systems theory, etc.).   
 
106
 For simplicity, I use the term meta-analysis here to refer to both qualitative and quantitative analysis of 
multiple pieces of evidence.   
107
 Of course, one could argue that in time claim x might accrue more support than claim y.  Perhaps with newer 
and better technologies, and more research, time and funding being poured into claim x, it may turn out that claim 
x actually has a higher degree of corroboration than claim y.   
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In an education setting, a chapter on memory may base all of its teaching off the fundamental 
assumption that y is true, so that the undergraduate studying memory for the first time may come 
to accept this claim as true.108  In sum, the two advantages of the systematic review, ideally, are 
its ability to integrate large amounts of information about the mind-brain and its ability to 
corroborate said claims via meta-analysis (either qualitative or quantitative, although more 
frequently the latter). 
Trends reviews also have the potential to integrate information and corroborate claims.  With 
respect to the former, because Trends reviews are written by leading scholars considered to be 
experts in their respective area of science, their expertise and knowledge on a given topic makes 
them particularly well-suited for triaging numerous studies in the literature and extracting only 
the most scientifically sound and relevant.  Their ability to corroborate claims is grounded in one 
of the primary components of a Trends review: explanation.  That is, authors of Trends reviews 
are provided room for ‘speculation and debate’ within their review 
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors).  It is within this space that the author 
may explain and comment on the summarized findings and advance their own conjecture based 
on the current state of the literature (as per the author’s summary).  This conjecture can 
sometimes take the form of a synthesized claim; that synthesis would likely be the product of 
integrating the summarized findings into a cohesive explanation about an aspect of the mind-
brain.109  The caveat with Trends reviews advancing their own conjectures and speculations is 
simply that the author be clear that this is his/her/their personal opinion 
(https://www.cell.com/trends/cognitive-sciences/authors).  Interestingly, because Trends claims 
to contribute deep insight into the mind-brain by producing reviews written by only the greatest 
scholars with the most ‘authoritative voices in science today’, the synthesized claim emerging 
from the Trends review appears to stand on strong epistemic footing insofar as it is the integrated 
product of a qualitative analysis/synthesis of multiple studies (recall that Trends reviews do not 
include quantitative meta-analysis or statistical models) from different areas of the mind-brain 
 
108
 A critically minded student may challenge this assumption, but the point is simply that corroborated claims can 
sometimes take a foundational form whereby students are taught that this claim is confirmed.   
109
 The author of the Trends review may not necessarily include their own opinion on the debate or problem at all, 
or if they do, it may not necessarily take the form of a synthesized claim (integrating the information from different 
areas of science).  The point is merely that their opinion can potentially take the form of a synthesized claim, and 
when it does, this claim can appear to be corroborated.   
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sciences.  Further, because the claim is advanced by an authoritative and well-respected voice 
within the mind-brain science community, that claim might gain more epistemic warrant (ibid).  
The allegedly corroborated claims emerging out of Trends reviews thus have the potential to 
influence future research in the same way that the systematic review does: that is, they can 
potentially act as evidence against another alternative claim or theory, and/or they can act as a 
foundation of sorts, both for research and in education.110  
At this point, one might ask what it is about review papers and their specific features that make 
them uniquely suited to the project of exploring the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences.  The 
goal of the next section will be to make this connection succinct. 
2.5 Implications of Review Papers for IC 
To understand why review papers are a good place to start investigating the concept of IC – that 
is, what features they possess that makes them uniquely suited for the task – it is helpful to re-
examine the main components of IC.  In section 2.1 of this chapter, I provided a working 
definition of IC whereby IC occurs when findings from different areas in the mind-brain sciences 
corroborate a claim about the mind-brain in such a way that those findings point towards a claim 
and are mutually supportive and interdisciplinary.  I noted there are two main components to IC 
– interdisciplinarity and corroboration. I will now briefly re-visit both aspects of IC.111 
The interdisciplinarity aspect of IC relates to the different areas of science housed under the 
mind-brain sciences.  Such disciplines include but are certainly not limited to computer science 
and AI, biology, psychology, genetics, linguistics, neuroscience, etc.  Both systematic reviews 
and Trends reviews survey findings from multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences in their 
investigation of a given topic; therefore, both satisfy the interdisciplinarity component.  Further, 
Trends prides itself on being a highly interdisciplinary research journal, and thus one would 
assume the articles published therein would be too (or at least contribute to that aspect).   
Corroboration occurs when pieces of evidence confirm/support a claim.  In section 2.1 of this 
chapter, I noted individual research papers provide a good first pass at demonstrating 
 
110
 See above for elaboration on these two points. 
111
 This is just a brief review; for a more complete description of ‘interdisciplinarity’ and ‘corroboration’, please 
see section 1 of this chapter.   
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corroboration in that they (sometimes) try to situate their original findings within the broader 
context of the literature by citing other findings that support their main claim/finding, but the 
degree of corroboration in these papers was too narrow in scope.   
The role of individual research papers, however, is not insignificant to corroboration.  As 
Gurevitch et al. (2018) note, “An individual primary study may now be seen as a contribution 
towards the accumulation of evidence rather than revealing the conclusive answer to a scientific 
problem” (178), and, as Mulrow (1995) puts the point, “The hundreds of hours spent conducting 
a scientific study ultimately contributes only one piece of an enormous puzzle” (7).  
Corroboration thus relies on different findings from original research papers; the more findings 
point towards y, the more one can argue y has been corroborated.  Thus, for findings to 
corroborate y, multiple research sources must confirm/lend support to/point towards y. 
Further, a point emphasized by philosophers of science (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson (1993); 
Campbell (1966); Hacking (1983); Wimsatt (2007), etc.), those findings must be the result of 
‘independent measures’ (Bechtel and Richardson 1993, xxvii).  This point connects both the 
interdisciplinarity component and the corroboration component in that when the different areas 
of the mind-brain sciences (interdisciplinarity) all employ different measures (i.e., they appeal to 
specialized tools, methods, technology, software, etc.), and they all point toward y, then y, it 
might be argued, has been corroborated.  Thus, the more original research from different areas of 
the mind-brain sciences points towards y, the more corroboration y accrues.112 
 
112
 This process of multiple independent research papers contributing one piece of the puzzle which is completed 
when multiple pieces of evidence from different areas of science point towards some claim is strikingly similar to 
Roskies’ (2010) notion of convergence via functional triangulation.  In this case, the different studies from different 
areas of science can be said to triangulate/converge on the same claim, and insofar as this is done, the claim 
stands on firm epistemic footing; this, arguably, could be what Nagel’s (1949, 1979) ‘essential condition’ requires.   
 
Further, one might interpret the synthesis component of the systematic review and the Trends review to be akin to 
the kinds of ‘integration’ required by Mitchell (2002, 2003), Mitchell and Dietrich (2006) and Piccinini and Craver 
(2011).  That is, the product of the review paper – the synthesis – is the act of integrating all the results of different 
areas of science into one claim; this resulting claim is considered to be well-supported/confirmed and accordingly 
stands on firm epistemic footing.   
 
On this point, Bickle (2003, 2006) might claim that it is the analysis of different studies from different labs in 
cellular and molecular neuroscience that have been synthesized.  In fact, in Bickle’s (2006) example of the cAMP-
PKA-CREB pathway as the molecular mechanism for social recognition memory in mammals, Bickle points to the 
fact that this conclusion has been corroborated by a number of other independent original studies on the topic.  In 
other words, a large number of studies revealed a general trend – i.e., that this pathway is the molecular 
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The concepts of interdisciplinarity and corroboration are echoed in both the systematic review 
and the Trends review.  Both papers survey research papers from different areas of the mind-
brain sciences on a topic (interdisciplinarity).113  Authors of systematic review papers will 
analyze these papers and their respective findings to determine any overall patterns/trends; this is 
often performed via meta-analysis and statistical modelling.  If a trend is identified, authors 
advance a claim which can be considered synthesis of the surveyed findings involved in the 
meta-analysis.   
Authors of Trends reviews summarize the current state of some problem or topic about the mind-
brain, citing multiple papers from different areas of the mind-brain sciences.  They may also 
comment on the nature of their findings and this comment (the authors’ opinion) may take the 
form of a synthesized claim.114  This synthesis provides the reader with a more complete 
understanding of the mind-brain and is considered more reliable insofar as it is supported by 
numerous interdisciplinary findings and is advanced by an author considered to be an influential 
and authoritative voice on the matter.   
The synthesized claims falling out of both the systematic and the Trends review (as the result of 
either a quantitative meta-analysis or a qualitative analysis) relates to the corroboration aspect.   
That is, if the interdisciplinary papers (and their respective findings) surveyed by both types of 
papers reveal a general trend – which is identified either by meta-analysis in the case of the 
systematic review, or qualitative analysis in the case of the Trends review – whereby that trend 
suggests a claim about the mind-brain, one might argue that that claim has been corroborated (in 
that it is supported by considerable interdisciplinary evidence).   
 
mechanism for social recognition memory in mammals – and this trend is taken to be corroborated by Bickle 
(Bickle 2006, 423-424).   
 
Interpreting this through Darden and Maull’s (1977) notion of interfield theories, one might say that an interfield 
theory such as the chromosome theory of Mendelian genetics has been corroborated via numerous studies which 
confirm the interfield theory.   
113
 Authors of course are not required to survey studies from multiple areas of science; some authors of review 
papers may choose to focus solely on evidence from one particular area of science.  However, systematic review 
papers and Trends review papers frequently cite evidence from different areas of science, and accordingly, my 
claims extend only to papers which do so.   
114
 Not all authors of Trends reviews will take their own stance on a debate, nor comment on those findings, nor 
will those comments (if they provide them) necessarily all take the form of a synthesized claim.  My argument 
pertains only to those papers that do.   
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In section 2.3 of this chapter, I surveyed three main types of review papers (i.e., the systematic 
review paper, the Trends review paper, and the GRP).  Of those mentioned, the systematic 
review and the Trends review paper do what is required for IC: that is, they review findings from 
different areas of the mind-brain sciences (i.e., interdisciplinarity), and if a trend/pattern is 
identified, authors of the review paper advance a claim taken to be a synthesis of those findings 
(i.e., a corroborated claim in that multiple pieces of independent evidence from different areas of 
science support this claim).  Accordingly, both would provide a good starting point for 
investigating the nature of IC and analyzing whether and to what extent claims about the mind-
brain are corroborated in practice.   
However, due to the length of this project, it is not possible to analyze both a Trends review 
paper and a systematic review.  Instead, I begin what I hope to be an ongoing project of 
investigating the epistemic role of review papers in the mind-brain sciences by analyzing a 
Trends review paper; because the Trends review contains less features than a systematic review 
(which often additionally includes meta-analyses), my analysis will create a baseline against 
which to compare future units of analysis for corroboration. Furthermore, is important to 
consider not just the systematic review, since journals in the mind-brain sciences contain and 
make use of different types of review papers (not just systematic reviews).  Ioannidis (2016) 
notes that papers tagged as ‘reviews’ are published at a much larger scale than papers tagged as 
‘systematic reviews’ in PubMed (489).  Thus, it is important to not rush this investigation by 
immediately jumping to a systematic review; again, starting with a Trends review allows a 
baseline against which to compare different units of analysis with different/additional features 
(such as a meta-analysis) to determine how and whether the additional features increase the 
integrity of the claims about the mind-brain emerging from those papers.  Since Trends claims to 
provide deep insight into the mind-brain via review papers from some of the most authoritative 
scholars, the Trends review paper, which contains both the interdisciplinarity and the 
corroboration component of IC, provides a strong starting point for investigating the nature of 
IC.   
In chapters three and four, I analyze a case study of a Trends review paper by Eichenbaum 
(2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’ as a potential instance of IC with the goal of extracting 
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critical lessons for the notion of IC and its relation to strong epistemic claims in the mind-brain 
sciences. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Introduction 
In chapter one, I surveyed popular accounts of the relationship between different areas of science 
emphasizing the notion of fitting together as essential for scientific progress.  I noted a problem 
with these accounts is their notions of fitting together were vague and subject to multiple 
clarificatory questions.  In chapter two, I introduced the term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ 
(hereafter IC) as a placeholder for the notion of fitting together to get a better understanding of 
the assumption underlying the surveyed accounts of scientific progress.  I noted, however, IC 
was a working definition which needed elaboration and analysis.  I argued a good place to begin 
investigating IC and assessing the extent to which claims are corroborated in the mind-brain 
sciences was to look for instances of it in practice via a Trends review paper.  As a case study for 
this investigation I have selected a paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on Time’.   
My investigation of this review paper comprises a two-part analysis structured around what 
Eichenbaum does (chapter three) and does not do (chapter four) to show support for the main 
claims he defends in this paper.  The aim of this chapter is to showcase what Eichenbaum does to 
support the main claims he advances in ‘Memory on Time’ and how it is representative of IC.  
My analysis focuses on the language and terms used to describe the findings which he cites in 
support of his claims.  I begin section 3.1 by explicating why I selected Eichenbaum’s review 
paper as my case study, what cursory criteria I use to guide my analysis, and what methods I use 
to analyze Eichenbaum’s paper.  I provide a brief summary of ‘Memory on Time’ and the main 
claims advanced by Eichenbaum in section 3.2.  In section 3.2.1, I analyze the ways in which 
Eichenbaum shows support for the main claims he defends by focusing on the language he used 
to describe the cited findings, such as the findings ‘show that’ or ‘suggest that’ x (Eichenbaum 
2013, 83, 86)115.  I assess the extent to which the case study conforms to IC in sections 3.2.2 
(focusing on the interdisciplinary component), and 3.2.3 (focusing on the corroboration 
component), and argue that, prima facie, the case study appears to represent a strong instance of 
IC where interdisciplinary findings fit together in such a way that lends support to Eichenbaum’s 
main claims.   
 
115
 Where x represents one of the claims Eichenbaum (2013) advances in ‘Memory on Time’. 
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However, in conducting this analysis, certain questions began to emerge such as “what counts as 
substantial evidence”, “what does it mean for evidence to be consistent with each other”, and 
“how are anomalies factored into the ‘substantial evidence’ that appears to be consistent with 
each other”.  These questions began to reveal cracks in what appeared to be a clear instance of IC 
in Eichenbaum’s review paper.  This led me to conduct part-two of my analysis in chapter four, 
wherein I deepen my analytic work in chapter three by explicitly addressing these questions and 
their implications for IC.  As my aim in this chapter is to constrain my focus on the work 
Eichenbaum does to support the claims he defends, I bracket these questions and concerns for 
chapter four. 
 3.1 Methods 
The case study I selected for this analysis is a paper by Eichenbaum (2013) entitled ‘Memory on 
Time’.  As noted in chapter one, I am interested in claims made in the mind-brain sciences about 
how the brain realizes psychological functions.  Memory organization, specifically, spatio-
temporal memory (i.e., memory for how events are organized in time and space) is a 
psychological function and is the main topic of my case study.   
The paper I selected is a Trends review paper with a substantial number of citations.116  
However, more than a high citation count, I selected this paper because of the tremendous 
influence Eichenbaum has had on memory research.  Eichenbaum (1947-2017) is considered by 
many to have been one of the leading pioneers in memory research.  Hasselmo and Stern (2017) 
described Eichenbaum as a ‘vital leader’ in illuminating the role of the hippocampus for memory 
and learning (875, emphasis mine).  Eichenbaum held an impressive amount of positions in the 
scientific community including being a William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, the 
director of BU’s Center for Memory and Brain and the Laboratory of Cognitive Neurobiology, 
and the founder of “… what is now called the Graduate  Program for Neuroscience …” (Brown 
2017, https://www.bu.edu/today/2017/howard-eichenbaum-obituary/).  Additionally, in 2015, he 
 
116
 There were different papers on memory organization by Eichenbaum I could have selected as my case study.  
However, I chose ‘Memory on Time’ (2013) which has 179 citations to date as a middle ground between his (2017) 
‘On the Integration of Space, Time, and Memory’ paper, which has 54 citations, and his (2014) ‘Time Cells in the 
Hippocampus: A New Dimension for Mapping Memories’ paper, which has 247 citations.  Eichenbaum’s (2013) 
review ‘Memory on Time’ has enough citations that a case can be made that the paper is influential, but not too 
many that tracking the citations and cited studies (the 2014 paper has approximately 70 more cited studies than 
the 2013 paper) would be too lengthy.   
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was elected into the American Academy of Arts and Science and was a Fellow of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, where he acted as chair in the neuroscience 
division and the Association for Psychological Science (ibid).  He also served on the Council of 
the Society for Neuroscience as well as the National Institute of Mental Health (ibid).  Finally, 
Eichenbaum was the editor-in-chief of the journal Hippocampus until his passing in 2017 
(Hasselmo and Stern 2017, 875). 
Eichenbaum was an ‘internationally recognized figure’ known for making headway and 
advancing knowledge of the hippocampus and the neural mechanisms for memory organization 
(Brown 2017, https://www.bu.edu/today/2017/howard-eichenbaum-obituary/).  Commenting on 
Eichenbaum’s work, Dr. David Somers, professor and chair of psychological and brain sciences, 
states:  
His extensive empirical findings … his integrative approach, which synthesized results 
across species, across methods, and across levels of analysis; and his important theoretical 
advances concerning multiple memory systems in the brain, all helped advance our 
understanding of how memory works and how it is organized in the brain” (ibid, emphases 
mine).   
Within memory research, Eichenbaum is considered a ‘pioneer’, a ‘titan’, and an ‘internationally 
recognized figure’, making him a top scholar on memory research.  Given his authoritative status 
within memory research, the impressive and deep impact his research has had and continues to 
have on the mind-brain science community, as well as the fact that much of his research, as 
Somers points out, includes an integrative approach which synthesizes results across different 
areas of science (an aspect emphasized by both reductive and non-reductive accounts of progress 
in chapter one of this dissertation), Eichenbaum’s paper is a great candidate for my case study. 
My goal for my analysis of Eichenbaum’s (2013) ‘Memory on Time’ is to evaluate how and to 
what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated within this review paper.  From my 
analysis, I hope to draw out important lessons concerning the nature of IC and how claims about 
the mind-brain are corroborated in units of analysis such as the Trends review paper.  These 
lessons might serve as a springboard for future research; I discuss such prospects in section 4.4. 
of chapter four. 
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Importantly, I begin this analysis with a general understanding of how review papers function 
from my descriptive work in chapter two.  That is, Trends review papers are packaged in such a 
way that they include a summary of a topic in the mind-brain sciences, an explanation of 
findings cited in the summary section, and directions for future research.  I noted, in chapter 
two, that the explanation component can manifest in a number of ways.  For example, authors of 
review papers can explain the relevance of the scientific findings they cite, they can explain 
those findings by contextualizing them within a debate or within the broader picture of a mind-
brain topic, they can comment on the nature of those findings, they can argue how those findings 
fit together to support a given claim, etc.  In providing explanations, authors sometimes argue for 
claims that are a synthesis of the findings they survey in their summary.  This, however, is a 
superficial understanding of how review papers work; the purpose of my analysis is to do the 
analytic work required to discern how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are being 
corroborated in units of analysis such as the Trends review paper.   
Accordingly, I come to the table with some cursory criteria to help address these questions and 
guide my analysis.  These criteria includes the following questions: “what is the aim of 
Eichenbaum’s review paper”, “what claims does Eichenbaum argue for”, “how does 
Eichenbaum show support for those claims”, “are Eichenbaum’s arguments implicit or explicit”, 
and “does the case study represent a strong case of IC, and if so, how”?   
To evaluate how and to what extent claims are corroborated in Eichenbaum’s (2013) ‘Memory 
on Time’, I begin by laying down some descriptive work by providing a brief synopsis of 
Eichenbaum’s paper, including the paper’s purpose and its main claims.  I consider the ways in 
which Eichenbaum shows support for those claims.  In analyzing this, I notice that a crucial 
aspect of Eichenbaum’s arguing for the claims he defends involves citing interdisciplinary 
findings on memory organization and using certain descriptive terms/phrases indicative of 
corroboration.  Accordingly, I focus my analytic work around the language and terms 
Eichenbaum uses to describe the findings he cites in support of his claims.  When relevant, I 
appeal to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of important terms via a software program 
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called NVIVO12, as well as other important statistical information such as citation counts and 
impact factors.117 118 119 
3.2  Summary of ‘Memory on Time’  
Trends reviews involve a summary of the current literature on a given topic as well as 
explanations/comments that sometimes take the form of a synthesized claim (provided the author 
clearly states when the claim in question is their own opinion).  The main aim of ‘Memory on 
Time’ (hereafter referred to as ‘the case study’) is to establish the role of the hippocampus as 
creating a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories.  In the case study, 
Eichenbaum summarizes findings from recent literature on the spatio and temporal aspects of 
memory organization.  He explains the significance of the findings from this literature by stating 
they all fit together to support claims about memory organization.  Specifically, he states that in 
addition to summarizing literature on memory organization, he will relate the findings he cites on 
temporal representation to literature on spatial organization, and argue that, ‘taken together’, 
these findings suggest a role for the hippocampus which functions to create a spatio-temporal 
framework for the organization of memories (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). 
My analysis yielded what I consider to be five synthesized claims advanced by Eichenbaum in 
the case study.  Importantly, Eichenbaum only flags what I identify as the fifth claim as a 
synthesized claim; this is the main claim that Eichenbaum explicitly argues for in the case study.  
However, because Eichenbaum states what I identify as claims 1-4 are supported by findings 
from different areas of science which, when combined, results in a specific claim about the 
nature of memory organization, I read each claim as a unique synthesis of the findings from 
Eichenbaum’s cited research papers.  Thus, on my reading, the case study contains four implicit 
claims (claims 1-4) and one explicit claim (claim 5).  The five synthesized claims I take 
Eichenbaum to advance and defend in the case study are: 
 
117
 NVIVO 12 is one of the leading qualitative research software programs on the market for determining insights 
in unstructured data and is used internationally by academia, government, non-profit, and commercial 
organizations (Kolodny, online tutorial 2019-03-18). 
118
 All citation counts were acquired through Google Scholar, which enables users to “… gauge the visibility and 
influence of recent articles in scholarly publications” (https://scholar.google.ca/intl/en/scholar/metrics.html). 
119
 All impact factors were acquired through the most recent statistics released by the Journal Citation Report 
(JCR) on their website and/or the website of the journal in question. 
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Claim 1: the hippocampus is responsible for the memory of the order of events (ibid, 83). 
Claim 2: the hippocampus disambiguates overlapping sequences of events (ibid). 
Claim 3: hippocampal neurons replay sequences of events by encoding and retrieving the order 
of events (ibid). 
Claim 4: hippocampal time cells possess the properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge 
the order of events120 121 (ibid, 86). 
Claim 5: the combination of claims 1-4, in addition to previously unmentioned literature on 
memory organization, entail that the role of the hippocampus is to provide a spatio-temporal 
framework for the organization of memories (ibid, 86-87). 
Of the synthesized claims listed above, I make a distinction between two types of syntheses.122  I 
identify claims 1-4 as mini syntheses, and claim 5 as the macro synthesis (i.e., the main claim 
advanced by Eichenbaum in the case study).  My reasoning for the distinction is that claim 5 not 
only synthesizes findings from previously uncited studies, but also syntheses claims 1-4 (and the 
papers/findings cited for each of those).  In this sense, claim 5 is the culmination of the work 
done to support claims 1-4, as well as additional references added to provide further support to 
claim 5. 
In the case study, Eichenbaum argues that claims 1-5 are well supported by interdisciplinary 
research on memory organization.  Prima facie, it appears that the synthesized claims are 
corroborated by results from research spanning multiple areas of the mind-brain sciences 
investigating memory organization.  In the following section, I demonstrate what kind of work 
Eichenbaum does to provide support for claims 1-5 (i.e., how does he argue for their 
corroboration), and explore this analysis within the context of IC in sections 3.2.2. and 3.2.3.  
 
120
 Eichenbaum defines time cells as: “neurons that fire at a specific moment within a temporally structured 
episode” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). 
121
Eichenbaum defines context cells as: “theoretical neurons whose activity bridge events and therefore could link 
their representations in order.  These may pre-exist or arise independent of specific events, or could arise as an 
integration of event information over time” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). 
122
 For length purposes, I shorten ‘the synthesized claims 1-5’ to ‘claims 1-5’ in the remainder of this dissertation. 
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3.2.1 What Eichenbaum Does to Show Support for his Main Claims 
In the case study, Eichenbaum advances what I identify as claims 1-5; what does Eichenbaum do 
to show these claims are well supported?  Put differently, what kind of work does Eichenbaum 
do to demonstrate that claims 1-5 stand on firm epistemic footing?  How does Eichenbaum argue 
for each claim; what kind of arguments does he advance?  In analyzing the case study, I noticed 
the majority of this work is done by stating findings from different research papers on memory 
organization and using certain terms to describe or introduce those findings and the claims that 
they suggest.  The terms used to describe the findings Eichenbaum states in support of claims 1-5 
are indicative of corroboration. To better understand how Eichenbaum provides support for his 
claims by using these key terms, I focus on claim 3 and claim 5 as examples.123 
Claim 3 states hippocampal neuronal ensembles replay sequences of events in memory by 
encoding and retrieving the order of events (ibid, 83).  Eichenbaum cites findings from six 
research papers on memory organization to demonstrate the substantiation of claim 3.  
Eichenbaum provides no critical analysis of these findings.  Instead, he briefly states findings 
from each paper and states what he takes to be their implication(s) for memory organization.  He 
begins by stating there is ‘substantial evidence’ for the claim that hippocampal neuronal 
ensembles are responsible for representing the order of past events (ibid, emphasis mine).  
Importantly, however, Eichenbaum provides no explanation as to what constitutes ‘substantial 
evidence’, how it is quantified, etc. (ibid).  He goes on to claim a great deal of evidence backing 
this claim comes from studies working on rats in a task where the animals routinely pass through 
the same route while investigators record place cell activation in the animals (ibid).124   
Within this paradigm, Eichenbaum notes ‘numerous studies’ have reported both forward and 
reverse replays of place cell sequences (ibid, emphasis mine).  The ‘numerous studies’ 
Eichenbaum refers to consists of four papers investigating memory for order in rats (ibid).  The 
first study Eichenbaum cites is by Karlsson and Frank (2009), who reported consistent replays of 
 
123
 The analysis of claim 3 has similar results for claims 1, 2, and 4, since they all share the same structure (i.e., 
Eichenbaum reviews a certain amount of studies, which, he argues provide strong support for the mini syntheses).  
For length purposes I chose to constrain my focus on claim 3 as an illustration of what Eichenbaum does to show 
support for his mini synthesized claims 1-4. 
124
 Eichenbaum defines a place cell as: “neurons in the hippocampus that fire when an animal (or human) is at a 
particular location in a spatially defined environment” (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). 
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past experience in animals both during periods of wakefulness and rest (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  
After stating this, Eichenbaum cites a paper by Ji and Wilson (2007), who found hippocampal 
replays are synchronized with cortical replays, and a paper by Jadhav et al. (2012), which 
demonstrated that interfering with replays lead to impairments on memory for maze learning 
tasks (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  Eichenbaum claims the two findings together suggest that replays 
are an essential aspect of memory consolidation (ibid).  Eichenbaum immediately cites a study 
by Johnson and Redish (2007), who found when rats undergo maze learning, hippocampal 
neuronal ensembles replayed possible route options (ibid).  Eichenbaum states this finding 
suggests that replays represent memory for past events (ibid).   Eichenbaum again does not 
explain how this finding fits together with the previous findings from Karlsson and Frank (2009), 
Ji and Wilson (2007), and Jadhav et al. (2012), but seems to take these studies as representing the 
‘substantial evidence’ implicating hippocampal neuronal replays as essential for memory for 
sequences of events.   
Eichenbaum continues to show support for claim 3 by claiming there is not only ‘substantial 
evidence’ from rat studies, but also evidence from human studies implicating hippocampal 
replays in memory consolidation.  Specifically, a study from Gelbard-Sagiv et al. (2008) found 
neuronal ensembles within the human hippocampus replayed firing sequences when human 
participants were asked to recall scenes in a movie, and a study from Paz et al. (2010) found 
hippocampal neuronal ensembles demonstrated reliable firing patterns while human participants 
learned sequences from a movie (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  As with the rat studies, Eichenbaum 
does not explain the relation between the two human studies nor how they fit together with the 
rat studies other than immediately concluding the section by claiming: “These findings provide 
compelling evidence that hippocampal neuronal ensembles can encode and retrieve the temporal 
structure of sequential events” (ibid, emphasis mine). 
This is what Eichenbaum does in the case study to substantiate claim three; I will now unpack 
this work by establishing what kind of an argument Eichenbaum provides for claim 3.  
Eichenbaum wants to demonstrate that claim 3 is supported by evidence from human and non-
human animals.  This evidence consists of four research papers investigating memory 
organization in rats, and two papers on memory organization in humans, for a total of six 
research papers.  Generally speaking, all six findings implicate hippocampal replays in memory 
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consolidation (in some shape or form).  Eichenbaum’s argument for claim 3 standing on firm 
epistemic footing is implicit; that is, he does not explicitly advance an argument explaining how 
and in what ways the cited findings support claim 3, but it seems implied that because all six 
findings are consistent with each other, and further, because the cited findings are from 
experiments on different species that all implicate hippocampal replays in memory consolidation 
(i.e., because they all point towards the same general claim), claim 3 stands on firm epistemic 
footing. 
This seems especially true considering the terms Eichenbaum used to describe/introduce the 
findings he cites.  That is, the terms used to describe the overall evidence in favor of claim 3 
include: ‘there is substantial evidence for’, ‘provides compelling evidence that’, and ‘suggests 
that’ (ibid).  These statements convey a great deal of confidence with respect to the epistemic 
status of claim 3.  That is, if there is substantial and compelling evidence suggesting claim 3, it 
would seem that one has good reasons to believe claim 3 stands on firm epistemic footing.  
Again, however, the argument Eichenbaum advances to support claim 3 is implicit; the reader 
may be able to piece together Eichenbaum’s argument, perhaps by noting as I do that all six 
findings seem to point towards the same conclusion and are consistent with each other, however, 
Eichenbaum himself never explicitly makes this point in the case study.  Instead, Eichenbaum 
simply states there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence for claim 3, cites findings from six 
interdisciplinary studies on memory organization, and states that they all suggest hippocampal 
replays are involved in memory consolidation (ibid, 83). 
In sum, Eichenbaum shows support for claim 3 by stating there is compelling and substantial 
evidence for it by citing six findings from different scientific research papers on human and non-
human animals, and stating what they, together, suggest for memory organization (which is 
claim 3, according to Eichenbaum).  I will now analyze the work done by Eichenbaum to support 
claim 5. 
The main claim Eichenbaum defends in the case study (i.e., claim 5) is that the fundamental role 
of the hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories 
(ibid, 81).  Eichenbaum begins by stating there is ‘considerable evidence’ implicating the 
hippocampus in spatial representation; here he cites McNaughton et al. (1996) and Shapiro et al. 
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(2006) (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  However, he notes claims 1-4 implicate the hippocampus in 
temporal representation.  Eichenbaum asks how the two streams of research can be reconciled?  
Does the hippocampus function to represent spatial or temporal memory information?  
Eichenbaum answers this by stating time and place cells are not, in fact, distinct, and that 
whether their activity is associated with temporal or spatial representations depends on the 
context of learning within which the human/non-human animal is engaged in (this is claim 5) 
(ibid).  His answer thus synthesizes both streams of research on the role of the hippocampus for 
memory organization.  How does Eichenbaum provide support for claim 5?  How does he argue 
claim 5 stands on firm epistemic footing? 
Eichenbaum argues claim 5 is supported by two key features of place and time cells.  The first 
feature is that the two cell types share a host of similarities.  He cites findings from MacDonald 
et al. (2011) – a study Eichenbaum cites heavily in support of claim 4 – stating changes to the 
primary dimension of a task creates a ‘partial re-timing’ of hippocampal time cells in much the 
same way that changes to ‘spatial cues’ causes ‘partial re-mapping’ of place cells (Eichenbaum 
2013, 86).  Drawing again on MacDonald et al. (2011, 2012) and newly on Komorowski et al. 
(2009), Eichenbaum states both time and place cells encode specific events from within their 
respective frameworks (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Despite there being multiple sources of temporal 
information in the brain (here Eichenbaum cites two new papers from and Buhusi and Meck 
(2005) and Mauk and Buonomano (2004)), Eichenbaum draws on Kraus et al. (2012) to show 
the main source of spatial and temporal information reaches the hippocampus via the medial 
entorhinal cortex (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Eichenbaum continues to highlight a final similarity 
between the two types of cells.  Specifically, he cites McNaughton et al. (1996) who found that 
place cells seem to be ‘pre-configured’ and applied to representations of spatial dimensions, just 
as Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) (previously cited in support of claim 4) found that time cells “… 
reflect a sequential configuration of the passage of time, onto which specific events are serially 
attached” (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).   
The second feature of time and place cells Eichenbaum identifies as key to substantiating claim 5 
is demonstrated by MacDonald et al. (2011) (previously cited in support of claim 4) who found 
that time cells tend to incorporate spatial information, and place cells tend to incorporate 
temporal information (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Further, a finding by Kraus et al. 2011 (also cited 
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to support claim 4) in experiments where rats traverse through a T-maze task demonstrated that 
many of the same neuronal ensembles ‘fire selectively’ at periods of time also display ‘spatially 
specific activity’ while the rat traverses the maze (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Thus, while 
Eichenbaum does not comment further on these findings, it would seem as though time and place 
cells are the same type of cell (or at least that they share many of the same properties).   
After listing traits shared between time and place cells and demonstrating hippocampal cells 
represent both spatio-temporal aspects of memory organization, Eichenbaum comments critically 
on the distinction between the two cells in the literature as being  “… a reflection of different 
experimental designs that emphasize time or place representation, respectively, rather than a 
fundamental distinction between time cells and place cells” (ibid).  Finally, Eichenbaum sums up 
in his ‘concluding remarks’ section by claiming  
… a synthesis of emerging knowledge suggests that the same population of hippocampal 
neurons encodes both the spatial and temporal regularities of experience, creating a 
framework that organizes the spatio-temporal  context of experience and puts each event into 
its time and place (ibid, 87, emphases mine). 
This is a brief description of what Eichenbaum does in the last two sections of the case study 
where he introduces claim 5.  Like claim 3, Eichenbaum wants to demonstrate that claim 5 is 
supported by evidence from human and non-human animals.  He begins by stating there is 
‘considerable evidence’ implicating the hippocampus in spatial memory; for this, he cites one 
research paper on rats, one review paper including data on human and non-human animals, and 
two studies on human animals (ibid, 86).  Thus, the ‘considerable evidence’ consists of four 
papers on human and non-human animals implicating the hippocampus in spatial memory.   
Eichenbaum asks how one stream of research (i.e., the spatial aspects of memory in the 
hippocampus) can be reconciled with literature suggesting the hippocampus is responsible for 
temporal aspects of memory (i.e., claims 1-4 and all the research papers he cites to support those 
claims)?  His answer is to synthesize the two streams of research and argue that the role of the 
hippocampus is to establish a spatio-temporal framework for memory organization (ibid, 86).   
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According to Eichenbaum, there are two main features of time and place cells suggesting claim 5 
(ibid).  The first feature is that time cells and place cells share similar properties; here 
Eichenbaum cites three rat studies, two review papers on human and non-human animals, and 
one paper on mice, for a total of five papers.  While each cited finding refers to a different 
similarity, generally speaking, all six of these studies show that time and place cells share 
properties such as ‘re-timing’ and ‘re-mapping’, for example (ibid).   
The second feature is that time cells incorporate spatial information and place cells incorporate 
temporal information; here, Eichenbaum cites a paper on rats and a review paper on human and 
non-human animals, for a total of two papers.  Eichenbaum’s argument for claim 5, like claim 3, 
is implicit.  That is, Eichenbaum does not explicitly state what the two features entail, but it 
seems implied that if time and place cells share a host of similarities, and if each type can 
incorporate spatial and/or temporal information, then the two cell types are not distinct.  Since 
they are not distinct (the implicit argument seems to go), whether their activity is associated with 
time and/or space is dependent on the context within which the human/non-human animal finds 
itself (ibid, 86).   
To re-iterate, the implicit argument rests on the two features of time and place cells described by 
Eichenbaum.  These two features are supported by a total of seven papers (three of which are 
review papers) on human and non-human animals.  When Eichenbaum reports these features, he 
does so by briefly stating what each paper found, generally speaking, without introducing them 
with any terms like ‘compelling evidence’, ‘shows that’, ‘suggests that’, or ‘indicates that’, etc. 
(ibid 83-86-87).  Eichenbaum only uses terms indicative of corroboration at the beginning of his 
section entitled ‘time and place cells’, when claiming there is ‘considerable evidence’ 
implicating the hippocampus in spatial representations in non-human animals and ‘strong 
evidence’ for it in human animals, and when he introduces claim 5 as an answer to how the 
spatial and temporal aspects of the hippocampus and memory can be reconciled.  With respect to 
the latter, he argues there are two main features of time and place cells which ‘suggest that’ the 
role of the hippocampus is to establish a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of 
memories (ibid).  In his section entitled ‘concluding remarks’, Eichenbaum states that a 
‘synthesis of emerging knowledge’ – presumably that which he reviewed in the case study – 
‘suggests that’ the same population of hippocampal neurons encode both spatial and temporal 
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aspects of experience, therefore time and place cells are not distinct, and the role of the 
hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for memory organization (ibid, 87).  Thus, 
the main terms used to introduce and advance claim 5 are ‘suggest that’ in Eichenbaum’s section 
entitled ‘time cells and place cells’ and ‘suggests that’ in his section entitled ‘concluding 
remarks.  What suggests claim 5?  Again, Eichenbaum does not make this argument explicit, but 
it seems that what suggests claim 5 is ‘compelling’, ‘substantial’, ‘considerable’ evidence from 
claims 1-4, along with evidence from a few papers which were not cited in support of claims 1-4 
in his section ‘time cells and place cells’ showing time and place cells are not distinct (ibid, 83, 
86-87).  Importantly, the term ‘suggests’ implies that while claim 5 may not be completely true, 
it is very likely, given that it is well supported by interdisciplinary research on multiple species 
in the mind-brain sciences investigating memory organization.   
This descriptive analysis leads to the question: “does the case study represent a strong case of IC, 
and, if so, how”?  I address these questions in the following sections. 
3.2.2  In What Ways ‘Memory on Time’ is a Prime Example of IC in Practice: The 
Interdisciplinarity Component 
Thus far I have showcased what Eichenbaum does in the case study to argue for claims 1-5 by 
focusing on the language and terms he used to describe the findings he reported to substantiate 
claims 1-5.  That is, he used terms like ‘compelling’ and ‘substantial evidence’ to describe the 
cited findings, and (sometimes) commented on some of the findings by stating what he thinks 
they suggest (ibid, 83).  I now want to address how and in what ways the case study adheres to 
the requirements of IC; does the case study represent a strong case of interdisciplinary 
corroboration?   
In answering this, I begin with the interdisciplinarity component of IC insofar as it is relatively 
straight-forward to define and assess.  The interdisciplinarity component held that the papers 
surveyed in one’s review paper must come from different areas of science, which often make use 
of different methods of experimentation, different protocols, different types of analysis, on 
different animals, etc., (instead of reviewing studies only in psychology, only on humans, using 
only questionnaires).  The 59 articles mentioned in Eichenbaum’s review paper span the fields of 
neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, neuropsychology, biology, computational biology, 
neurobiology, behavioral biology and cognitive science, cognitive neurobiology, psychology, 
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etc.125  Eichenbaum thus does not constrain his focus to one sole area of science, but instead 
reviews studies from multiple areas of science housed under the mind-brain sciences researching 
memory organization.   
Critically, the cited papers not only span different areas of science, but different species.  For 
instance, the reviewed papers involve experimental research on humans (e.g., Ekstrom and 
Bookheimer, 2007; Lehn et al., 2009; Shimamura, 1990; Spiers et al., 2001; Vargha-Kadem et 
al., 2007, etc.), rats (e.g., Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2006; Fortin et al., 2002; Karlsson and 
Frank, 2009; Kesner et al., 2002, etc.), mice (e.g., Devito and Eichenbaum, 2011; Dragoi and 
Tonegawa, 2011Suh et al., 2011), and monkeys (e.g., Naya and Suzuki, 2011; Templer and 
Hampton, 2012) (see figure 4 for a breakdown of the type of species studied by each of the cited 
papers).   
Further, while the cited papers involve work on four main species (i.e., humans, rats, mice, and 
monkey), each species type is varied.  For example, in humans, control groups were compared 
against humans with global retrograde amnesia (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 2007), patients with 
Korsakoff’s syndrome (e.g., Shimamura, 1990), or with selective bilateral hippocampal lesions 
(e.g., Mayes et al., 2001).  Of the two papers on monkeys (i.e., Naya and Suzuki, 2011; Templer 
and Hampton, 2012), the former used macaque monkeys and the later rhesus monkeys.  
Different tasks were used to investigate memory organization such as serial order for list tasks 
(e.g., Shimamura, 1990; Vargha-Khadem et al., 2007), memory of order for action and stimuli 
sequences (e.g., Ekstrom and Bookheimer, 2007), a taxi cab virtual reality game task, (Lehn et 
al., 2009), retrieving a series of action sequences from movie clips task, (e.g., Fortin et al., 2002), 
overlapping sequences of odors task (e.g., Agster et al., 2002) retrieval for overlapping images 
of faces task (e.g., Ross et al., 2009), and various T-maze tasks (e.g., Ainge et al., 2007; 
Ferbinteanu and Shapiro, 2003; Frank et al. 2000; Wood et al., 2000, etc.).   
 
125
 While Eichenbaum cites 61 studies in his ‘References’ section, I have chosen to exclude the first two – 
Aristotle’s (1930) ‘On Memory and Reminiscence’ and Tulving’s (1984) ‘Precis of Elements of Episodic Memory’ – 
insofar as their sole citational purpose is to set up the appropriate background/history of temporal memory 
research.  Accordingly, because I’m interested in the findings cited for the purpose of providing evidence for claims 
1-5, they do not fit this description, and I have thus excluded them from any further analysis in this chapter and 
chapter four. 
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These tasks involved varied methodologies.  One common method of analysis in human and 
non-human animals is the comparison of a control group versus a group with some kind of brain 
damage.  The type of and the extent of brain damage varies from paper to paper.  For example, 
hippocampal lesions/damage in human animals are often naturally occurring (i.e., they are the 
product of some disease/pathology such as Korsakoff’s syndrome and not the product of a 
researcher directly intervening by creating the lesions themselves).  In non-human animals, 
however, brain damage is a product of direct intervention and is produced in a number of ways.  
For example, many of the research papers on rats (whether the task is the disambiguation of 
overlapping odors or the navigation of a T-maze) compare the behavior of a group of control rats  
to rats with various types of brain damage.  In some cases, this damage involved brain lesions 
which were produced in a number of ways; for instance, Agster et al. (2002) produced human-
made lesions by either injecting infusions of the neurotoxin ibotenic acid or via the application of 
a radiofrequency current, and Fortin et al. (2002) surgically created lesions in the hippocampus 
(Agster et al. 2002, 5760-5761; Fortin et al. 2002, 458).   
Finally, the behavior/results of the tasks are analyzed via a variety of techniques/tools including 
but not limited to MRI (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997), fMRI (e.g., Schendan et al. 2003; 
Staresina and Davachi, 201), positron emission tomography (PET)126 (e.g., Gill et al., 2011), 
electroencephalogram and magnetoencephalographic imaging (EEG and MEG)127 (e.g., Jensen 
and Lisman, 2005), and electrophysiological recording/ single-cell recording (e.g., Ji and 
Wilson, 2007; Johnson and Redish, 2007; Karlsson and Frank, 2009; Komorowski et al. 2009; 
Wood et al., 2000; etc.).   
In sum, the case study clearly adheres to/includes the interdisciplinary component of IC.  That is, 
it includes findings from different areas of science, performed on different species, using 
different experimental tasks and protocols, the results of which were analyzed via different 
techniques/tools.  While the case study has a strong interdisciplinary component, summarizing 
findings from different areas of science is not sufficient for IC.  The cited interdisciplinary 
 
126
 PET uses a radioactive substance to detect disease in the body. 
127
 EEG is a tool used to detect brain waves and MEG is an imaging technique that allows researchers to detect 
and record “… the magnetic field associated with electrical activity in the brain” (https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/electroencephalogram, and https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/magnetoencephalography). 
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research papers and their respective findings must also corroborate claims 1-5.  In the next 
section, I analyze the case study in light of the corroboration requirement. 
3.2.3 In What Ways ‘Memory on Time’ is a Prime Example of IC in Practice: The Corroboration 
Component 
In chapter two, I noted a standard definition of corroboration is one where evidence either 
confirms or supports x.128  In the context of the case study, we might say claims 1-5 are 
corroborated if multiple pieces of evidence confirm or lend support to one or more of them.  To 
confirm x is akin to saying the evidence indicates the truth of x.  To claim evidence lends support 
to x, however, is epistemically weaker.  One can claim evidence supports x without making the 
additional claim that x is true.  That is, in saying a, b, and c, lend support to x, we can accept that 
x is not necessarily true, but instead approximately true, likely, unlikely to be false, highly 
probable, etc.129  Accordingly, analyzing the case study within the context of IC requires asking 
what kind of epistemic claims (i.e., either that it confirms or lends support to) claims 1-5 are 
making.   
To answer this, I further investigated the language/terms Eichenbaum used before advancing 
claims 1-5.  The terms used before stating a claim that appear to imply corroboration are: the 
studies show that x (a remark made with respect to claim 1 and 2), there is compelling evidence 
for x (a remark made with respect to claim 3), these findings strongly support x (a remark made 
with respect to claim 4), and that a synthesis of knowledge on time and place cells suggests that x 
(a claim made with respect claim 5 in two separate sections of the case study) (ibid 83,86-87).  
Since claim 5 is mentioned twice, both in the section of the case study entitled ‘time and place 
cells’ and again in the section entitled ‘concluding remarks’, there are a total of 6 terms 
indicative of corroboration used to advance a given claim.  A text frequency search on NVIVO12 
revealed the two most common terms of the six are ‘show that’ (shortened in fig 2. below as 
 
128
 Here I take x to represent a claim about the temporal organization of memory, where x could thus be any of 
claims 1-5. 
129
 Bechtel and Richardson (1993) define corroboration in probabilistic terms.  They claim when different pieces of 
evidence (using different and independent measures) point to some claim x, the likelihood of x being an error is 
low.  Thus, their epistemic understanding is not one of confirmation, but something weaker along the lines of 
probability (xxvii).  Similarly, Wimsatt’s (2007) concept of robustness also presents a case for corroboration as 
something weaker than confirmation.  For Wimsatt, something is robust if it is assessible, detectible, etc., by a 
variety of different and independent measures; however, to say x is robust is not to say that x is true, instead, the 
likelihood of x being robust increases with each piece of evidence supporting it (Wimsatt 2007, 196). 
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‘show’) and ‘suggest that ’ (shortened in fig 2. below as ‘suggest’), each of which make up a 
respective weighted percentage of 33.3%.130  To show x implies x is true or has been confirmed, 
but to suggest x merely entails it being a likely possibility, approximately true, etc.  While it 
seems that the kind of corroboration occurring in the case study is undetermined, insofar as the 
two most frequent terms are tied, the two remaining terms break this tie.  That is, there being 
‘compelling evidence’ for x (shortened in fig 2. below as ‘compelling’) and there being evidence 
that ‘strongly supports’ x (shortened in fig. 2 below as ‘supports’) each make up a weighted 
percentage of 16.67%.  Neither of these terms entail x has been confirmed; there can be 
compelling evidence for x without x being true, just as evidence can strongly support x without x 
being true.  These terms simply imply there are good reasons to believe x stands on firm 
epistemic footing insofar as it is well supported by multiple distinct pieces of evidence; but it 
need not and does not entail x is true. 
The terms ‘compelling’ and ‘supports’, along with the term ‘suggest’ support a reading of 
corroboration understood in terms of evidence lending support to x.  This seems especially true 
given the term used with respect to the claim 5 (i.e., the main claim Eichenbaum argues for in the 
case study) is ‘suggest that’, which implies something weaker than confirmation.  While there 
are aspects both of a confirmation and a lending support reading throughout the case study, 
ultimately, the terms falling under a ‘lending support to’ reading of corroboration (i.e., suggest, 
compelling, and supports) make up a weighted percentage of 66.64%, making it predominantly 
on the side of ‘lending support to’ reading of corroboration.131  Corroboration in the case study 
should therefore be understood along the lines of ‘lending support’, whereby the cited findings 
lend support to claims 1-5 in such a way that one has good reasons to believe the claims are 
probable, likely, etc. 
 
130
 All weighted percentages were automatically generated via the NVIVO12 text frequency analysis. 
131
 If one considers the terms used to with respect to claim 5 (i.e., the term ‘suggests’ once in Eichenbaum’s 
section entitled ‘time cells and place cells’ and once in Eichenbaum’s ‘concluding remarks’), the percentage jumps 
to 100% in support of a corroboration defined as pieces of evidence lending support to claim x (Eichenbaum 2013, 
86).  
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Figure 2 – Tree map produced via text frequency query on NVIVO12 demonstrating the most common terms to the least 
common terms suggesting corroboration.  I’ve shortened all the phrases down to their key terms (e.g., ‘studies show that’ to 
‘show’). 
I noted in section 3.2.1 the phrase ‘suggests that’ used by Eichenbaum before advancing claim 5 
left open the possibility that claim 5 may not be completely true, even if there was ‘substantial’ 
or ‘compelling evidence’ in favor of it (ibid, 83).  Applying the new definition of corroboration 
to the case study, one might argue claims 1-5 have been corroborated insofar as the findings 
cited by Eichenbaum all lend support to claims 1-5 and do so in such a way the claims are to be 
understood as approximately true, probable, likely etc.  That is, the cited findings, when 
combined, appear to lend support to claims 1-5.   
Do the cited findings possess any other features that may increase the likelihood of the 
corroboration of claims 1-5?  What characteristics might the cited findings possess such that one 
can confidently say a reliable claim about memory has been advanced?  I answer this by 
considering two key features of the cited findings in the case study: the journals in which the 
findings were published, and the number of citations each of the cited papers received.  As 
Seglen (1997) notes, evaluating the quality of scientific research papers is notoriously 
challenging.  Impact factors and citation statistics are frequently called upon in the evaluation of 
scientific research papers insofar as they are considered to be a “… quantitative and objective 
indicator directly related to published science” (Seglen 1997, 498).   
One important feature of the papers Eichenbaum cites in support of claims 1-5 is that they are 
published in high-calibre and well-respected journals within the mind-brain science community.  
To see a breakdown of the cited journals, I’ve created a chart below indicating the name of the 
93 
 
journal, how many studies Eichenbaum cites from each journal, and the journal’s impact 
factor.132 133 
 
Figure 3 – Chart including one column for the name of the journal, a second column for the number of studies in the case study 
that are published in said journal, and a final column stating the impact factor of the journal. 
 
132
 Again, I’ve only included the 59 studies as they are the ones doing the epistemic work in the case study.   
133
 An impact factor is the outcome of a quantitative analysis measuring how frequently articles in a journal have 
been cited for a given year (https://researchguides.uic.edu/if/impact).  An impact factor is represented numerically 
and is used to determine the rank or status of a given journal; the higher the number, the higher ranked the 
journal is (ibid).  Specifically: “… The calculation is based on a two-year period and involves dividing the number of 
times articles were cited by the number of articles that are citable” (ibid).  Journal Citation Reports (hereafter JCR) 
are responsible for providing impact factors for journals in science, technology and the social sciences (ibid).   
Name of Journal Number of Cited Studies in 
Case Study 
Impact Factor 
Academic Press 1 Book 
Annual Review of Neuroscience 2 14.675 
Science  6 37.205 
Neuropsychologia 1 2.888 
Cognitive Neuropsychology 1 1.84 
Hippocampus 4 3.945 
Learning & Memory 3 2.906 
Journal of Neuroscience 11 5.971 
PLOS Biology 1 9.163 
Cerebral Cortex 1 6.308 
Nature Neuroscience 3 19.912 
Frontiers in Behavioral 
Neuroscience 
3 3.104 
Neuron 9 14.318 
Behavioral Brain Research 2 3.002 
Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 
1 9.504 
Trends in Neurosciences 2 17.755 
Psychological Review 1 7.230 
Journal of Experimental Biology 1 3.32 
Nature 3 41.577 
Current Opinion in Neurology 1 5.307 
Frontiers Integrative 
Neuroscience 
1 3.23 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience 1 28.880 
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The journals highlighted in yellow in figure 3 represent the three journals with the highest 
number of cited papers in the case study.  Specifically, Eichenbaum cites six studies from 
Science, nine studies from Neuron, and eleven studies from the Journal of Neuroscience, for a 
total amount of 26 studies out of 59 (making up almost half of the cited studies at 44%).134  All 
three of these journals are well-established within the mind-brain science community.  Science, 
founded in 1880, claims to publish only ‘the very best’ research articles in science and those 
articles “… consistently rank among the most cited in the world” 
(https://www.sciencemag.org/about/about-science-
aaas?_ga=2.10191605.1947000741.1556017401-385344628.1554129536).  Indeed, out of all the 
journals listed above, Science has the second highest impact factor rating (see my fig. 3 above).  
Neuron is another well-respected, multidisciplinary journal in the mind-brain sciences.  Over the 
last fifteen years, Neuron, founded in 1988, has established its place in the scientific community 
as “… as one of the most influential and relied upon journals in the field of neuroscience. … 
Neuron serves as one of the premier intellectual forums of the entire neuroscience community” 
(https://www.cell.com/neuron/aims, emphases mine).   
Finally, the Journal of Neuroscience claims to advance neuroscientific research by “… 
publishing and widely disseminating the highly rigorous research representative of the breadth 
of neuroscience …” (http://www.jneurosci.org/content/about-jneurosci, emphasis mine).  The 
Journal of Neuroscience prides itself on five main qualities: first, delivering articles of excellent 
quality and scientific rigor, by ensuring that studies reflect ‘unbiased and repeatable 
experiments’ and reporting procedures to ensure progress in neuroscience (ibid).  Second, the 
journal represents the wide-scope and ever-evolving field of neuroscience (ibid).  Third, the 
journal ensures diversity amongst its editorial board (ibid).  Fourth, the journal prides itself on its 
quick and efficient dissemination of peer-reviewed articles by publishing fifty weeks out of the 
year and is committed to publishing articles as quickly as possible while maintaining scientific 
rigor and excellence (ibid).  Finally, the journal prides itself of its constructive and fair peer-
review process whereby: “Decisions are made by our journal editors who are active research 
scientists in the field” (ibid).  In sum, all three of the journals with the highest number of papers 
 
134
 Percentages in this section are rounded up for simplicity. 
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referenced by Eichenbaum are from internationally recognized, multidisciplinary, cutting-edge, 
and highly influential journals producing some of the best and most scientifically rigorous and 
sound articles on the mind-brain. 
The impact factors highlighted in turquoise in figure 3 represent the three most highly ranked 
journals of Eichenbaum’s 59 references.  These journals are Science, Nature, and Nature 
Reviews Neuroscience.  Science, which is also ranked in the top three journals with the highest 
number of scientific papers referenced by Eichenbaum, is the second highest ranked journal of 
those included in the case study (in terms of its impact factor).  As stated above, Science claims 
to publish and disseminate only the very best research articles in science, making it a high-
ranking, peer-reviewed, international journal in the mind-brain sciences 
(https://www.sciencemag.org/about/about-science-
aaas?_ga=2.10191605.1947000741.1556017401-385344628.1554129536).   
Nature, which has the highest impact factor of those included in the case study, is an 
international journal that publishes weekly, producing, “… the finest peer-reviewed research” 
(https://www.nature.com/nature/about, emphasis mine).   In their mission statement, Nature 
states that they contribute to advancing scientific knowledge by the “… prompt publication of 
significant advances in any branch of science … to ensure that the results of science are rapidly 
disseminated to the public throughout the world …” (ibid).  Nature is therefore a 
multidisciplinary, peer-reviewed, and highly ranked journal in the mind-brain sciences producing 
some of the best research concerning the mind-brain.   
The third highest ranking journal according to its impact factor is Nature Reviews Neuroscience.  
In their ‘aims and scope’ section, Nature Reviews Neuroscience claims similarly to provide some 
of the best peer-reviewed research from a variety of branches in neuroscience 
(https://www.nature.com/nrn/about).   
The journals with the highest number of cited research papers (i.e., Science, the Journal of 
Neuroscience, and Neuron) are considered prestigious and high-calibre mind-brain science 
journals.  The papers cited from those journals make up almost 44% of Eichenbaum’s 
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references.135  Of the top-three highest ranking impact factors, 6 papers were cited from Science, 
3 papers from Nature, and 1 paper from Nature Reviews Neuroscience.  If these papers are added 
to those from The Journal of Neuroscience and Neuron (omitting Science, as its numbers are 
already factored into the 44%) we get a total of 30/59 papers, making a total percentage of 50% 
of the cited papers.  Thus, at least half of the studies Eichenbaum cites in support of claims 1-5 
are from internationally top-ranked, multidisciplinary journals that purport to disseminate only 
the best and most scientifically sound articles.  
Further, there are other highly ranked journals just shy of the top three.  For example, 
Eichenbaum cites two studies from Annual Review Neuroscience (which has an impact factor of 
14.75), three studies from Nature Neuroscience (which has an impact factor of 19.912), and two 
studies in Trends in Neurosciences (which has an impact factor of 17.755).  Adding these papers 
to those above results in 37/59 papers, making a total percentage of 63%.  Accordingly, more 
than half of Eichenbaum’s references are from trustworthy and reputable sources.  A final point 
worth noting is all journals listed in fig. 3 (even those with lower impact factors) are peer-
reviewed journals in the mind-brain science.136   
I inquired above whether the findings cited by Eichenbaum possess features which might 
increase the likelihood of claims 1-5 being corroborated.  The analysis of journal impact factors 
suggests that if the cited papers and their respective findings are published in reputable and high-
calibre journals that allegedly produce the most scientifically sound articles, one might argue this 
lends more credibility to Eichenbaum’s findings, which would not be the case if he were citing 
findings from random websites or non-peer reviewed journals.  This credibility increases the 
likelihood of the corroboration of claims 1-5 in the case study. 
Another feature to consider is the number of citations each individual cited paper has received.  
To visualize the breakdown of citations per study, I have included a chart (see figure 4) 
containing the author(s) of each article, the journal in which it was published, the number of 
citations it received, and the primary species studied. 
 
135
 Percentage was rounded up for simplicity. 
136
 Peer-reviewed means any submitted article for potential publication must pass a board of reviewers who are 
knowledgeable in the topic to ensure top quality research. 
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Author(s) Journal  # of Citations Primary Species 
Studied 
1. N/A    
2. N/A    
3. Eichenbaum 
et al. (2007) 
Annual Review 
Neuroscience 
2004 Human and non-
human animals 
4. Vargha-
Khadem 
(1997) 
Science 1849 Humans 
5. Shimamura 
(1990) 
Neuropsychologia 649 Humans 
6. Mayes et al. 
(2001) 
Cognitive 
Neuropsychology 
146 Humans 
7. Spiers et al. 
(2001) 
Hippocampus 198 Humans 
8. Ekstrom and 
Bookheimer 
(2007) 
Learning & Memory 134 Humans 
9. Lehn et al. 
(2009) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
155 Humans 
10. Kumaran and 
Maguire 
(2006) 
PLOS Biology 236 Humans 
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11. Tubridy and 
Davachi 
(2011) 
Cerebral Cortex 110 Humans 
12. Staresina and 
Davachi 
(2006) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
280 Humans 
13. Fortin et al. 
(2002) 
Nature Neuroscience 740 Rats 
14. Kesner et al. 
(2002) 
Behavioral 
Neuroscience 
281 Rats 
15. Templer and 
Hampton 
(2012) 
Hippocampus 21 Mice 
16. Devito and 
Eichenbaum 
(2012) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
116 Rhesus Monkeys 
17. Ergorul and 
Eichenbaum 
(2004) 
Learning & Memory 234 Rats 
 
18. Schendan et 
al. (2003) 
Neuron 522 Humans 
19. Ergorul and 
Eichenbaum 
(2006) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
66 Rats  
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20. DeCoteau and 
Kesner (2000) 
Behavioral 
Neuroscience 
126 Rats 
21. Fouquet et al. 
(2010) 
Behavioral Brain 
Research 
36 Rats 
22. Agster et al. 
(2002) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
251 Rats 
23. Kumaran and 
Maguire 
(2006) 
Neuron 109 Humans 
24. Ross et al. 
(2009) 
Hippocampus 67 Humans 
25. Brown et al. 
(2010) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
94 Humans 
26. Karlsson and 
Frank (2009) 
Nature Neuroscience  436  Rats 
27. Ji and Wilson 
(2007) 
Nature Neuroscience 1115 Rats 
28. Jadhav et al. 
(2012) 
Science 410  Rats 
29. Johnson and 
Redish (2007) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
680 Rats 
30. Gelbard-Sagiv 
et al. (2008) 
Science 382 Humans  
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31. Paz et al. 
(2010) 
Proceedings of the 
National Academy of 
Science of the United 
States of America 
74 Humans 
32. Jensen and 
Lisman 
(2005) 
Trends in 
Neurosciences 
369 Humans 
33. Mehta et al. 
(2000) 
Neuron 382 Rats 
34. Levy (1989) Academic Press 217 Computational 
Modelling 
35. Wallenstein et 
al. (1998) 
Trends in 
Neurosciences 
518 Computational 
Modelling – Human 
and non-human 
animals 
36. Rolls (2010) Behavioral Brain 
Research 
211 Monkeys 
37. Dargoi and 
Buzsaki 
(2006) 
Neuron 450 Rats 
38. Howard et al. 
(2005) 
Psychological 
Review 
250 Computational 
Modelling 
39. McNaughton 
et al. (1996) 
Journal of 
Experimental 
Biology 
852 Rats 
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40. Dragoi and 
Tonegawa 
(2011) 
Nature 380 Mice 
41. Wood et al. 
(2000) 
Neuron 709 Rats 
42. Frank et al. 
(2000) 
Neuron 573 Rats 
43. Ferbinteanu 
and Shapiro 
(2003) 
Neuron 429 Rats 
44. Ainge et al. 
(2007) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
114  Rats 
45. Shapiro et al. 
(2006) 
Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology 
68 Human and non-
human animals 
46. Ginther et al. 
(2011) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
45  Rats 
 
47. Barnes et al. 
(1997) 
Nature 345 Rats 
48. Mann et al. 
(2007) 
Neuron 288 Rats 
49. Pastalkova et 
al. (2008) 
Science 733 Rats 
50. Kesner et al. 
(2005) 
Behavioral 
Neuroscience 
118 Rats 
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51. Farovik et al. 
(2010) 
Learning & Memory 111 Rats 
52. Suh et al. 
(2011) 
Science 200 Mice 
53. MacDonald et 
al. (2011)  
Neuron 593 Rats 
54. Yin and 
Troger (2011)  
Frontiers of 
Integrative 
Neuroscience 
41 Rats/Mice 
55. Gill et al. 
(2011) 
Hippocampus 71 Rats 
56. Naya and 
Suzuki (2011) 
Science 160 Monkeys 
57. Erkstrom et 
al. (2013) 
Nature  1114 Humans 
58. Maguire et al. 
(1997) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience  
761 Humans 
59. Komorowski 
et al. (2009) 
Journal of 
Neuroscience 
240 Rats 
60. Mauk and 
Buonomano 
(2004) 
61. Buhusi and 
Meck (2005) 
Annual Review 
Neuroscience 
 
Nature Review 
Neuroscience 
793 
 
 
1618 
Human and non-
human animals 
 
Human and non-
human animals 
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Figure 4  – Chart with one column for the name of the author(s) and year of publication, a second column for the journal in 
which it was published, a third column for the number of citations each received, and a final column for what kind of species the 
study (primarily) investigated. 
 
I noted above that Eichenbaum selected research papers from high-calibre journals in the mind-
brain sciences, but have those papers themselves had much impact in terms of their citations?  
An analysis of the 59 studies reveals a total of 24 274 citations for the combined 59 studies, 
giving the references a mean of 411 citations.137  The three papers with the most citations 
(highlighted in yellow in fig. 4) are Eichenbaum et al.’s (2007) paper with 2004 citations, 
Vargha-Khadem’s (1997) paper with 1849 citations, and Buhusi and Meck (2005) paper with 
1618 citations.  On the lower end of the spectrum, the three least cited papers (highlighted in 
turquoise in fig. 4) are Templer and Hampton’s (2012) paper with 21 citations, Fouquet et al.’s 
(2010) paper with 36 citations, and Yin and Troger’s (2011) paper with 41 citations.  Despite 
these low numbers, the majority of the cited papers hit a minimum of one hundred citations, with 
many of those almost reaching (and some breaking) one thousand citations.  As an example of 
the former, Fortin et al.’s (2002) has 740 citations, and as an example of the latter, Ji and 
Wilson’s (2007) article surpassed 1000 citations with a total of 1115 citations. 
Further, the three papers with the most citations were also published in high-calibre journals with 
high impact factors.  For example, Vargha-Khadem’s (1997) paper was published in Science, 
which has an impact factor of 37.205, Buhusi and Meck’s (2005) paper was published in Nature 
Review Neuroscience, which has an impact factor of 28.880, and finally Eichenbaum et al.’s 
(2007) paper was published in Annual Review Neuroscience, which has an impact factor of 
14.675, all of which are high impact factors. 
Thus, one might argue a mean of 411 citations for Eichenbaum’s cited papers, in addition to their 
being published in high-calibre and internationally recognized mind-brain journals adds more 
credibility to claims1-5 (since they are grounded in the reliability of cited findings).   
 
137
 Mean average was rounded down for simplicity. 
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Furthermore, the cited papers having high citation counts and being published in journals with 
high impact factors, in addition to the fact that the cited findings are highly interdisciplinary adds 
another level of credibility to the findings corroborating claims 1-5.  That is, a point made by 
Bechtel and Richardson (1993), Campbell (1966), Hacking (1983), Roskies (2010) Wimsatt 
(2007), is that when multiple pieces of evidence from different areas of science, using different 
tools, techniques, and methods of analysis all point towards a general conclusion, then that 
conclusion is more probable than one reached by one individual piece of evidence or pieces of 
evidence from the same area of science using the same general protocols and methods of 
analysis.138  In section 3.1.1, I noted the ways in which the case study adheres to the 
interdisciplinary component of IC by including papers on memory organization from different 
areas of the mind-brain sciences, on different species, using different tasks, and methods of 
analysis.  In section 3.1.2, I noted that claims 1-5 appear to be corroborated by the cited findings, 
but in a way that claims 1-5 are understood as likely, probable, etc., but not necessarily full-stop 
true.  Further, because each the cited findings are from papers published in high-calibre mind-
brain science journals with high impact factors and citations, the findings can be considered 
reliable pieces of information.  Therefore, the case study appears to represent a prime example of 
IC in practice insofar as the interdisciplinary papers/findings cited in the case study are 
considered reliable pieces of information, which, when taken together, corroborate claims 1-5 in 
such a way that makes them very likely/probable.  
In sum, I began my analysis in this chapter with a general understanding of how Trends review 
papers work based off of my research presented in chapter 2 (i.e., they contain a summary, 
explanation(s), which can take the form of a synthesis, and directions for future research).  My 
analysis in this chapter was based off of this information and was guided by cursory criteria such 
as the following questions: “what is the aim of Eichenbaum’s review paper”, “what claims does 
Eichenbaum argue for”, “how does Eichenbaum show support for those claims”, “are 
Eichenbaum’s arguments implicit or explicit”, “and “does the case study represent a strong case 
of IC, and if so, how”?   
 
138
 Each author articulates this point somewhat differently.  For those differences, refer to chapter two of this 
dissertation. 
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I stated that the main aim of the case study was to establish the role of the hippocampus as 
creating a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories.  I identified a total of 
five synthesized claims advanced in the case study; claims 1-4 were implicit, and claim 5 was 
explicitly flagged by Eichenbaum.  Eichenbaum supported claims 1-5 by citing findings from 
papers suggesting the claim in question.  For example, claim 3 stated hippocampal neuronal 
ensembles replay sequences of events in memory by encoding and retrieving the order of events 
(ibid, 83).  To support this claim, Eichenbaum cited findings from human and non-human 
animals studies which all generally implicated hippocampal replays in memory consolidation.  
That is, while there were minor discrepancies in the findings – for example, intervening with 
hippocampal replays impairs the rats memory for maze learning (Jadhav et al. 2012) and that 
hippocampal replays are observed in humans during the recall of scenes from a movie (Gelbard-
Sagiv et al. 2008) – all six findings observed hippocampal replays during memory and learning 
tasks (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  Thus, the combined interdisciplinary findings suggest claim 3.  
Further, by describing and introducing findings using terms like ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling 
evidence’, Eichenbaum gives the reader the impression that there is good reason to take claim 3 
(and by proxy, claims 1, 2, 4, and 5) as corroborated by the interdisciplinary findings he cites. 
Critically, the arguments for the corroboration of claims 1-5 are implicit.  That is, Eichenbaum 
never explicitly spells out the arguments for his claims; instead, he cites a number of studies 
which he takes as representing ‘substantial’ or ‘compelling’ evidence for a claim, and states that 
taken together, they suggest a given claim 1-5 (ibid).  Thus, his arguments for the corroboration 
of claims 1-5 are implied by the terms he uses to describe the findings he cites in support of his 
claims. 
My goal in this chapter was to get a deeper understanding of how review papers work to 
corroborate claims about the mind-brain and to assess the extent to which the claims in the case 
study were corroborated.  In section 3.1.2, I argue that prima facie, the case study appears to 
represent a strong case of IC, insofar as claims 1-5 are supported by reliable and interdisciplinary 
findings.   
However, analyzing the case study – especially the implicit arguments for claims 1-5 – prompted 
a number of questions and concerns about the case study representing a strong case of IC.  That 
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is, part of Eichenbaum’s support for claims 1-5 is that there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ 
evidence or that there are ‘numerous studies’ corroborating a given claim (ibid, 83).  This 
introduced worries about what Eichenbaum meant by ‘substantial’ or ‘numerous studies’ (ibid).  
Eichenbaum states there are ‘numerous studies’ that show forward and reverse hippocampal 
replays in animals (ibid).  However, he only cites four papers in support of this claim; are the 
findings from four paper sufficient for representing ‘numerous studies’ in this instance (ibid)?   
In Eichenbaum’s introduction, entitled ‘the temporal organization of memory’, Eichenbaum 
states he will relate the cited findings in such a way that shows how they all combine to 
corroborate claim 5 (ibid, 81).  This ‘relating’ thus involves showing how the findings fit 
together in a way that corroborates claim 5 (ibid).  The problem is Eichenbaum only shows how 
they fit together implicitly; he never explicitly explains how all of the findings fit together to 
support a given claim.  Implicitly, it seems that Eichenbaum is arguing that because all the 
findings point towards a given claim, and because those findings are consistent with each other, 
they corroborate claims 1-5.  This, however, introduced worries about the term ‘consistency’; 
how is ‘consistency’ defined, how is it measured, and further, is this even what Eichenbaum 
meant to imply? 
Worries about consistency and ‘substantial evidence’ and its relation to IC prompted questions 
about anomalous findings (ibid).  That is, I began to wonder about Eichenbaum’s selection 
criteria; why were there next to no anomalies or contradictory findings presented in the case 
study?  Of the few anomalous findings that are included in the case study, how do they fit 
together with the rest of  findings which are seemingly all consistent with each other; it was not 
immediately clear to me that they did fit together with the rest of the findings in this way. 
In the following chapter, I elaborate on these problems and their implications for IC in the mind-
brain sciences; I then use these questions and concerns to advance a methodology for evaluating 
review papers with an eye towards assessing their claims for corroboration in the second half of 
chapter four. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Introduction 
In chapter three, I conducted part-one of my analysis of a Trends review paper ‘Memory on 
Time’ by Eichenbaum (2013).  My aim in chapter three was to focus on the work Eichenbaum 
did to support what I identified as claims 1-5.139  I noted this work consisted of citing 
interdisciplinary findings, which, taken together, corroborated one of the five claims I identified.  
This corroboration was implied by the terms Eichenbaum used to introduce findings and to 
advance a given claim.  For example, with respect to claim 3, when he introduced relevant 
findings, he prefaced their description by stating ‘there is substantial evidence’ for hippocampal 
replays representing the order of past events, and that ‘numerous studies’ have shown both 
forward and reverse hippocampal replays in memory consolidating (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  
After all the findings for a given claim have been cited, Eichenbaum stated ‘these findings 
provide compelling evidence’ for claim 3; this language suggests there are good reasons to think 
claim 3 has been corroborated (ibid).  An analysis of the language used in the case study revealed 
that the kind of corroboration at play in the case study is one where a given claim is not full-stop 
true, but instead approximately true, probable, likely, etc.  Contextualizing this analysis within 
the context of IC revealed that prima facie, the case study appeared to represent a strong example 
of IC; that is, interdisciplinary findings corroborate claims 1-5 in such a way that those claims 
are understood to be approximately true, probable, likely, etc.   
However, the process of conducting this part of my analysis elicited a number of questions and 
concerns such as “what counts as substantial evidence”, “what does it mean for evidence to be 
consistent with each other”, and “how are anomalies factored into the ‘substantial evidence’ that 
appears to be consistent with each other” (ibid).  These preliminary questions suggested the 
support provided for claims 1-5 in the case study is much more questionable than it initially 
appeared in chapter 3.  Thus, my analysis in chapter 3 using my understanding of how a Trends 
review works from chapter two and my cursory criteria prompted a number of questions and 
concerns I deem important to have answered in order to better assess corroboration in the case 
study.   
 
139
 I noted that the claims 1-4 were implicit in the case study, and claim 5 was explicit in that it is the main claim 
Eichenbaum argues for and because he explicitly flags it as a synthesis.   
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The aim of this chapter is to continue my analysis by focusing on what is absent in the case study 
and to advance a methodology for assessing review papers for corroboration.  I begin in section 
4.1 by addressing the question of “what counts as substantial evidence”, what it means for 
findings to be consistent with each other in section 4.1.2, and how anomalous findings feature in 
the case study in 4.1.3.  At the end of each, I note how these questions complicate evaluating the 
extent to which claims 1-5 have been corroborated in the case study.  As I conducted this part of 
the analysis, it struck me that another factor missing in the case study was an evaluation of the 
methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites.  I discuss this problem in section 4.1.4, and show 
how this point, together with the other problems I mention, demonstrate the corroboration of 
claims 1-5 is uncertain, at best.  From this, I call attention to the lessons learned from my two-
part analysis of the case study in section 4.2.  In section 4.3, I use the problems and lessons from 
my analysis to advance a methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye for 
corroboration.  I close, in section 4.4., with some questions and directions for future research. 
4.1  Substantial Evidence, Numerous Studies, Suggesting, and IC 
As I noted in chapter 3, the arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit.  That is, Eichenbaum never 
explicitly advanced an argument to support them; he never says something akin to “here are the 
findings that support claim x, this is how they fit together”, and/or “the findings corroborate 
claim x because they have features y and z”, etc.  Instead, Eichenbaum shows support for claims 
1-5 by stating evidence that appears to point towards or suggest a given claim, and notes that 
there is ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence to supporting it (ibid).  Using such language 
indicates to the reader that there are good reasons to believe claims 1-5; that is, if there is 
substantial and compelling evidence suggesting claims 1-5, it would seem that the claims stand 
on firm epistemic footing.   
This logic might hold if it were the case that there is substantial and compelling evidence 
supporting x.  However, as I conducted my analysis in chapter three focusing on how 
Eichenbaum supports claims 1-5, I began to wonder about what counted as substantial evidence.  
Throughout the case study, Eichenbaum uses terms like ‘substantial evidence’, ‘compelling 
evidence’, ‘considerable evidence’ to introduce findings that allegedly support a given claim 
(ibid 83, 86).  These terms convey a powerful epistemic message; that is, a given claim is not 
simply supported by a couple scientific findings, but it is backed by substantial empirical 
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evidence.  This conveys to the reader that the evidence behind a given claim is strong, reliable, 
and significant.   
However, one might ask: “what does substantial evidence mean”?  “Is ‘substantial evidence’ 
defined and meant to be understood qualitatively or quantitatively” (ibid, 83).  If the former, then 
some definition would be required for the reader to understand what and how Eichenbaum 
understands and uses the term in the case study.  If the latter, how much evidence is required for 
‘substantial evidence’; how many scientific findings are required to be considered ‘substantial’.  
One might also wonder how other key terms like ‘compelling evidence’ and ‘numerous studies’ 
are defined (ibid).  One might ask: “to what extent and how exactly is the evidence compelling”? 
“Can evidence be compelling without it also being substantial?” “How many studies must a 
review paper cite to constitute or merit the term ‘numerous studies”? 
Consider claim 3 again.  In showing support for claim 3 – i.e., that hippocampal neurons replay 
sequences of events by encoding and retrieving the order of events – Eichenbaum states there is 
‘substantial evidence’ that hippocampal neuronal ensembles represent the organization of past 
experiences (ibid).  The ‘substantial evidence’ for claim 3 consists of six findings from research 
papers on memory organization.  One might wonder whether six studies is sufficient to count as 
substantial evidence.  Relatedly, after advancing this statement, Eichenbaum goes on to state 
there are ‘numerous studies’ within this ‘substantial evidence’ that demonstrate forward and 
reverse hippocampal replays in rats (ibid).  The ‘numerous studies’ consist of four findings from 
Jadhav et al. (2012), Ji and Wilson (2007), Johnson and Redish (2007), and Karlsson and Frank 
(2009) on rats.  Again, one might wonder whether four papers sufficiently represents the term 
‘numerous studies’ (Eichenbaum 2013, 83).  If four papers do sufficiently represent the term 
‘numerous studies’, some justification seems to be required. 
Further, a big part of how Eichenbaum implicitly argues for claims 1-5 is by stating there is 
‘substantial’ and ‘compelling’ evidence suggesting a given claim (ibid).  However, Eichenbaum 
never explicitly explains how the evidences suggests what it does.  Instead the argument is 
implicit, and the reader is required to try and piece together Eichenbaum’s thought process.  I 
noted in chapter three that Eichenbaum seems to imply that because there is substantial evidence 
that is consistent with each other, and because that evidence seems to point towards claim 3, that 
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claim 3 stands on firm epistemic footing.  Claims 1-5 are suggested by the substantial cited 
evidence.  However, if it turns out that the evidence is not substantial, perhaps the support for 
claim 3 is weaker than it appears when prefaced with the term ‘substantial evidence’; perhaps the 
evidence does not suggest what Eichenbaum claims it does (ibid).   
It is important to flesh out these key terms as the corroboration of claims 1-5 hinges on them.  If 
there is no ‘substantial evidence’, if the evidence is not, in, fact, compelling, then the claims may 
not be as corroborated as they appear on a first reading/analysis.  Thus, because Eichenbaum 
provides no definition for terms like ‘substantial’ and ‘compelling evidence’, and because he 
does not provide an explanation as to how the evidence suggests what he claims it does, it is 
unclear how/whether claim 3 – and claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 by proxy – are corroborated (ibid 81-
87).   
4.1.1 Consistency and IC 
Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit.  In chapter three, I noted my reading of the 
case study implied that another factor (in addition to there being substantial evidence suggesting 
a given claim) implying corroboration is the fact that the cited findings are consistent with each 
other.  In the example I use in chapter three, I note that all six findings cited in support of claim 3 
are consistent with each other insofar as they do not contradict each other and generally seem to 
suggest that hippocampal replays are an essential part of memory for past events (i.e., they all 
seem to suggest a similar role of hippocampal replays and memory organization).  Importantly, 
with respect to claim 3, Eichenbaum does not explicitly make this point nor does he state that the 
findings are consistent with each other; this is my interpretation of how I think his argument for 
claim 3 would go. 
Eichenbaum does, however, in other parts of the case study use the terms ‘consistent with’ and 
‘complemented by’ with respect to claim 1 and claim 4; this is part of what led me to believe that 
the consistency of the findings was crucial to establishing the corroboration of all the claims I 
identify in the case study (ibid 82-84, 86).  I review claim 1 and claim 4 in turn to make this 
connection concise.   
Claim 1 stated the hippocampus is responsible for the memory of the order of events (ibid, 81, 
83).  Eichenbaum begins by reviewing findings implicating the hippocampus for the memory of 
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the order of events in human animals; he cites eight studies on human animals suggesting claim 
1.  Eichenbaum then stated these findings from experiments on human animals are 
‘complemented by’ studies on non-human animals (e.g., rats, mice, and monkeys) (ibid, 82, 
emphasis mine).  Eichenbaum does not explain what he means by evidence from human studies 
is ‘complemented by’ evidence from animals studies (ibid).  One might surmise that Eichenbaum 
means that the studies on animals enhance the argument for claim 1 in the following way: not 
only is there evidence for the hippocampus being involved for memory of the order of events in 
human animals, but there is also evidence from a number of studies on different non-human 
animals suggesting the same general claim.  The evidence from animals studies thus enhances 
the evidence by providing further support for the claim that it allegedly suggests.  This is my 
reading of what Eichenbaum means by ‘complementary’ and how it factors into his argument for 
claim 1; importantly, Eichenbaum does not explain what he means by complementary here nor 
how it functions to corroborate claim 1.   
Eichenbaum states that findings are ‘consistent with’ each other multiple times while providing 
support for claim 4 (ibid, 83-84, 86).  Claim 4 states hippocampal time cells possess the 
properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge the order of events (ibid, 86).  Eichenbaum 
provides support for claim 4 in the same way he does for the other claims: by citing findings 
from different areas of the mind-brain sciences, on different species, using different tasks and 
methods of analysis, and relating them in such a way that he synthesizes them to show that they, 
taken together, suggest claim 4.  This work consists primarily of stating findings by introducing 
them via terms like there is ‘substantial evidence’ showing that x (ibid).   However, Eichenbaum 
does more than this with claim 4; here, he states multiple times that various pieces of evidence 
not only suggest a given claim, but that they are consistent with each other (ibid, 82-84, 86).  On 
my reading, this implies that claims 1-5 hinge on the cited evidence being consistent with each 
other.  It is thus important to understand what is meant by consistency.  If no explanation of 
consistency is provided, it is difficult to assess whether the evidence is, in fact, consistent, and 
consequently, it is challenging to evaluate whether a given claim as been corroborated.  
For example, with respect to claim 4, Eichenbaum cites a finding by McNaughton et al. (1996) 
demonstrating: “…the existence of pre-configured contextual representations to which specific 
behavioral events were linked to compose spatial memory” (Eichenbaum 2013, 84).  He then 
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relates this finding to another finding by Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) stating: “Consistent with 
this proposal … hippocampal ensembles tend to ‘pre-play’ sequences that will subsequently 
reflect serial place cell firings in a new environment, which suggests that pre-existing ensemble 
structure contributes to new sequence coding” (Eichenbaum 2013, 84, emphasis mine).  What is 
meant by consistency in this example?  Unfortunately, nowhere in the case study does 
Eichenbaum provide an explanation of what he means by evidence being consistent with each 
other, nor does he provide a measure of consistency (i.e., how is consistency measured in the 
case study – qualitatively or quantitatively?).   
One might speculate that what Eichenbaum has in mind is that evidence is consistent with each 
other to the extent that it does not contradict each other, and that all findings consistently 
demonstrate a similar pattern/trend with respect to memory organization.  Consider a couple of 
the findings cited for claim 4.  McNaughton et al. (1996) found ‘pre-configured contextual 
representations’ during memory tasks, and Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) found a ‘pre-existing 
ensemble structure’ which replayed certain sequences during memory tasks (Eichenbaum 2013, 
84).  Both findings demonstrate a ‘pre-existing’ neuronal ensemble critical for memory 
organization. Thus, one could argue the findings are consistent in that their findings both 
revealed a similar trend (i.e., a pre-existing neuronal structure that replays during memory tasks), 
and the findings do not contradict each other.  Perhaps this is what Eichenbaum meant by 
consistency and its relation to the corroboration of claims 1-5.     
The point I want to emphasize is that because Eichenbaum provides no explanation nor measure 
of consistency in the case study, it is difficult to ascertain whether the evidence is consistent, and 
accordingly, it is difficult to evaluate the whether a given claim has been corroborated.  Since 
Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 are implicit, and because they appear to hinge on terms 
like ‘consistency’ and ‘substantial evidence’, the fact that neither term is explained is 
problematic for evaluating the extent to which claims 1-5 are corroborated in the case study.   
Furthermore, in chapter one of my dissertation, I flagged a potential problem with the 
consistency of evidence entailing the corroboration of a claim.  That is, in discussing a potential 
way of fleshing out the concept of convergent evidence for Nagel (1949, 1979) and Roskies’ 
(2010) accounts of fitting together and strong explanations, I advanced a conceptualization of the 
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convergence of evidence via the notion of consistency wherein findings do not contradict each 
other and point towards a similar but not identical conclusion.  I argued, however, that 
understanding convergence via consistency runs the risk of trivializing the claims which it 
allegedly corroborates.  That is, by requiring the consistency of evidence in corroborating a 
claim, all that is required is a general compatibility between different findings; this seems all too 
easy to achieve.  An author could easily scan the literature and choose to cite only those findings 
consistent with each other and with the main claim(s) they want to argue for and ignore 
contradictory or anomalous findings.  Thus, consistency alone is insufficient for ensuring strong 
epistemic claims; that evidence be consistent is one thing, but it is also important that the cited 
evidence to be mutually supportive and consistent in a way that coincidence, errors, and 
alternative explanations can be ruled out.  Thus, without an explanation and measure of 
consistency provided in the case study, evaluating whether a given claim has been corroborated 
is difficult. 
This leads to the next problem I want to address, which is the general lack of anomalous findings 
and the lack of substantial explanations as to how the few anomalous findings that do feature in 
the case study fit together with the rest of the cited findings.   
4.1.2 Anomalies and IC 
During the analysis I conducted in chapter three, it struck me that the majority of the cited 
findings all suggested a (general) role of the hippocampus in memory organization.  I began to 
wonder why the cited findings were primarily in favor of claims 1-5.  That is, of the 59 findings 
Eichenbaum cites, only a couple of them are anomalous; why was no contradictory evidence 
included in the case study?  Why were there so few anomalies cited in the case study?  Are 
adequate explanations provided for why the cited anomalies can be dismissed?  If claims 1-5 
depend on the cited evidence being consistent with each other, then anomalous findings have the 
potential to complicate a clear case of consistent evidence, which would consequently undermine 
the corroboration of claims 1-5.   
One clear anomaly is cited in Eichenbaum’s discussion of claim 4.  Recall claim 4 states 
hippocampal time cells possess the properties of context cells, allowing them to bridge the order 
of events.  After summarizing allegedly consistent findings from human and non-human animals 
which all suggest “…a temporal context signal containing common elements that encode the 
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common temporal structure and distinct elements that encode the differences in memory”, 
Eichenbaum flags a potential complication via a finding by Naya and Suzuki (2011) 
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Naya and Suzuki’s (2011) research on monkeys found: 
…hippocampal neurons in monkeys performing a visual paired association task, where the 
stimuli are separated in time, provide a temporal signal during the interstimulus interval.  
Neurons in the higher order visual areas (inferotemporal and perirhinal cortex) encode the 
visual cues, and entorhinal neurons encode both the visual cues and time, whereas the 
hippocampal neuronal ensemble signals only the temporal organization, without specificity of 
items held in memory (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).   
This complicates the narrative Eichenbaum delivers in support of claim 4 insofar as it is 
inconsistent with the literature he cites on rats (ibid).  Specifically, Eichenbaum notes that it is 
unclear why studies on rats have consistently demonstrated the existence of memory-specific 
time cells, but Naya and Suzuki’s (2011) work on monkeys demonstrated “…the same time cell 
sequences for all memories” (Eichenbaum 2013, emphasis mine).   
How does Eichenbaum explain this potentially anomalous finding?  Eichenbaum briefly explains 
the discrepancy between the findings from studies on rats and the findings on monkeys in this 
example as the product of different experimental protocols (ibid).  That is, in the experiments on 
rats, association tasks involved a small amount of repetitive sequence exposures, whereas the 
monkeys performed a task which, conversely, involved a large number of sequence exposures 
where those sequences were rarely repeated (ibid).  Eichenbaum therefore reasons: “… possibly, 
after many exposures, stimulus sequences are embodied in the regularities of the temporal 
structure, whereas when diverse stimulus sequences seldom repeat, only the reliable temporal 
structure of the task is represented by the hippocampus” (ibid, emphasis mine).  This explanation 
is unsatisfactory for two reasons.  First, his reasoning that perhaps the discrepancy is the multiple 
exposures that the monkeys undergo is only a possibility.  His use of the term ‘possibly’ implies 
only that this might explain the differences between the studies; it is also possible that if the tasks 
were the same as in the rat paradigm, the findings from the monkey studies might still be 
incompatible with the findings from rat studies, thus undermining or complicating the 
corroboration of claim 4 (ibid).  Secondly, offloading the inconsistency between findings in rats 
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and on monkeys as the product of differences in experimental protocols is unsatisfying given that 
the majority of the case study comprises findings from different areas of science, studying 
different animal species, via different tasks, methods, and experimental protocols.  The cited 
findings for claims 1-5 all involve different tasks and protocols; nonetheless, they are deemed 
consistent with each other, and further, the fact that they employ different experimental protocols 
is seen as bolstering the corroboration of claims 1-5.  Why is it the case that different 
experimental protocols are considered a virtue when they are consistent with and point towards 
claims 1-5, but seen as problematic when they yield a result inconsistent with the rest of the cited 
findings? 
The example above represents one anomaly Eichenbaum introduces in the case study; this 
appears to be the only anomalous finding in the case study.  One might argue, however, that the 
research implicating the hippocampus in spatial representations can be read as anomalous 
research insofar as it suggests a different role for the hippocampus than that suggested by claims 
1-4 (which all suggest a temporal role).  How does Eichenbaum handle this anomalous data?  
Eichenbaum handles the discrepancy between research suggesting a spatial role for the 
hippocampus and memory and research suggesting a temporal role of the hippocampus and 
memory by synthesizing the two streams of research by advancing claim 5.  His synthesis is 
grounded in two features of time and place cells.  He cites evidence from findings cited in 
support of claim four, as well as previously uncited findings to illustrate that time and place cells 
are not distinct cell types.  Importantly, there is no critical analysis of the cited findings 
supporting claim 5.  In demonstrating the time and place cells are similar, Eichenbaum simply 
lists findings indicating similarities between time and place cells.   
One interesting and potentially anomalous findings is introduced during this process.  That is, 
two different review papers by Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
found that there are numerous origins of temporal signals in the brain (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  
Immediately after introducing this finding, Eichenbaum dismisses this potential complication by 
citing evidence from a poster presentation by Kraus et al. (2012) who found time and place cells 
are similar in that both receive information from the medial entorhinal cortex (hereafter MEC) 
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  Eichenbaum does not, however, explain how this finding dismisses the 
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potential anomaly introduced by the finding from Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and 
Meck (2005).  In fact, Eichenbaum does not even flag this finding as an anomaly or source of 
worry at all.  That is, Eichenbaum does not introduce it as an anomalous finding in the way that 
he does with the Naya and Suzuki (2011) finding (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).   
On my reading, however, the finding from the two review papers does constitute an anomalous 
finding; at least, it constitutes an anomalous finding in the way the Eichenbaum presents the 
findings from their respective papers.  That is, according to Eichenbaum, Mauk and Buonomano 
(2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) review papers state: “…there are multiple origins of 
temporal signals in the brain…” (Eichenbaum 2013, 86, emphasis mine).  Since this comment 
pertains solely to temporal signals, this finding would seem to pertain to time cells (but not place 
cells) and the various sources from which they receive information.  The Kraus et al. (2012) 
finding stated immediately after introducing the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and 
Meck (2005) reviews found that a key source of information for time and place cells is the MEC 
(Eichenbaum 2013, 86).   
However, if it is the case that time cells receive information from the MEC in addition to 
multiple other sources – as the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
finding seems to suggest – but place cells only receive information from the MEC, this would 
demonstrate that time and place cells are not distinct (or at least put pressure on the statement 
they that are distinct).  Another possibility is that while both receive information from the MEC, 
time and place cells may also receive information from other different sources in the brain; this 
could also undermine the claim that the two place cells are distinct if the other sources of 
information for time and place cells were different for each cell type.140  Due to the fact that 
Eichenbaum does not explicitly address this complication, the possibility remains open that the 
two cells types are not as similar as the case study makes them out to be.    
 
140
 It is unclear why Eichenbaum introduced the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
finding in the way that he does (i.e., with the strict focus on the temporal signal), especially since both papers are 
in agreement that time and space are inextricably linked.  To quote Buhusi and Meck (2005): COINCIDENCE 
DETECTION is also used by bats, owls and frogs to form an accurate, topographic representation of space from 
INTERAURAL TIME DIFFERENCES.  For these species, telling space is telling time” (755, italicized emphasis mine).   
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Interestingly, neither cited paper specifically stated: “…there are multiple origins of temporal 
signals in the brain…”; this is Eichenbaum’s interpretation of their review papers (Eichenbaum 
2013, 86).  Put differently, this is the aspect Eichenbaum focused on in their papers and decided 
to include in his review.  However, the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck 
(2005) review papers both comprise a review of literature in human and non-human animals on 
temporal organization that, on my reading, complicates claim 5.  Both papers distinguish 
between multiple types of memory organization.  For example, Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
differentiate between circadian timing, interval timing, and millisecond timing (756).  Buhusi 
and Meck proceed to cite different results from imaging, lesions studies and electrophysiological 
studies investigating different aspects of timing.  Unlike Eichenbaum’s review paper, which 
highlights and focuses almost exclusively on hippocampal activity in human and non-human 
animals during various timing tasks, Buhusi and Meck (2005) – as well as Mauk and 
Buonomano (2004) – found and highlighted activation of a whole host of brain areas/networks.  
For example, electrophysiological studies (e.g., Lewis and Miall, 2003) demonstrated activation 
of the thalamo-cortical striatal circuits, which include the basal ganglia, the prefrontal cortex 
(hereafter the PFC) and the posterior parietal cortex (hereafter PPC), during interval timing tasks 
(Buhusi and Meck 2005, 760).  Imaging studies focusing on millisecond and interval timing 
(e.g., Macar et al., 2002 and Lewis and Miall, 2003) found activation of the basal ganglia and the 
cerebellum, as well as a majority of the supplementary motor area (hereafter SMA), the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (hereafter DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex and the right parietal 
cortex (Buhusi and Meck 2005, 761).  In their concluding remarks, Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
state: 
In mammals, the circadian clock that drives metabolic and behavioral rhythms is located in 
the SCN.  Another timer, which is responsible for automatic motor control in the millisecond 
range, relies on the cerebellum.  In contrast to these relatively localized timing mechanisms, a 
general-purpose, flexible, cognitively controlled timer that operates in the seconds-to-minutes 
range involves the activation of a network of brain areas that form part of the thalamo-
cortico-striatal circuits, notably the SMA, the PFC, and the PPC.  …  As these areas are 
involved in several cognitive phenomena, it is likely that this circuit is not limited to temporal 
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processing, but is also involved in other processes, such as the estimation of quantity and 
numerosity (763, emphases mine).141 
It is interesting to me that while Eichenbaum cited both papers in his review, he chose to 
selectively focus on one vague finding, i.e., that temporal processing has multiple origins in the 
brain, and then immediately dismisses it, without justification, by the fact that Kraus et al. (2012) 
found that both time and place cells receive information from the MEC (Eichenbaum 2013, 86).  
The fact that both the Mauk and Buonomano (2004) and Buhusi and Meck (2005) highlight a 
multitude of brain areas/networks involved in various types of timing tasks was not included in 
the review is problematic.  That is, while these findings do not necessarily falsify claim 5, they 
complicate the clear picture painted by Eichenbaum in the case study whereby the hippocampus 
is the main brain structure responsible for the realization of spatio-temporal aspects of memory. 
Eichenbaum introduces few anomalous/contradictory findings throughout the case study.  This 
prompts a number of questions about his selection criteria.  For example, why were certain 
findings included while others were omitted?  Were many anomalous or contradictory findings 
encountered during his review process; if so, how were those handled?  It could be the case that 
the reason why so few anomalies are included in the case study is simply because there were not 
many in the literature to begin with.  However, because Eichenbaum’s selection criteria is not 
know to the reader, one cannot know this for certain.   
Further, many of the cited papers include more than one finding; what criteria did Eichenbaum 
use to decide which findings to focus on and which to omit when reading through individual 
research papers.  For example, why did Eichenbaum choose to exclude findings which involve 
the activation of structures/networks other than the hippocampus (such as the many findings 
from the Buhusi and Meck (2005) paper implicating a multitude of brain regions/networks))?  
Again, because Eichenbaum’s selection criteria and review writing strategy is unknown to the 
reader, one cannot know with certainty why certain findings were included and others omitted. 
 
141
 Mauk and Buonomano (2004) make a similar point.  They note that while there is still debate about whether 
temporal processing is localizable or distributed, it seems that if any neural circuit can “… intrinsically process 
temporal information, then virtually any circuit could be involved, and the location of temporal processing would 
depend on the nature and modality for the task at hand” (334). 
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I stated above that the lack of definitions for terms like consistency was problematic for 
evaluating the corroboration of claims 1-5.  I argued that we want evidence to be consistent in a 
way that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations can be ruled out; because few 
anomalous findings are introduced in the case study, and because the explanations of those few 
anomalies are unsatisfactory, it is a) not clear that the evidence is consistent, and b) it is not clear 
that coincidence, errors, and alternative explanations have been ruled out.  Adding this to the 
complications arising from the lack of definitions for terms like ‘substantial’, ‘compelling 
evidence’, and ‘suggests’, it is unclear how the findings in the case study fit together to 
corroborate claims 1-5. 
4.1.3 Evaluation of Methods, Citation-Based Bibliometric Statistics, and IC 
As I conducted this part of the analysis (i.e., what important aspects are missing in the case study 
in section 4.1., 4.1.2., and 4.1.3), it struck me that another missing factor was an evaluation of 
the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites.  That is, as I analyzed claim 1 and claim 4 in 
greater detail in section 4.1.2 of this chapter, I noticed that Eichenbaum treated claims 2, 3 and 5 
slightly differently than claims 1 and 4.  Eichenbaum spends more time elaborating on the 
findings cited in support of claims 1 and 4.  Eichenbaum’s showing support for claims 2, 3, and 5 
consisted primarily of Eichenbaum citing findings and immediately stating what they, taken 
together, suggest.  Eichenbaum does the same thing for claim 1 and 4, but also includes brief 
descriptions of the tasks used in some of the papers that he cites.   
Importantly, while Eichenbaum sometimes describes the tasks involved in the papers he cites, he 
does not critically evaluate the methods and protocols used to yield the findings he cites in the 
case study.  For example, consider his description of findings from Kumaran and Maguire (2006) 
and Lehn et al.’s (2009) research on hippocampal activation for memory for the order of events 
in humans: 
Another study showed striking selective activation of the hippocampus when humans 
reconstructed the correct ordering of scenes previously viewed in a movie clip, as compared 
to when they inferred the logical order of related scenes from the same movie …  Using a 
different approach that exploited the well-known observation of enhanced neural response to 
novel stimuli, Kumaran and Maguires [10] demonstrated hippocampal activation when 
subjects were presented with items out of order late in a familiar series; activation was not 
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observed in the hippocampus … when an entirely novel ordering of familiar pictures was 
presented.  Thus, hippocampal activation signaled a mismatch of expectation in temporal 
order per se, and not merely a novel sequences of pictures (Eichenbaum 2013, 81). 
In this example, Eichenbaum describes what kind of task is involved in each paper (i.e., a virtual 
reality driving game (Lehn et al. (2009) and the presentation of pictures (Kumaran and Maguire 
(2006)) and the results from each task (i.e., human hippocampal activation in the virtual reality 
task, and human hippocampal activation when participants were shown items out of order later 
on in a ‘familiar series’) (Eichenbaum 2013, 81).  What is absent in this description is an 
evaluation of the methods/protocols used to conduct and analyze said tasks.  This leaves open 
the possibility that the methods used by the cited studies are unsound.  If the methods of the cited 
findings in the case study are unsound, this would discredit or at least put pressure on the 
corroboration of claims 1-5. 
However, one might argue that because the papers cited in support of claims 1-5 are from papers 
published in mind-brain sciences journals with high impact factors and citations that the 
methods/protocols used in the cited papers must be sound (I make a similar point in section 
3.2.3. of this dissertation wherein I argue that because the cited findings are published in mind-
brain journals with high impact factors/citations, the cited findings can be considered reliable 
pieces of information).   
Citation-based bibliometric measures, such as a journal’s impact factor, are frequently consulted 
in the evaluation of scientists and their research (Seglen 1994, 1; Seglen 1997, 498).142  One of 
the attractions of this measure is that it is considered to be quantitative, simple to calculate, and 
objective (Seglen 1997, 498).  Assuming this measure is indeed objective, one might have good 
reason to believe that the methods and protocols used by papers published in journals with high 
impact factors and citations are scientifically sound.   
Should one take it on good faith that the methods/protocols used in the cited papers are 
scientifically sound due to their being published in journals with high-impact factors and 
 
142
 Funding allocation based on impact factors has been reported in countries such as Canada and Hungary 
(Seglen 1997, 498).  In many Nordic countries, impact factors have been appealed to in the evaluation of individual 
scientists as well as scientific institutions (ibid). 
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citations?  Drawing on Seglen (1994, 1997), I argue we should not, because impact factors are 
not always reliable indicators of sound scientific research.  I raise three points to support this 
argument.143  Firstly, a journal’s impact factor is not ‘statistically representative’ of individual 
research papers published within it (Seglen 1997, 498-499).  An impact factor is defined as “… 
the mean annual citedness of all articles published in a given journal in a given year” (Seglen 
1994, 1).  For a journal’s impact factor to be fairly representative of its papers, the citation rate 
for each individual article must demonstrate a “… narrow distribution, preferably a Gaussian 
distribution around the mean value (the journal’s impact factor)” (Seglen 1997, 498-499).  
However, Seglen’s case study of three different biomedical journals showed skewed distributions 
of citation rates; only a select few papers came close to the mean (ibid, 499).  Further analysis of 
Seglen’s case study demonstrated: “… the most cited half of the articles are cited, on average, 10 
times as often as the least cited half” (ibid).  Assigning the ‘same score’ (i.e., the impact factor) 
to all papers within a given journal disguises this important difference (ibid).  That is, an article 
with low to no citations will receive “… full credit for the impact of the few highly cited articles 
that predominantly determine the value of the journal impact factor” (ibid).  Therefore, impact 
factors do not reliably represent the quality of individual papers.  This is one reason to not rely 
(solely) on a journal’s impact factor/citations when determining or assessing the quality and 
scientific rigour of its papers. 
Secondly, authors consider many factors other than a journal’s impact factor when submitting a 
paper for publication.  Authors do not necessarily submit their best work to the most prestigious 
journals, nor are their papers necessarily representative of the impact factor of the journal in 
which they are published (Gordon, 1984; Seglen 1997, 499).  While some authors may decide 
which journal to submit their paper to based on a journal’s impact factor, there are many other 
factors that can contribute to an author’s decision on where to submit and/or resubmit a paper for 
publication.  Other factors include but are not limited to: the journal’s area of science and how 
well it aligns with the author’s own specialization, how quickly the editing team works, the 
fairness and helpfulness of feedback from peer-reviewers, the likelihood of acceptance, 
publication turn around times, etc. (Seglen 1997, 499).  Gordon (1984) performed a sociological 
 
143
 For more arguments on why impact factors are not reliable measures of the quality of scientific research, see 
also Allison (1980); Folly et al. (1981); Hargens and Felmlee (1984); Moed et al. (1985); and Seglen (1992,1994, 
1997). 
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experiment in which 98 biomedical authors were asked to fill out a questionnaire including 
questions such as which journal they had recently submitted to, which other journals were 
considered, any journals that previously rejected their submission, and if rejected, would they 
resubmit to that journal and why (29).   
Gordon’s analysis demonstrated a great diversity of responses among the 98 authors involved in 
the study with respect to reasons for journal selection criteria, submission, and resubmission.  
The data acquired from Gordon’s study provided “… no support to the assumption that scientists 
necessarily chose the most prestigious journal from amongst those which they feel would accept 
their papers” (ibid, 40).  Accordingly, a paper of high scientific quality may end up in a journal 
with a lower impact factor because that journal’s area of science aligns more specifically with 
the author’s area of expertise, or because the journal is known to have quick publication 
turnarounds, etc.  Therefore, it is not the case that scientifically sound papers are published 
exclusively in journals with high impact factors/high citation rates.  This is yet another reason 
one should not rely solely on bibliometric measures like a journal’s impact factor/citations in 
assessing the soundness/quality of a research paper. 
Thirdly, self-citations are frequently not corrected for in the calculation of a journal’s impact 
factor (Seglen 1997, 500).  That is, databases that record and calculate impact factors such as the 
Science Citation Index and the Journal Citation Report include citation types of all sorts such as 
citations in editorials, meeting abstracts, etc. (ibid).  Further, citations for translated journals are 
often listed twice (ibid).  Accordingly, journals including items like editorials and meeting 
abstracts will have an impact factor that is ‘greatly inflated’ compared to journals excluding 
these items (ibid).  Editors who want to increase the impact factor of their journal will often 
make ‘frequent references’ to these items since the databases do not correct for self-citations 
(ibid).   
This is particularly relevant to my analysis of the case study insofar as of the 59 papers cited to 
support claims 1-5, Eichenbaum co-authored 12/59, for a total of 20% of his references.144  
Recall in chapter two of this dissertation I noted one of the alleged advantages of research 
 
144
 Percentage is rounded down for simplicity. 
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synthesis is its ability to minimize bias (Chalmers and Altman 1995, Gurevitch et al. 2018, 
Mulrow 1995, Shamseer et al. 2015, etc.).  While none of these authors advanced a specific 
argument for the minimization of bias in research synthesis, I noted their claims about bias 
reduction hinge on systematic reviews adhering to some kind of official and standardized 
protocol for writing review papers (whatever kind of review paper it may be).   
However, because the case study does not include a methods section stating which standardized 
guidelines were used, if any, and because Eichenbaum co-authored 20% of his references, the 
corroboration of claims 1-5 is jeopardized by potential author bias.  Some of the cited findings 
are not as objective as they initially appear.  The fact that citation databases do not correct for 
self-citations opens the threat of objectivity and worries about bias.  This is another reason why 
impact factors/citations should not be considered purely objective nor a reliable indicator of the 
soundness of one’s scientific research. Thus, because one cannot be certain that the methods 
cited by the paper’s Eichenbaum cites are reliable, the integrity of the substantial evidence for 
claims 1-5 is questionable.  This point makes it hard to assess the extent to which claims 1-5 
have been corroborated in the case study due to a lack of evaluation of the methods used in the 
papers Eichenbaum cites. 
In sum, I have highlighted four key components absent in the case study.  First is a definition of 
terms like ‘substantial evidence’ ‘numerous studies’ ‘compelling evidence’ and ‘suggests’ (83. 
86-87).  Eichenbaum’s arguments in the case study are implicit; these arguments, on my reading, 
hinge on terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘suggests’ (ibid).  If claim x is backed by 
substantial evidence suggesting x, one might be confident in the corroboration of that claim.  
However, to properly evaluate the extent to which claims 1-5 have been corroborated, a 
statement describing what Eichenbaum means by each term and how they factor into the 
corroboration of the claims is required.  If these terms are undefined, it is difficult to assess 
whether claims 1-5 has been corroborated. 
Secondly, on my reading, Eichenbaum’s (implicit) arguments for claims 1-5 also hinge on the 
terms ‘complemented by’ and ‘consistent with’ (ibid, 82-84, 86).  That is, part of Eichenbaum’s 
implicit argument is that there are numerous and substantial evidence backing claims 1-5.  
Additionally, the cited evidence comprising the substantial and compelling evidence, on my 
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reading, requires consistency.  The term consistency is used throughout the case study to support 
claims 1 and 4 and suggests that for these claims to be corroborated by the interdisciplinary cited 
findings, those findings must fit together in such a way that they are consistent with each other 
and with the resulting claim.  Although Eichenbaum does not use the term consistency explicitly 
for claims 2, 3 and 5, it seems necessary for those claims as well that the cited findings be 
consistent with each other.  However, as I note above, terms like consistency are also not 
defined.  It is therefore unclear what Eichenbaum means by consistency and how it is measured 
in the case study; accordingly, it is open to question that the cited findings fit together in a way 
indicative of corroboration. 
This second point is further complicated by the third feature lacking in the case study.  Namely, 
there is a general lack of anomalous findings, and the few times anomalous findings are 
mentioned, they are given little explanation with respect to how they fit in with the rest of the 
cited findings.  This is especially important because if it is true that the cited findings need to be 
consistent with each other for the corroboration of claims 1-5, ideally there would be more than 
just a general compatibility between findings.  Ideally, the cited findings would be consistent 
with each other in a way that also rules out random error, coincidence, alterative hypotheses etc.  
Therefore, the introduction of anomalous findings and how they fit together with the rest of the 
findings is critical.  If Eichenbaum introduced anomalous findings for each claim, and if he also 
then explained how they fit together with the other findings (e.g., how the other findings reliably 
rule out the anomaly), the epistemic integrity of claims 1-5 would increase.   
However, in the few instances that Eichenbaum does mention anomalous findings, they are 
either immediately dismissed (another finding is introduced and the anomalous finding is left 
with no explanation), or the explanation is unsatisfactory (such as Eichenbaum claiming the 
discrepancy between the rat and monkey studies cited in claim 4 can be explained away by the 
use of different experimental protocols) (ibid, 86). 
The final feature I flagged as lacking in the case study was an evaluation of the methods used in 
the papers he cites.  This is important because claims 1-5 depend on the reliability of the findings 
cited in support of them.   That is, it is not sufficient for the corroboration of claims 1-5 being 
supported by substantial evidence; that substantial evidence must consist of reliable and 
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scientifically sound findings.  If the substantial evidence cited in support of claims 1-5 comprised 
of findings from unsound scientific research, the epistemic integrity of claims 1-5 would be 
compromised.  One way to demonstrate the reliability of the cited findings in the case study 
would be to include an evaluation of the methods used by the cited papers.  This might involve 
including statements like “these are the methods used in this cited paper and this is why they can 
be considered reliable and sound methods” to help increase the reliability of the findings 
supporting claims 1-5.   
One might argue, however, that this is unnecessary in virtue of the fact that the majority of the 
cited findings were published in papers from journals with high impact factors and citation rates; 
because such journals allegedly produce research of high scientific rigour, one can confidently 
assume the respective findings from those papers are the product of reliable methods.  However, 
as I argue above, drawing on Seglen (1994, 1997), citation-based bibliometric measures such as 
impact factors are not reliable indicators of sound scientific research.  It is therefore possible that 
some of the methods used in the cited papers were unsound, discrediting the reliability of the 
cited findings.  Furthermore, the fact that Eichenbaum co-authored 20% of his cited references 
generates worry about author bias – again, potentially reducing the reliability of the cited 
findings. 
Together, these four missing components put pressure on the case study representing a clear case 
of IC.  Towards the end of my analysis in chapter three, I began to notice some questions and 
problems complicating the corroboration of claims 1-5.  My analysis in this chapter explored 
those problems and showed that given the lack of definitions such as ‘substantial evidence’ and 
‘consistency’, along with sufficient explanations of anomalies and the methods used in the cited 
papers, it is unclear how the cited findings fit together to support claims 1-5; Eichenbaum does 
not tell us this.  Accordingly, it is unclear that claims 1-5 have been corroborated.  I will now 
highlight some key lessons from this analysis. 
4.2 Lessons from a Review Paper 
The first lesson I draw from this analysis is the fundamental assumption underlying the 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress I surveyed in chapter one – i.e., that 
pieces of evidence from different areas of science must fit together in some way to yield 
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epistemically strong claims – is not as simple or as clear as it is assumed to be in the literature.  
That is, in the case study I analyzed, Eichenbaum argued the claim that the role of the 
hippocampus is to create a spatio-temporal framework for the organization of memories is well 
supported by pieces of evidence from different areas of science.  This unit of analysis – the 
Trends review paper – provided an example of an instance of a claim gaining corroboration in 
virtue of different pieces of interdisciplinary evidence supporting it.   
However, as my analysis in this chapter revealed, it is unclear exactly how pieces of evidence fit 
together to corroborate the claims advanced in the case study, and accordingly, it is difficult to 
assess whether or not its claims stand on strong epistemic footing.  Put differently, because it is 
unclear how the pieces of evidence fit together in the case study, it is uncertain how and to what 
extent claims 1-5 have been corroborated.  My analysis thus reveals that the assumption I 
highlight in chapter one of this dissertation is complex and messy.  When one analyzes units of 
analysis that appear to do the work required of IC, one sees that pieces of evidence do not 
necessarily fit together as neatly as one might expect.  This assumption therefore requires more 
philosophical attention and work.  
The second lesson I draw from my analysis is my working definition of IC (which I introduce in 
chapter two) requires revision.  Initially my working definition of IC read that findings 
corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar as those findings are interdisciplinary, mutually 
supportive, and together all points towards a given claim.  However, as I note above, consistency 
and mutual support alone is not sufficient for corroboration.  Pieces of evidence need to be more 
than consistent and mutually supportive; they also need to rule out coincidence, error, and 
alternative explanations.  Thus, my revised definition of IC reads: interdisciplinary corroboration 
is a phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain when said findings 
are interdisciplinary, mutually supportive and consistent in a way that rules out coincidence, 
errors, and alternative hypotheses, and where the findings all point towards a similar (but not 
identical) claim. 
This leads to the third lesson.  My analysis revealed not only that the assumption held by 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress is complex and messy, but that certain 
fundamental pieces of information are missing to adequately assess the extent to which 
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corroboration occurs in the case study.  For example, definitions for key terms like ‘substantial 
evidence’, ‘suggests’, and ‘consistency’ were absent.  This absence makes it difficult to assess 
whether claims 1-5 have been corroborated since it is unclear what Eichenbaum meant by 
evidence being consistent with each other and if he even considered it to be a requirement for the 
corroboration of claims 1-5.  Further, because the reader does not know Eichenbaum’s selection 
criteria nor his review process, it is unclear why certain findings were included and others were 
omitted.  Was the general lack of anomalous findings simply because Eichenbaum did not 
encounter many in his search process?  Or were some encountered but omitted; if this was the 
case, what was the justification for this omission?  Of the few anomalies that were included in 
the case study, Eichenbaum does not provide a satisfactory explanation of how those anomalies 
fit together with the other cited findings and how those cited findings rule out the anomaly.  If 
one cannot rule out the possibility of potential anomalies, then it is difficult to evaluate whether 
claims 1-5 have been corroborated.  If one knew, on the other hand, that Eichenbaum 
encountered no other anomalies than those cited in the case study, and if Eichenbaum explained 
why the cited anomalies could be reliably dismissed, one would be better positioned to assess the 
corroboration of claims 1-5.  However, since that information is not provided, it is unclear 
whether claims 1-5 have been corroborated.  Finally, the lack of an evaluation of the methods 
used by the cited papers in the case study makes it challenging to assess the corroboration of 
claims 1-5.  If claims 1-5 have been corroborated by the cited findings, those findings need to be 
scientifically sound/reliable.  However, because Eichenbaum does not provide an evaluation or 
justification for the soundness of the methods used in the cited papers, it is unclear whether the 
cited findings constitute reliable pieces of information.  Since this cannot be ascertained, it is 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which corroboration has occurred in the case study. 
The point I want to emphasize is not that Eichenbaum’s main claim is false, nor that the case 
study represents poor quality scientific research.  The goal of the dissertation was to analyze and 
assess how pieces of evidence fit together in such a way that is indicative of corroboration.  The 
lessons emerging from the analysis of the case study is not that claims 1-5 are false.  Instead, the 
lessons are that the fundamental assumptions shared by reductionist and non-reductionist 
accounts of progress and fitting together is more complicated than assumed by the literature (and 
that this assumption requires further philosophical attention), that my working definition of IC 
required refinement (i.e., the addition of the fact that the findings must be consistent in such a 
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way that they rule out coincidence, error, alternative hypotheses, etc.), and that certain critical 
pieces of information are lacking to adequately address the extent to which the corroboration of 
claims 1-5 has occurred. 
4.3 A Methodology for Evaluating Review Papers for Corroboration 
If philosophers are interested in knowledge production and want to assess how pieces of 
evidence from different areas of science amalgamate to produce better and epistemically stronger 
claims, there are certain questions and concerns that should be raised towards the units of 
analysis (e.g. different types of review papers) which allegedly do this work.  In virtue of this, I 
use the questions and concerns prompted by my analysis in this chapter to advance the following 
itemized list as a methodology for analyzing review papers with an eye towards corroboration in 
the mind-brain sciences.  Importantly, I consider this methodology to be a working framework; 
as more research is conducted on different units of analysis and IC, I suspect the list (as well as 
my current definition of IC) will change. 
Factors to consider in evaluating review papers for corroboration: 
1.1. What is the main aim of the review paper? 
1.2. What are the main claims advanced in the review?  Are those claims implicit, explicit, or 
both? 
1.3. How does the author argue for those claims?  Are their arguments implicit or explicit?  Do 
the arguments depend on any specific terms?  What other important factors do their 
arguments hinge on? 
1.4. What kind of language does the author use to describe the findings they cite in support of 
their claims?  What are the key terms used in the paper to relate the different cited findings?  
Does the author provide a definition of those terms?  Are those terms qualitatively or 
quantitatively defined? 
1.5. Are the cited findings interdisciplinary?  I.e., does the author include evidence from multiple 
areas of the mind-brain sciences?  Are the species, tasks, and methods of analysis varied in 
the cited papers? 
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1.6. How current are the cited findings?  Does the author draw primarily on current research on a 
topic, or do they include older papers as well? 
1.7. Does the author primarily report findings from research papers, or do they elaborate on those 
findings, explaining the tasks and methods used in each and how they fit together with other 
cited findings?   
1.8. Does the author report the conclusion of a given research paper as the cited finding, or is it 
one of many findings from various tasks in the paper?  Are there other findings in the cited 
paper that might complicate the picture the author of the review paper is painting? 
1.9. Does the author evaluate the methods involved in the cited findings and state how they 
constitute reliable pieces of information?  Are there other aspects of the review that make up 
for the lack of an assessment of the methods of the cited papers (if such a lack is present in 
the review paper) such that the reliability of the cited findings remains intact? 
1.10.   How is coincidence ruled out in the review paper?  How are random errors and 
alternative hypotheses ruled out? 
1.11. Does the author include any contradictory or anomalous pieces of evidence?  If yes, how 
many findings fall under these categories?  How are they dealt with, and does the author 
provide sufficient reasons for why those anomalous findings can justifiably be dismissed?  
1.12.  Does there review explicitly adhere to a standardized guideline (e.g., the Cochrane 
Handbook)? 
1.13.  If no such standardized guideline is used, does the author include a methods section 
wherein they describe and justify the methods they use in their review. 
1.14. Does the author describe their selection criteria and search process wherein they state 
which journal databases they consulted, their criteria for inclusion and omission, etc.? 
1.15. What measures does the author use to reduce risk of bias in the individual papers they 
cite in the review? 
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1.16. Does the author co-author any of the cited papers?  If so, how many?  How does this 
potential risk of author bias factor into corroboration? 
1.17. What methods does the author use to combine (i.e., synthesize) the findings in the review 
paper?  Is a meta-analysis involved or is the combining qualitative?  If qualitative, how is the 
combining justified?  How are anomalous and/or contradictory findings factored into this 
synthesis? 
1.18. What kind of corroboration is represented in the review paper?  Is it one of confirmation, 
lending support, or something else? 
1.19. Does the author include/flag any limitations their review may be subject to?  Do they flag 
any gaps in their arguments?  Do they acknowledge any potentially complicating factors that 
decrease the likelihood of their main claims being corroborated? 
This list is meant to be read as a working framework.  As I note, in section 4.4. of this chapter, 
future research on different types of units of analysis will likely yield important implications for 
this methodology (i.e., it may be the case that the list is expanded, certain questions are refined, 
or that different types of units of analysis require their own methodology, thus resulting in a 
plurality or a hierarchy of methodologies for evaluating corroboration in the mind-brain sciences, 
etc.).   
4.4 Questions and Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation only begins to scratch the surface of the epistemic role of review papers for IC 
in the mind-brain sciences.  In this dissertation, I analyzed one specific case study; however, one 
case study is not sufficient for drawing conclusive claims about the nature of IC and its relation 
to scientific progress.  Future projects might involve comparing multiple Trends reviews to 
discern whether my findings were simply coincidental, then comparing a Trends review paper 
with a systematic review paper to see whether and to what extent the additional component of a 
methods and materials section increases the integrity of corroboration at play in the case study.  I 
see the next step of this process as looking at systematic reviews with meta-analysis.145  Another 
 
145
 Review papers are one way to explore whether interdisciplinary evidence fits together in a way that 
corroborates claims about the mind-brain.  I conducted an analysis of a Trends review paper in my dissertation and 
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project might be analyzing these units of analysis in the of context big data projects (e.g., 
BrainMap) and open science.   
As qualitative (and quantitative) analysis software programs such as NVIVO12 develop over 
time, a more fine-tuned analysis of the case study I analyze in this dissertation may also be 
possible; this may result in a more nuanced definition of IC and a modified methodology for 
evaluating review papers for corroboration.   
As more research is conducted on the nature of IC and different units of analysis that do this 
work, I suspect my current definition of IC will undergo refinement, and that my methodology 
will similarly undergo revision.  Moreover, I did not elaborate on the methodology I advance in 
section 4.3 or provide different methodologies for assessing different types of units of analysis 
for research synthesis.  Perhaps, as more comparative analyses are conducted (e.g., a Trends 
review paper with a systematic review, or a systematic review with a systematic review 
including a meta-analysis, etc.), it might be revealed that a plurality of methodologies is best 
suited for the task of evaluating different kinds of units of analysis that synthesize research 
across different areas of science. 
Another important question with respect to evaluating IC in the mind-brain sciences via units of 
analysis such as review papers is whether the mind-brain sciences require their own distinct 
guideline/handbook/checklist such as the Cochrane handbook for the health sciences.  I noted in 
my second chapter that the standards for organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration in the 
health sciences are not applicable to the mind-brain sciences, in virtue of the latter synthesizing 
information from a variety of areas of the mind-brain sciences, using different methods, 
protocols, and techniques.  As such, future research might involve the advocacy of such an 
organization or list of criteria and identify what standards must change and why.  In doing so, 
one might look to the standards of organizations such as the Cochrane Collaboration and identify 
 
found that the pieces of interdisciplinary evidence in the case study did not fit together as neatly nor as clearly as 
would be required for corroboration.  I see the next stage of my research as systematically moving through various 
units of analysis that appear to do the work required for IC; this includes units of analysis such as systematic 
reviews with meta-analysis/various types of meta-analyses.   
For a different view of where to look for the fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence, see Sullivan (2016), who 
is skeptical of meta-analyses and thinks the best strategy is to look at actual ground-work practices in labs.  
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whether any of their standards should be included in the criteria for writing reviews in the mind-
brain sciences and which new ones need to be introduced in virtue of the mind-brain sciences 
being distinct from disciplines like the health sciences. 
Future research might also address the question of what aspects of scientific papers are being 
cited in the review paper.  That is, scientific research papers typically include detailed 
descriptions of different tasks and the results of those tasks; there are frequently more than just 
one very specific finding in a given scientific paper.  For example, Buhusi and Meck (2005) 
highlighted multiple brain structure/networks involved in numerous timing tasks; despite this, 
Eichenbaum selectively focused on one vague aspect – i.e., the fact that there are multiple 
sources of temporal information in the brain – while excluding information about the many areas 
and networks in the brain that were activated during various timing tasks.  One might therefore 
investigate what parts of the cited scientific research papers are being included in the review in 
question and what parts are omitted.  This is an important question because it has the potential to 
impact the corroboration of a given claim.  If a claim states something along the lines of “the 
hippocampus is the key structure involved in spatio-temporal memory”, and the author 
selectively focuses on aspects of papers highlighting hippocampal activation while excluding 
findings demonstrating activation in other areas, one might question just how epistemically 
warranted that claim is.  This leads to my final point. 
Finally, future research might involve advocating for a methods section in future Trends review 
papers.  That is, especially if the review does not adhere to standardized guidelines such as those 
included in the Cochrane handbook, the inclusion of a methods section wherein the author states 
their selection criteria, defines their key terms, identifies their main claims, states how the studies 
they cite were screened for bias and error in individual papers, etc., may help the reader better 
assess the extent of corroboration in review papers, thereby increasing the integrity of the review 
in question. 
In sum, I demonstrated that a lack of definitions for critical terms like ‘substantial evidence’, 
‘numerous studies’, ‘consistency’, etc., makes it difficult to assess the extent of corroboration at 
play in the case study.  This, in addition to a lack of adequate explanations for anomalous 
findings and an evaluation of the methods used by the papers Eichenbaum cites in support of 
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claims 1-5 complicate the case study representing a clear case of IC.  I showcased three 
implications of my analysis.  First, the assumption held by the accounts of progress I surveyed in 
chapter one is complex and requires further philosophical analysis.  Secondly, my working 
definition as introduced in chapter two required revision; my new definition added that IC 
required that interdisciplinary evidence be consistent in such a way that rules out coincidence, 
errors, and alternative explanations.  Thirdly, I argued that critical information was missing in 
the case study to adequately assess the extent to which claims 1-5 were corroborated.  I used the 
lessons and the questions/concerns I addressed in this chapter to serve as criteria for my 
methodology for evaluating review papers with an eye towards corroboration. 
In the following chapter, I conclude my dissertation by re-capitulating my main aim, how I 
achieved it, the results of my analysis, as well as how I think my results generalize out into other 
areas of philosophy and science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
Chapter 5 
5 Conclusion 
 
My goal in this dissertation was to analyze what it means for information from different areas of 
science to fit together in such a way that results in strong epistemic claims by addressing the 
question of how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific 
practice.   
To address how and to what extent claims about the mind-brain are corroborated in scientific 
practice, I began by establishing the relevant historical and motivational background for my 
dissertation in chapter one.  This involved surveying a number of reductionist (Nagel 1949, 
1961, 1979; Bickle 1998, 2003, 2006) and non-reductionist accounts (Darden and Maull, 1977; 
Mitchell 2002, 2003; Mitchell and Dietrich 2006; Darden 2006; Roskies 2010; Piccinini and 
Craver 2011) of scientific progress emphasizing the notion of fitting for claims about the mind-
brain to stand on firm epistemic footing.  I noted that while they all concede that interdisciplinary 
evidence must fit together to produce strong epistemic claims, each notion of fitting together 
(e.g., ruthless reduction for Bickle (2003, 2006), ‘convergence’ for Roskies (2010), etc.)) was 
vague in that it was unclear from their accounts and their examples what it meant for pieces to fit 
together in such a way that ‘conclusive evidence’ is provided for a claim about the mind-brain 
(Roskies 2010, 641). 
To better understand how evidence fits together to yield strong epistemic claims, I introduced the 
term ‘interdisciplinary corroboration’ (hereafter IC) as a general placeholder for what I think 
philosophers of science have been gesturing towards, but which has yet to be clearly articulated 
and analyzed in chapter two.  My working definition of IC stated findings corroborate claims 
about the mind-brain when they all point towards a general claim and when said findings are 
interdisciplinary, consistent, and mutually supportive.  The accounts of progress I survey in 
chapter one all claim that the fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence results in epistemically 
strong claims; implicit in their accounts is an argument that claims about the mind-brain (e.g., the 
frontal region is involved in semantic processing (Roskies 2010, 641)) are corroborated by the 
fitting together of interdisciplinary evidence.  For this reason, I introduced IC as a general 
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placeholder for these accounts to facilitate my analysis of how interdisciplinary evidence fits 
together to corroborate claims about the mind-brain. 
Since my definition of IC was introduced as a working definition, it required further analysis to 
better understand the nature of IC in the mind-brain sciences.  To better understand how IC 
functions to corroborate claims about the mind-brain, I suggested looking for instances of it in 
practice.  I argued that a good place to start assessing IC in practice was by looking at review 
papers, which are units of analysis surveying literature from a variety of disciplines on a given 
topic.  Some review papers simply contain a literature review; however, many review papers also 
contain arguments (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit).  These arguments can involve 
showing how a given claim about the mind-brain is supported by the evidence cited in the review 
paper (i.e., showing how the interdisciplinary evidence fits together to corroborate a claim about 
the mind-brain).  Review papers are therefore ideal units of analysis to begin investigating the 
nature of IC and addressing the extent to which corroboration occurs in these papers. 
To address the questions of how and to what extent corroboration of claims about the mind-brain 
occur in review papers, I conducted a two-part analysis in chapters three and four of a case study 
of a Trends review paper entitled ‘Memory on Time’ by Eichenbaum (2013).   
I began my analysis with some cursory criteria.  That is, I came to the table with a general 
understanding of how Trends reviews function through my descriptive work in chapter two.  
Further, my analysis was guided by cursory criteria such as the following questions: “what is the 
main aim of the review”, “what claims does Eichenbaum defend”, “how does Eichenbaum show 
support for his claims”, “what kind of arguments does Eichenbaum provide”, and “does the case 
study represent IC”?  My analysis in chapter three, guided by this criteria and knowledge of 
Trends review papers, was structured around the work Eichenbaum did in the case study to 
support claims 1-5.  I stated Eichenbaum’s arguments for claims 1-5 were implicit and that his 
implicit arguments hinged on terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistency’ (Eichenbaum 
2013, 82-84, 86).  That is, claims 1-5 are corroborated insofar as they are supported and 
suggested by ‘substantial evidence’ consisting of findings from different areas of the mind-brain 
sciences, on different species, using different tasks and methods of analysis, all of which are 
consistent with each other and its associated claim.  An analysis of the language used in the case 
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study revealed that the kind of corroboration at play was one where claims 1-5 are best 
understood as being highly probable, but not full-stop true.  I further argued that because the 
cited findings were published in mind-brain science journals with high impact factors and 
citation numbers, the cited findings appear to constitute reliable sources of information.  This 
increases the strength of corroboration in the case study.  On a first pass, the case study appeared 
to represent a strong case of IC. 
However, my analysis structured around what Eichenbaum does to support claims 1-5 gave rise 
to questions and concerns such as: “what counts as substantial evidence”, “what is meant by 
consistency in the case study”, and “how are anomalies factored into the findings supporting 
claims 1-5”.  These questions led me to ask how well the case study represented IC after all.   
I used these questions to guide the second part of my analysis, which I conducted in chapter four.  
While my analysis in chapter three focused on the work Eichenbaum did to support claims 1-5, 
my analysis in chapter four focused on what was absent in the case study.  That is, definitions for 
key terms like ‘substantial evidence’ and ‘consistent with’ were lacking; because Eichenbaum’s 
arguments for claims 1-5 implicitly depend on these terms, it is crucial to understand how 
Eichenbaum uses these terms.  However, because Eichenbaum provides no definitions or 
explanations of these terms, it is challenging to evaluate the extent to which claims 1-5 have 
been corroborated.  Further, because the anomalous findings introduced in the case study are 
inadequately addressed/explained by Eichenbaum, it is unclear how all the cited findings fit 
together; Eichenbaum does not tell us.  In elaborating on these three questions, I noticed another 
aspect missing in the case study was an evaluation of the methods used by the cited findings; 
because of this, it is hard to discern whether the methods used in the cited papers are reliable.  If 
the methods used by the cited papers were unsound, the cited findings would comprise unreliable 
pieces of information, thus discrediting or putting pressure on the corroboration of claims 1-5.  
Taken together, these questions and the concerns they raise complicated the case study 
representing a clear case of IC. 
I then stepped back from the analysis in the second half of chapter four to showcase three key 
lessons emerging from the analysis.  The first lesson is that the fundamental assumptions shared 
by both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of progress I surveyed in chapter one – i.e., 
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that epistemically strong claims are the result of evidence from different areas of science fitting 
together – is complex and not nearly as straightforward as the literature makes it out to be.  The 
second lesson is that my working definition of IC needed to be revised.  IC should now be 
understood as a phenomenon whereby findings corroborate claims about the mind-brain insofar 
as they are interdisciplinary, and mutually supportive/consistent in such a way that rules out 
coincidence, errors, and alternative hypotheses, and all point towards a similar claim.  The third 
lesson from my analysis is that certain critical pieces of information were missing to adequately 
assess the extent to which claims 1-5 were corroborated.  I used the missing information and the 
concerns that arose during my analysis of the case study to advance a methodology for 
evaluating review papers in the mind-brain sciences for corroboration. 
The contributions of my dissertation to philosophy of the mind-brain sciences are twofold.  First, 
I demonstrated that a fundamental assumption shared by numerous accounts of progress in the 
philosophy of the mind-brain sciences – i.e., that epistemically strong claims are the result of 
evidence from different areas of science fitting together – was not as clear as the literature 
presumed it to be.  Accordingly, I showcased that more philosophical attention is required to 
better understand how interdisciplinary pieces of evidence fit together to corroborate claims 
about the mind-brain.  I began this work by advancing the concept of IC and analyzing a case 
study of a review paper to start to get a handle on how IC works in practice.  My analysis 
revealed critical information was missing in the case study to properly determine whether and to 
what extent its claims were corroborated.  The implications of this for philosophers of the mind-
brain sciences interested in knowledge production is that more work needs to be conducted on 
different units of analysis that function to corroborate claims about the mind-brain (such as 
comparing a Trends review with a Frontiers review, or a Frontiers review with a review with 
meta-analyses, etc.).  The more research conducted on the different units of analysis that function 
to corroborate claims about the mind-brain, the more one can elaborate and fine-tune both my 
working definition of IC as well as the methodology I advance to evaluate review papers for 
corroboration. The point is not that the assumption held by reductionist and non-reductionist 
accounts of progress is false; instead, my contribution is to demonstrate that the assumption 
(which to date has been under-analyzed and unquestioned) is complex, and that future research 
should continue to examine this assumption and its implications for knowledge production and 
scientific progress. 
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My second contribution to the philosophy of the mind-brain sciences is the methodology I 
advance in my fourth chapter for evaluating review papers for corroboration.  That is, if 
philosophers of the mind-brain sciences are interested in how claims about the mind-brain are 
corroborated by evidence from different areas of science, there are certain questions and 
concerns that should be addressed in assessing the corroboration of claims in units of analysis 
such as review papers.  My methodology outlines the questions and concerns I deem important to 
be addressed in evaluating the corroboration of claims in review papers.   
It should be acknowledged my methodology is meant to be a working framework.  My hope is 
that as more research is conducted, my methodology will become more fine-tuned.  One 
limitation of my methodology is that since the dissertation is the beginning of what will 
hopefully be an ongoing investigation of the role of IC in the mind-brain sciences, my 
methodology pertains primarily to Trends review papers.  Future research might address how 
different kinds of units of analysis corroborate claims about the mind-brain.  For example, such 
projects might involve examining a systematic review, or comparing a Trends review paper with 
a systematic review, or comparing reviews with different types of meta-analyses, etc.  As these 
units of analysis involve different components (i.e., some include meta-analysis, some do not; 
some include a methods section, some do not, etc.), it may turn out that a plurality of 
methodologies for approaching IC in the mind-brain sciences is necessary. 
More generally, my dissertation has implications for philosophy of science and empirically 
engaged philosophy of mind.  With respect to the former, other areas of science similarly draw 
on interdisciplinary evidence to corroborate claims.  For example, multiple pieces of evidence 
from cosmology, chemistry, and particle physics come together to corroborate the existence of 
dark matter.146  Here, one might ask whether and to what extent these pieces of evidence 
corroborate the existence of dark matter.  To address this, one might consider various units of 
analysis demonstrating the corroboration of dark matter and appeal to some of the questions I 
flag in my methodology to evaluate whether the hypothesis about the existence of dark matter 
has been corroborated.  Conversely, one might appeal to this list to evaluate alternative theories 
concerning dark matter such as the Modified Newtonian Dynamics theory and the Tensor-
 
146
 I am grateful to Dr. Marie Gueguen for this point. 
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Vector-Scalar gravity theory.147  Appealing to my methodology in other areas of science outside 
the mind-brain sciences may therefore help assess units of analysis for the corroboration (or lack 
thereof) of dark matter hypotheses in physics.148 
My dissertation also has implications for empirically engaged philosophy of mind.  That is, in 
the philosophy of mind, philosophers sometimes appeal to empirical research on a given topic in 
order to argue for (or against) a philosophical position.  For example, in their paper ‘Neural 
Plasticity and Consciousness’, Hurley and Noë (2003) argue for a dynamic sensorimotor account 
of consciousness that allegedly bridges some versions of the explanatory gap problem.  In 
arguing for their account of consciousness and how it solves some explanatory gap problems, 
Hurley and Noë appeal to scientific evidence to support the main claims behind their account.  I 
will not get into the specifics of their arguments, nor how it deals with explanatory gap problems, 
but instead want to highlight the fact that their account of consciousness hinges on empirical 
work on neural plasticity demonstrating that the cortex both dominates (here they cite 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998) and defers (here they cite 
Buchel et al. 1998; Cohen et al. 1997; Sadato et al. 1996, 1998) (Hurley and Noë 2003, 133-
134).   
Since their account depends on this cited empirical evidence, if a philosopher of mind wanted to 
argue against Hurley and Noë’s account, a crucial step would be demonstrating that the empirical 
evidence upon which their account is based is weak.  Using some of the questions I outline in my 
methodology might help the reader better assess the empirical literature for strong epistemic 
claims, therefore making a stronger case against Hurley and Noë (2003) if it turns out that the 
papers they cite and their respective findings are not well-established.  Conversely, a philosopher 
of mind might appeal to my methodology to identify strong empirical claims from review papers 
and cite those to support some of their own arguments about the mind. 
In sum, via my analysis of Eichenbaum’s (2003) ‘Memory on Time’, I demonstrated that pieces 
of evidence may not fit together as neatly as one would require for the corroboration of a claim.  
This does not entail that the assumption that strong conclusions require evidence from multiple 
 
147
 Again, I am grateful to Dr. Marie Gueguen for this point. 
148
 This example generalizes out in similar ways to other hypotheses in physics and other areas of science. 
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fields of science is false, but that the assumption is complex and requires more philosophical 
attention to better understand how claims are corroborated in the mind-brain sciences.  The 
methodology I advance at the end of chapter four is meant as a guide for philosophers of science 
to better assess the epistemic strength of claims emerging out of review papers.  Future research 
will help expand on this methodology as more work on the nature of IC is conducted. 
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